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Overview and Executive Summary 
 
The State Government initiated the review of the west coast rock lobster management 
system in March 2002.  The purpose of this review paper is to present the options for 
managing the fishery and to compare the current fishing effort control system to a 
more flexible one and to two types of individually transferable quota (ITQ) 
management systems, one with the current effort controls and the other without or 
with reduced1 effort controls. 
 
The State Government does not have a preconceived idea as to what is the best 
management system, rather it has an expectation that the review process will identify 
the best long-term and strategic approach for managing the fishery to produce the best 
socio-economic outcomes for the State, within an ecologically sustainable 
development framework. 
 
This report also includes an overview of the major findings of three specialist reports 
prepared for the review that should be read in conjunction with it.  The specialist 
reports provide important detailed information on different aspects of the management 
review: 
 
• Bio-Economic Modelling – Compares the economic benefits that can be 
realised under different fishing effort and quota management systems.  The 
paper is titled A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the 
West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, by Economic Research Associates, 2005. 
• Social Research – Presents the initial findings of research on the possible 
social impacts of fishing effort and quota management systems, particularly on 
small coastal communities.  The paper is titled A Social Assessment of Coastal 
Communities Hosting the Western Rock Lobster Fishing Fleet, by the Institute 
for Regional Development, University of Western Australia, 2005.2 
• Quota Experience in Other Rock Lobster Fisheries – Describes the rock 
lobster quota management experience in South Australia, Tasmania and New 
Zealand.  The paper is titled How do Quota Management Systems Work in 
Rock Lobster Fisheries?  The Experience in New Zealand, Tasmania and 
South Australia, by Tim Bray, Steven Gill and Ron Edwards, Department of 
Fisheries, 2005. 
 
[This paper and the three associated reports listed above are available on the 
Department of Fisheries’ web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au or the Western Rock 
Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobsterwa.com and hard copies are available 
by contacting the Department on (08) 9482 7267.] 
 
Because of the very large amount of information that has been provided as 
background for the management review, this overview has been included to help 
                                                 
1 The ITQ system without effort controls that was modelled for this review does not have uncontrolled 
effort.  It has been limited to a 20 per cent increase in the number of pots fishers can use because 
experience in other ITQ lobster fisheries has shown that fishers do not use excessive numbers of pots, 
when controls on pot numbers are removed. 
2 This is a three-year project funded by the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation. 
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focus readers’ attention on some of the most important issues that are discussed in 
more detail in this report and the three accompanying specialist reports. 
 
The rock lobster fishery has had a long history of fishing effort controls dating back to 
1963 when the fishery became limited entry.  Many regulations were introduced in the 
20 years after 1963 to try to control and slow the continual growth in fishing effort 
that scientists feared would eventually lead to overfishing and a collapse of the lobster 
breeding stock.  As the fishing effort controls became more numerous and complex, 
they began to impinge on the flexibility of fishing operations and significant 
economic inefficiencies began to emerge.  The industry pushed hard for management 
reforms to alleviate these problems and over the next 20 years some of the very tight 
effort control rules, particularly the strict boat replacement policy, were relaxed (see 
section headed History of Regulation of the Western Rock Lobster Fishery for further 
details). 
 
Unfortunately, while relaxing some of the effort control rules has given fishers greater 
flexibility, it has also allowed effective fishing effort to increase at a faster rate than it 
would have otherwise, and pot reduction programs have had to be implemented to 
counteract it, i.e. 10 per cent in 1986, 18 per cent in 1993 and 10 per cent for part of 
the season in Zone A and B in 2005. 
 
The Western Rock Lobster Fishery is currently ecologically sustainable and 
profitable, however, it is facing unprecedented economic challenges both in the short- 
and long-term due to rising costs (e.g. fuel, bait, labour) and reduced prices for the 
catch (a decline of about 20 per cent in real terms over the last 10 years).  The current 
economic conditions and the recent management process to decide on the fishing 
effort reduction package for 2005-06 has raised considerable interest among fishers 
with regard to how the current effort control management system would compare to 
other management systems, particularly individual transferable quotas (ITQs). 
 
Some people believe the rock lobster industry is at a “management crossroads” – 
should it stay with the current effort control system, or move to an ITQ system?  
These people are of the view that despite some uncertainty and issues surrounding 
ITQs, they have the potential to deliver significantly different economic and social 
benefits compared to the current management system.  Others would argue that the 
current system has served the fishery well for more than 40 years and “if it ain’t 
broke, don’t fix it”. 
 
Detailed economic modelling and social and fisheries management research has 
identified a number of major issues that readers need to be aware of while reading the 
detail of this review. 
Key Issues 
Rules to protect the breeding stock  
 
No matter what management system is used, the breeding stock must be maintained at 
levels above those of the late 1970s to ensure the sustainability of the fishery.  It will 
be necessary to retain the current breeding stock decision rules framework, with its 
trigger points for management action. 
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Accuracy of the bio-economic model 
 
Economic Research Associates (ERA), the consultants who have undertaken the 
economic modelling of the Western Rock Lobster Fishery have obtained their 
information from a survey of fishers (postal questionnaire – 21 fishers responded), 
detailed discussions with focus groups of fishers, processors, research scientists and 
managers, scientific publications, Department of Fisheries’ databases, and the 
Australian Bureau of Statistics. The information has been collected in order to 
develop the assumptions that underpin the model.  ERA have tested the model outputs 
against the historical fishery information (e.g. catch and fishing effort, catch rate 
(kg/pot lift), distribution of catch by month, boat and pot numbers, and beach prices) 
and the fits are good.  Therefore, ERA believe the model is behaving in a realistic and 
reliable way and that the model outputs provide robust estimates of what would 
happen to the fishery under the different management options, based on the 
assumptions used. 
 
It is impossible to model the behaviour of each individual boat/business in the fishery. 
Therefore, by necessity, the model used what is called an “average” or 
“representative” boat/business for Zones A, B and C.  The behaviour of the 
representative boat/business is modelled under the different assumptions (e.g. price 
and efficiency increases) for each management option and the results are then applied 
to the entire fleet in each zone.  In reality, individual businesses will have different 
capital and cost structures. However, the model provides a good indication of what 
would happen on a total fleet basis. 
 
For example, under the ITQ system without controls on pot numbers,3 the model 
predicts that fishers (the representative boat/business) would make changes to their 
normal fishing patterns to maximise their profits.  For instance, such a change might 
involve catching some of their quota in July-August when the price is higher and the 
increase in pot efficiency could allow them to work two- and three-day pulls very 
economically.  The model shows that the normal catch peaks in the whites and the 
reds are still present but are reduced a little, which allows more rock lobsters to be 
available at traditionally low catch rate periods and during the extended season, when 
prices are higher.  The model appears to be realistic in that it does not allow fishers 
(the representative boat/business) to concentrate their entire quota in periods of high 
price, because catchability in those periods is low and only a modest portion of the 
quota could be taken at that time. 
 
To give an indication of how “realistic” the model outputs are, the average number of 
pot lifts and the average catch (kg) per month for Zone C are shown below as 
examples of what the model estimates for some of the different management options.  
Note that graphs 3c and 3d and 4c and 4d overlay each other, so it is difficult to 
distinguish between them. 
 
                                                 
3 Under this option pot usage was allowed to increase by 20 per cent, the fishing season was extended 
to 31 August, there was an increase in the beach price in certain months of the season (particularly 
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Zone C: Pot lifts by month 
 
[Note:  Sc = Scenario; Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current 
management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3c and 3d = variable ITQ with the 
current effort (pot number) controls and price increases of $2.00/kg and $1.00/kg respectively; 
Scenario 4c and 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are 
increased by 20 per cent, and price increases of $2.50/kg and $1.25/kg respectively.  Graphs 3c and 3d 
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 Zone C: Catch by month  
 
[Note:  Sc = Scenario; Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current 
management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3c and 3d = variable ITQ with the 
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current effort (pot number) controls and price increases of $2.00/kg and $1.00/kg respectively; 
Scenario 4c and 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are 
increased by 20 per cent, and price increases of $2.50/kg and $1.25/kg respectively.  Graphs 3c and 3d 
and 4c and 4d overlay each other, so it is difficult to distinguish between them.] 
 
One factor that has not been modelled, which would be likely to have a significant 
impact on fishers’ behaviour and the potential $ benefits that could be gained by 
moving to an ITQ system, is the start time for the quota season.  For instance, if the 
quota season started in February or May, fishers would use different fishing strategies 
to what they would use for a traditional November start. 
Modelling fleet efficiency/economic gains 
 
An important aspect of the bio-economic modelling was to determine if any of the 
management options offered additional gains in fleet efficiency, that is, greater annual 
net economic benefits ($ profits) compared to the current system.  In the model, the 
fleet efficiency gains were calculated using the assumptions around the increases in 
pot efficiency (obtained by changes in pot design) and the optimisation of fleet size, 
while taking into account the costs of fishing.  These gains were expressed as 
reductions in boat numbers.  That is, economic theory implies (and the model 
assumes) that fewer boats in the fleet means more catch per boat = lower costs/kg of 
lobsters caught.  This, in turn, means a more efficient fleet overall and greater net 
profits. 
 
However, increasing fleet efficiency and net profits does not necessarily just involve 
boats leaving the fishery.  Fleet efficiency and net profits can also be increased, 
particularly under an ITQ system, if fishers reduce their individual operating costs, 
e.g. use smaller, less costly and more economic boats and implement strategies to 
save on fuel, bait, labour costs and so on.  Therefore, the significant economic gains 
($), due to fleet efficiency increases (the significant reduction in boat numbers), that 
the model has predicted for the ITQ system without effort controls are, in practice, 
more than likely to be made up of a combination of reduced operating costs and fewer 
boats, rather than just fewer boats in the fleet.4
 
It is possible that the bio-economic model overestimates boat reductions for ITQs 
without effort (pot number) controls (Option 4). 
Pot reductions and economic efficiency gains 
 
Bio-economic modelling shows that under the current effort control management 
system, a pot reduction (e.g. 20 per cent, at two per cent per year over 10 years) would 
drive fleet rationalisation (i.e. reduce the number of boats) faster than the current 
system with no pot reduction, but not to the same extent as an ITQ without controls on 
effort (pots numbers).  A 20 per cent pot reduction would also result in slightly greater 
fleet efficiency/economic ($) benefits than the current system, but it would not yield 
the same $ benefits as ITQs.  This is due to the competitive nature of fishing under the 
current system and with a 20 per cent pot reduction, which provides less opportunity 
for fishers to reduce operating costs.  Therefore, the efficiency gains estimated by the 
                                                 
4 The current bio-economic model cannot provide separate estimates of the economic gains that can be 
attributed to reductions in boat numbers compared to reductions in individual boat operating costs. 
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model for the current system and the 20% pot reduction option are significantly lower 
than for ITQs, and the majority of the gains would come through a reduction in the 
number of boats, i.e. the fleet could comprise fewer boats with larger numbers of pots. 
Uncertainty around the economic benefits of ITQs 
 
The potential benefits of ITQs predicted from the bio-economic modelling are derived 
from hypothetical price increases and efficiency gains that industry representatives 
considered reasonable.  There are risks that these gains may not be fully realised, 
however, the model has to make assumptions on how the fleet could behave under 
different conditions associated with the various management options. 
 
Hypothetical price increase of up to $5.50/kg for the whole season 
 
The price increases are based on the best judgements of processors and marketers 
against the background of the uncertainties of international market conditions.  The 
price increases apply to the total catch over a year and are composed of: 
 
• $2/kg due to the longer season of supply – November to August (this applies 
to the more flexible effort control and the ITQ options that were modelled); 
• $1.50 to $3.00/kg if quotas result in a more stable supply of product from 
season to season; and 
• $0.50/kg if quotas result in a more stable supply of product within a season, 
i.e. catch is spread a little more evenly throughout the season (lower catch 
peaks in the whites and reds). 
 
If these hypothetical price increases did not materialise as an additional benefit on top 
of the normal price fluctuations caused by changes in exchange rate or economic 
conditions, then the potential economic benefits of an ITQ system with or without 
effort controls would be reduced. This would considerably reduce the economic 
incentive to change the current management system.  To allow for this uncertainty, the 
model used a conservative $1.00/kg increase in price for one of the ITQ options.  The 
sensitivity of the model’s estimates of average annual $ benefits to increases in price 
is discussed under Sensitivity of $ benefits to increases in price/kg in the section titled 
Comparisons Between Effort And Quota Management Systems – Results Of Bio-
economic Modelling. 
 
Hypothetical efficiency gains from changes in pot design 
 
It is estimated that changes in pot design (e.g. larger pots with side entrances, parlour 
pots that stop escapement, etc) could yield catching efficiency increases of between 
15 per cent and 40 per cent.  This would mean that a fisher could use more efficient 
pots to reduce overall operating costs by reducing the number of pots used.  This 
could result in the purchase of a smaller, more economic boat and lower fuel, bait, 
labour costs and so on.  The model shows that there are significant economic benefits 







Modelled efficiency gains from boat reductions 
 
The modelling results for ITQs showed the potential for significant increases in fleet 
efficiency (hence annual $ benefits) that could flow from a large reduction in the 
number of boats in the fishery.  This was particularly so for the ITQ system without 
(reduced) fishing effort controls (i.e. fishers could use up to 20 per cent more pots 
than they currently use and the pots could be up to 40 per cent more efficient at 
catching), where the number of boats declined from 549 to 256.  In practice, the $ 
gains from increases in fleet efficiency may not be as great as predicted by the model 
because: 
 
o the reduction in boat numbers could be less than predicted; 
o efficiency gains assumed for a significantly smaller fleet size may not be as 
large as anticipated; and  
o the decline in boat numbers may occur over a long period of time. 
 
If the efficiency gains were not as great as predicted and/or were slow to materialise, 
the benefits of ITQ systems (particularly with reduced effort controls) could be lower 
than the model estimates. 
Processing and Marketing 
 
At present, it appears that the processing sector is competitive and most of the value 
of the catch flows to fishers.  Fishers do little or no product promotion themselves and 
the current small margins on processing mean that in general processors have limited 
funds to invest in marketing, for example doing large promotions or advertising, 
developing and promoting specific brands, developing a larger product range, etc.  
This could change if there was a shift to ITQs and processors could gain extra benefits 
in the market place.  Under ITQs processors would be able to signal to fishers the best 
time to take their quota to maximise the $ return in the market place.  Some of the 
additional $ benefits obtained could be used to do more market promotion to try and 
develop a premium price for western rock lobster, compared to other lobsters.  In 
addition, processors could also secure control over quantities of quota, which could 
provide them with greater $ returns, some of which could be directed back into market 
promotion. 
Values of unit (pot) entitlements and ITQs 
 
In this review no attempt was made to model (predict) the possible changes in the 
value of unit (pot) entitlements or ITQs that may occur under the different 
management options.  This is because it is difficult to fully understand the factors that 
drive prices; they appear to be a mixture of economic forces and fisher and investor 
sentiments5.  In addition, fishers and investors have alternative investment 
opportunities that they take into consideration and the market for entitlements is 
small, which means scarcity can also affect prices.  The prime focus of the review is 
                                                 
5 For example after the 18 per cent pot reduction in 1993 some fishers wanted to buy pots to get back to 
their original number for economic reasons, while others just wanted to have the same number of pots 
they had previously. 
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on the net economic benefits that can be derived from the different management 
options. 
Time required to realise the benefits of ITQs 
 
If the fishery moved to ITQs, it may take as long as one generation of fishers to 
realise the full potential economic benefits.  The time would depend largely on two 
factors: 
 
• how quickly the management system could be deregulated under ITQs to 
allow fishers to design more efficient pots and to use more pots (e.g. up to 20 
per cent more) to catch their quota.  Deregulation could only proceed if it did 
not impact adversely on the sustainability of the stock and the integrity of the 
management and enforcement system (particularly the control of the black 
market for illegal catch); and 
• how rapidly the industry (fishers, processors and marketers) would adjust to 
the new ITQ system and deliver the price increases (processors would need to 
play a lead role) and efficiency gains (fishers would have to reduce their 
operating costs and boats would have to retire from the fishery). 
Risks associated with constant (fixed), variable and competitive quotas 
 
If it was decided to move an ITQ system there are two ways of setting the quota: 
 
• a constant quota which does not vary from year to year (i.e. it could be set for 
5, 10 or more years at a time), or  
• a variable quota based on catch predictions, which could vary each year. 
 
Modelling has shown that the annual $ benefits of a constant quota are greater than for 
a variable quota system.  However, there is a far greater risk of depleting the breeding 
stock under a constant quota (particularly during poor recruitment years), unless it is 
set at a very conservative level6, which then significantly reduces the $ benefits.  
Therefore from a sustainability and economic perspective the use of a constant quota 
from year to year would be difficult to justify.  So while a constant quota has been 
modelled and reported on as part of this review it is not considered very highly as a 
viable or practicable management option.  Therefore, variable quotas would be the 
basis of any ITQ system for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery. 
 
The use of a competitive Total Allowable Commercial Catch quota (TACC), i.e. 
where a total quota is set for the fishery and fishers compete for their share of the 
catch (with either limited or unlimited pots), was not considered a viable alternative 
management option.  Experience around the world has shown that competitive quotas 
combine the worst aspects of both quota and effort control systems and they are the 
most unpredictable regarding their impact on long-term sustainability (breeding stock 
levels).  Therefore, this review has focused on ITQs. 
 
                                                 
6 Possibly 9,000 to 9,500 tonnes/year 
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Initial quota allocation 
 
If it were decided to move to an ITQ system, there would be significant changes in 
some fisher’s catches because quota allocation would be based on the number of units 
(pots) a person owned and not on their catch history.  Fishers who would normally 
catch below the average would be raised up to the average, and fishers who caught 
above the average would be reduced down to the average.  To increase catch, a fisher 
would have to buy (or lease) additional quota.  See the example of how quota would 
be allocated in the Introduction under the heading Quota Allocation. 
Zone quotas 
 
Separate quotas would be set for each Zone (A, B and C).  A and B fishers would 
have one quota for the period 15 November to 14 March and another for the 
remainder of the season (i.e. separate coastal and Abrolhos quotas).  Consideration 
may also need to be given to quotas on the peaks of the whites and the reds if fishers 
concentrated too much on these high catch rate periods and exacerbated the current 
peak supply issues. 
Quota legislation 
 
New legislation would be required to implement the initial quota allocation procedure 
and the annual quota setting process.  To ensure complete transparency of determining 
and recommending quota levels to the Minister for Fisheries, a quota setting advisory 
committee with a clear set of business rules, would have to be established.  The 
committee would be composed of all relevant stakeholders and it would need a 
scientific advisory group to help it determine sustainable annual quota levels. 
Quota enforcement - risks and costs 
 
ITQ enforcement risks and costs around a black market for illegal lobsters would be 
major considerations in moving to an ITQ system and any increase in the uncertainty 
around the level of economic benefit that may be realised from ITQs would further 
raise the importance of these issues.  The enforcement system would need to keep the 
illegal lobster catch at very low levels, because even a five per cent leakage (about 
500 tonnes) to the black market would cost the industry in the vicinity of $12 million 
annually.  That is, every fisher’s quota would have to be reduced by about 900 kg 
($22,000 per year at current market value) to take account of it.  It would be difficult 
to justify a move to ITQs if there was significant potential for a 10 per cent illegal 
catch/blackmarket ($24 million annually) to develop.  The consequences of large 
scale quota avoidance by the industry has not been included in the modelling results. 
 
The risks around quota enforcement need to be judged against the current background 
of unlicensed lobster sales (currently believed to be in the order of 200 tonnes), which 
will remain problematic under any system of management. 
Who will own the quota and will wealth distribution change? 
 
The marketplace may view ITQs as a more secure and reliable share of the catch than 
pots.  Therefore, if the fishery were to move to an ITQ system investors and 
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processors may show more interest in owning or leasing quota than they currently do 
in owning or leasing pots.  However, for investors in particular, there is still a similar 
level of security around “quota rights” in the same way as there is around unit (pot) 
and boat licences, in that the Minister for Fisheries will have the authority to vary, 
suspend and cancel quota in a similar way as currently applies to unit (pot) and boat 
licences.  Investors and processors would make their investment decisions based on 
the $ return they could receive on their ITQ compared to other investment 
opportunities (e.g. real estate, shares, etc).  Processors may also want to hold quota to 
ensure a continuity of supply at particular times of the year. 
 
In other fisheries around the world, there have been mixed experiences with changes 
in quota ownership.  Some ITQ fisheries, particularly those with large volumes and 
high processing/catching infrastructure costs, appear more prone to purchase by 
processors/corporations than other low volume high value fisheries, which appear 
more likely to stay in the hands of family fishing businesses. 
 
A trend towards a change in the composition of ownership of rock lobster entitlements 
is already apparent under the current system (investors buy unit (pot) entitlements and 
lease them out) and it is likely to continue.  This trend may accelerate under an ITQ 
system for the reasons discussed. 
 
The experience in some ITQ fisheries where there has been a significant shift in the 
ownership of quota entitlements to investors/processors and hence in the wealth 
distribution, is that it has resulted in a reduced sense of stewardship towards the 
resource, i.e. industry takes less ownership and responsibility for sustainability of the 
resource. 
Lifestyle, social and retirement issues 
 
As with the population in general, there is a large group of rock lobster fishers who 
are at the age where they are considering retirement and another significant group 
aged in their 40s to early 50s who have spent 20 years or so in the fishery.  Rock 
lobster fishing is physically and mentally demanding and can be anti family-social 
from a working hours and/or fishing location point of view. 
 
Some of these fishers want to stay in the industry, which has rewarded them well for 
working hard and offers a unique lifestyle.  However, they do not want to be under 
what they consider to be the excessive pressure of competition for catch that is part 
and parcel of the current effort control management system.  These fishers believe 
that ITQs could provide much greater freedom to choose when, how and where they 
fished and enable them to concentrate on reducing fishing costs, without being under 
the relentless pressure of competing for catch.  They maintain that this freedom offers 
the potential for a far better working environment and lifestyle generally, and for 
these reasons alone, ITQs should be considered even if they do not result in increased 
economic benefits through reduced fishing costs or increases in product price. 
 
Other fishers would like to retire from active fishing but still maintain a 
presence/interest in and generate an income from the fishery by leasing their pots.  
Some of these fishers argue that ITQs offer a more financially secure and simpler 
leasing/trading unit than pots because: 
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o the current unit (pot) trading system is a cumbersome and indirect way of 
“allocating” catch; 
o the catch from pots under the current system is “unpredictable”, in that it can 
vary significantly depending on many factors, including a fisher’s ability, 
competition from other fishers in his fishing location, fluctuations in 
recruitment, etc; 
o because of the uncertainty in what a fisher’s annual catch might be (which is 
further exacerbated by any fluctuations in price), it is far more difficult for 
potential pot leasers or purchasers to undertake sound financial planning to 
reduce the possibility that they will overcommit themselves. 
 
Another group of fishers has a counter view in that they believe that an important part 
of rock lobster fishing is the competition to be a good catcher.  They also argue that 
competition for catch encourages and rewards young fishers/new entrants for working 
hard and smart to catch well, which helps them to pay off their investment loans. 
Social ramifications of quotas and reductions in fishing effort 
 
The bio-economic model results and social research predicts that the implementation 
of ITQ systems or reductions in fishing effort (particularly by reducing pots) would 
cause boat numbers to decline even faster than they currently are.  This could impact 
on: 
 
o employment within the industry, e.g. fewer skippers and deckhands and to a 
lesser extent in support industries (e.g. boat building); and 
o coastal communities – it is predicted that only a few of the smaller, more rock 
lobster dependent coastal communities would be impacted by a reduction in 
the size of the fleet from the current 495 (as at December 2005) to 250 – 450 
as predicted for under some of the management options, particularly ITQs. 
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The figure above shows the bio-economic modelling results for the average annual 
benefits in $ millions, for the management options that were modelled for the Western 
Rock Lobster Fishery.  The management options, some of the main model 
assumptions that underpin them and their $ benefits are summarised below.  This 
report, particularly the section Comparison Between Effort and Quota Management 
Systems – Results of Bio-Economic Modelling should be read so that the assumptions 
and limitations of the model are clearly understood. 
 
• Input (effort) controls.  The three fishing effort (pot number) control 
management options (Scenarios) produced the lowest benefits of the options 
that were modelled: 
 
o 1 – the current system gave an estimated annual net benefit of $15.4 
million 
o 1c – the current system with a 20 per cent pot reduction gave an 
estimated annual net benefit of $16.9 million; and 
o 2 – a flexible effort control system where pots and fishing days could 
be adjusted, the season extended to 31 August and a $2/kg increase on 
the average beach price gave an estimated annual net benefit of $28 
million. 
 
• Quotas with input controls.  The four ITQ system options (Scenarios) with 
the current effort (pot number) controls produced $ benefits that were 
significantly greater than the effort control options but significantly lower than 
the comparable “Pure” ITQ options with reduced effort (pot) controls. 
 
o 3a – constant (fixed) ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach 
price increase of $5/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching 
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $61.2 
million.  However, there are significant sustainability risks with fixed 
quotas (quotas that do not vary from year to year) as described above 
under the section Risks associated with constant (fixed) and variable 
quotas, that make fixed quotas a less attractive management option. 
o 3b – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price 
increase of $3.50/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching 
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $51.6 
million. 
o 3c – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price 
increase of $2.00/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching 
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $43.0 million 
o 3d – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price 
increase of $1.00/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching 
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $35.8 
million. 
 
• Pure ITQ.  The four ITQ system options (Scenarios) without the current 
effort (pot number) controls produced $ benefits that were significantly greater 
than any of the other management options.  Under these options effort 
controls, that is controls on pot numbers, were relaxed and the number of pots 
was allowed to increase by 20 per cent. 
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o 4a – constant (fixed) ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a 
beach price increase of $5.50/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the 
catching efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of 
$87.6 million.  However, there are significant sustainability risks with 
fixed quotas (quotas that do not vary from year to year) as described 
above under the section Risks associated with constant (fixed) and 
variable quotas, that make fixed quotas a less attractive management 
option. 
o 4b – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price 
increase of $4.00/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching 
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $96.6 
million. 
o 4c – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price 
increase of $2.50/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching 
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $91.4 
million. 
o 4d – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price 
increase of $1.25/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching 
efficiency of pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $82.7 
million. 
 
The bio-economic modelling results indicate that overall the ITQ management 
systems offer greater scope for fishers to be more efficient (i.e. to reduce their costs) 
and for processors to maximise the value of the catch (and hence the beach price paid 
to fishers).  However, as explained in the report the significant $ benefits that the 
model estimates for the ITQ options are dependent on fishers maximising the 
potentially large efficiency gains and processors maximising the potential market 
opportunities that ITQs may offer. 
Planned timetable of review and decision making process 
 
A four phase consultation and decision making process will be used to decide which 
management system is best for the long-term management of the rock lobster 
industry. 
 
Phase 1 (Jan 04 to Dec 05) Assess and compare a number of fishing effort and quota management systems. 
Phase 2 (Jan 06 to Sept 06) 
Stakeholder discussion on the advantages and 
disadvantages of fishing effort and quota 
management systems. 
Phase 3 (Oct 06 to Feb 07) 
Stakeholder’s views considered and advice prepared 
for Government.  Industry will be polled for their 
views.  It is hoped that fishers will arrive at an 
industry consensus on which management option 
they prefer. 
Phase 4 (March 07 to 
September 08) 
Government makes its decision on which 
management system to use and implementation 





Definitions Of Terms And Abbreviations 
See Attachment 1 for Definitions of Terms and Abbreviations. 
 
Introduction 
State Government’s Rock Lobster Management Review 
Initiative 
 
In March 2002, the then Minister for Fisheries Hon. Kim Chance MLC announced, on 
behalf of the State Government, the response to the review of fisheries legislation in 
Western Australia as required by the Commonwealth Government’s National 
Competition Policy. 
 
This review of fisheries legislation began late in 1998.  From the outset, it was clear 
that the National Competition Council, the body that administers competition policy 
at a Commonwealth level, was interested in the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery and 
why the fishery was managed under an input system (effort controls), as opposed to 
an output system (catch controls – quotas) as is the case for other Australian lobster 
fisheries.  Indeed, it is fair to say that the National Competition Council had an 
expectation that the State Government would announce a timetable under which the 
fishery would be moved from an input to an output (quota) management system. 
 
This was not the State Government’s position.  It does not have a preconceived idea 
as to what is the best management system, rather it stated on the record that: 
 
“The current input based management regime for the Western Rock 
Lobster Fishery will remain in place until at least December 2006 with 
the Department of Fisheries and the Rock Lobster Industry Advisory 
Committee to review and quantify any further efficiency gains from 
additional changes to the current regulatory regime, including the 
costs and risks of management failure, over the next 2-3 years”. 
 
The process to decide on the future management system for the rock lobster fishery 
will not be rushed and is designed to be inclusive, open and transparent.  The State 
Government is investing in a three-year consultation process so that at the end of it 
stakeholders will have been provided with all the information they need to make up 
their minds as to what is the best management system for the fishery. 
 
It needs to be re-emphasised that the State Government does not share the National 
Competition Council’s expectation that the rock lobster fishery will move to a quota 
management system.  Rather, the Government has an expectation that the review 
process will identify the best long-term and strategic approach for managing the 
fishery within an ecologically sustainable development framework.  A case for 
changing the management system would need to produce convincing arguments that 
there is a significant quantum of additional benefits7 to be realised, in an ecologically 
sustainable development context, under a new system of management.  It may well be 
                                                 
7 See the Conclusions section for further discussion on this issue. 
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that the review will demonstrate that the current system is the best way to manage the 
fishery. 
 
The National Competition Policy provided the initial need for this review8, and its test 
of legislation is founded on economic principles alone.  However, the pursuit of 
economic ideals in isolation of ecological and social values and objectives is not an 
appropriate basis for managing a fishery. 
 
If the review of the management system is going to produce results that are truly in 
the better interests of the Western Australian community, it has to have objectives that 
are consistent with the principles of ecologically sustainable development, which are 
entrenched in fisheries resource management policy in Australia. 
 
In Australia, ecologically sustainable development is widely recognised as a natural 
resource management philosophy that seeks to provide balance to the competing 
ecological, social and economic objectives associated with the utilisation of renewable 
natural resources such as fish stocks. 
 
In meeting the ecological management requirements set by the Commonwealth 
Government’s Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 and 
the Marine Stewardship Council, it is reasonable to state that the “ecological leg” of 
ecologically sustainable development is being satisfied and will continue to be 
satisfied regardless of the management system employed. 
 
This being the case, the review of the management system that is currently underway 
is treating the need for good ecological management practices (e.g. a safe/sustainable 
level of breeding stock) as an essential requirement for any management system under 
consideration.  With appropriate wording in the objective, this assumption allows the 
focus of the assessment to be on the economic and social components of ecologically 
sustainable development, which is potentially where the greatest room for 
improvement exists. 
 
The two management systems that will be reviewed and compared are effort control 
management systems, such as the current rock lobster management system and catch 
quota (ITQ) management systems. 
Quota Allocation 
 
If the issue of quota allocation were to be left unresolved until after or late in the 
management review process, there would be a significant risk that the review would 
be sidetracked by argument and uncertainty regarding the allocation process.  
Therefore, to help focus the discussions on which management system offers the rock 
lobster industry and the Western Australian community the best long-term ecological, 
social and economic outcomes, the State Government has decided how individual 
                                                 
8 It also makes good business sense to review the current management system so that inefficiencies can 
be highlighted and to determine if other systems (e.g. ITQs) offer substantial additional economic 
benefits.  The cost-price squeeze that the industry has been experiencing over recent years has brought 
the need for a review into sharper focus. 
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transferable quotas (ITQs) will be allocated if the rock lobster fishery were to move to 
a quota management system. 
 
Based on practical considerations and legal rulings that have been handed down in 
Australia in recent years regarding quota allocation9, the State Government has 
decided that: 
 
• a quota will be set for each zone, i.e. Zones A, B and C; 
• each fisher will be allocated an individual share (catch quota) of their zone’s 
quota, based on the number of units (pots) held on a licence; and  
• a fisher’s catch history will not be taken into account in the quota allocation 
process. 
 
Catch history would not be used in an ITQ allocation process because it would distort 
the value of authorisations (entitlements) for the following reasons: 
 
• It is possible in this fishery to link catch at a given time to a managed fishery 
licence (MFL).  But the MFL is not the ‘currency’ of the fishery – the gear 
unit (pot) is the currency of the fishery.  The extent of trading in units (buying, 
selling and leasing) that has occurred over the years means that it is simply not 
possible to track with administrative efficiency or accuracy, the ownership or 
fishing history of each unit in the fishery. 
• The market for rock lobster units of entitlement factors in the expected 
earnings into the value of the units, and this therefore represents the truest 
judgement of their worth.  The market does not differentiate between low and 
high catches of lobster when valuing units for sale.  All units have equal value 
in the market. 
• The strength of the lease market for rock lobster units of entitlement means 
that “owners” are not limited to fishing in order to use their entitlement to 
develop an income stream. 
 
A theoretical example of a quota allocation:  If the quota for Zone X was set at 
4,550,00 kg for the season and there were 34,579 units (pots) in the zone, then each 
unit would be allocated a quota of 131.6 kg of lobsters for the season (4,550,000 kg ÷ 
34,579 pots).  Therefore, a person who owned 100 units/pots would be allocated a 
total of 13,160 kg of lobsters for the season. 
 
A practical unit (entitlement) size would need to be developed to assist quota trading, 
i.e. to allow small kg amounts to be traded. 
The Management Review Process 
Objectives 
In the context of ecologically sustainable development, the objectives for the review 
of the rock lobster management system are to: 
• assess and compare alternative management systems using the current 
management system of fishing effort (input) controls as the benchmark; and 
                                                 
9 See Independent Allocation Review Panel for the Southern Shark Fishery.  Final Report. October 
2003.  Report to the Australian Fisheries Management Authority. 
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• make a decision as to which management system offers the best long-term 
socio-economic return to the State of Western Australia based on: 
o providing the greatest incentives and opportunity for growth in 
economic terms; and 
o encouraging the maintenance and development of regional 
communities. 
See Attachment 2 for further details. 
 
It is important to reiterate that the current effort control management system has 
served the fishery well over the years and will continue to do so in future provided 
managers and industry reduce fishing effort if overexploitation threatens the breeding 
stock.  However, there is a need to assess if additional benefits (ecological, economic, 
social and management) can be obtained by moving to an alternative management 
system, while still ensuring long-term sustainability. 
Proposed review timetable and consultative process 
 
See Attachment 2 for a summary table and details of the timetable and consultative 
process of the management review. 
Phase 1 – Objective analysis of management options 
 
October 2003 to December 2005, a joint departmental and industry Steering 
Committee has overseen the development of four papers that assessed the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the effort control and quota management systems 
outlined above.  The papers produced were: 
 
• Bio-Economic Modelling – Compares the economic benefits that can be 
realised under different fishing effort and quota management systems.  The 
paper is titled A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the 
West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery by Economic Research Associates, 2005. 
• Social Research – Presents the initial findings of research on the possible 
social impacts of fishing effort and quota management systems, particularly on 
small coastal communities.  The paper is titled A Social Assessment of Coastal 
Communities Hosting the Western Rock Lobster Fishing Fleet by the Institute 
for Regional Development, University of Western Australia, 2005.10 
• Quota Experience in Other Fisheries – Describes the rock lobster quota 
management experience in South Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand.  The 
paper is titled How do Quota Management Systems Work in Rock Lobster 
Fisheries?  The Experience in New Zealand, Tasmania and South Australia, 
by Tim Bray, Steven Gill and Ron Edwards, Department of Fisheries, 2005. 
• This paper – provides an overview of the management review process and 
findings. 
Phase 2 – Communicate analysis of management scenarios with 
stakeholders 
The purpose of Phase 2 (November 2005 – September 2006) is to communicate to all 
stakeholders (commercial and recreational fishers, processors, conservation sector, 
                                                 
10 This is a three-year project funded by the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation. 
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local communities and government, etc) the results of the assessment and comparison 
of the different management options to empower stakeholders to arrive at their own 
conclusions as to which management system is best. 
 
Commencing in early February 2006, an independent facilitator will conduct a series 
of workshops with professional fishermen’s associations and other interested parties. 
Phase 3 – RLIAC prepares advice for government 
 
In this phase (October 2006 - February 2007), RLIAC will receive submissions from 
stakeholders and engage with them to clarify their positions. 
 
The Western Rock Lobster Council will conduct a poll of the rock lobster fishing 
sector to ascertain which management system it prefers.  The results will not 
necessarily determine RLIAC’s advice or the Government’s final position, but will 
make it clear to Government which management system the majority of fishers 
support. 
 
During RLIAC’s October 2006 coastal tour, the committee’s proposed advice to 
Government will be communicated to all stakeholders before it is formally presented 
to the Minister for Fisheries in early 2007. 
Phase 4 – Government’s decision and implementation 
 
Once the Minister for Fisheries has received RLIAC’s advice he will take his position 
to Cabinet and a decision on the long-term management of the rock lobster fishery is 
likely to be made in 2007.  If there is a decision to move to a new management 
system, it is anticipated that it would be implemented for the 2008/09 season. 
Western Rock Lobster Fishery – Background 
 
This section provides a summary of the history of the regulation of the West Coast 
Rock Lobster Fishery and its catch and fishing effort, as background information to 
help readers understand how the fishery has evolved and what its current status is.  
The catch predictions for the next three seasons (2005/06 to 2007/08) and the main 
factors responsible for the current “cost-price squeeze” are also provided to give an 
indication of future trends. 
History Of Regulation Of The Western Rock Lobster Fishery  
 
The main aims of the regulations that have been introduced in to the Western Rock 
Lobster Fishery have been two-fold.  First and most importantly, they have been used 
to conserve the rock lobster stocks (particularly the breeding stock) and secondly, the 
limited entry rules introduced in 1963 also protected fisher’s livelihoods by restricting 
the number of boats (fishers) that could operate in the fishery.11
 
                                                 
11 The fishery’s management arrangements serve a twofold purpose, in that biological and fishing effort 
constraints ensure sustainability of the stock (now enshrined in the Decision Rules Framework) and 
limited entry protects fishers’ economic interests. 
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Some of the major regulations and reductions in fishing effort/exploitation were: 
 
• 1887 – Minimum size, initially a weight and then a carapace length. 
• 1899 – Protection of spawners (egg carrying females). 
• 1962 – Closed seasons. 
• 1963 – March 1963, limits on entry, boats and number of pots involving: 
o the number of boats (fishers) was restricted to 836, including 45 
freezer boats that were licensed to process at sea; and 
o the number of pots was restricted to three per foot (0.33 meter) length 
of boat, with about 76,000 being in the fishery.  However, a fisher 
could still increase his number of pots by building/purchasing a larger 
boat. 
• 1965 – Pot numbers and boat replacement.  Pot numbers were set at 76,623 
and boat replacements had to match exactly the number of pots held on the 
licence. 
• 1966 – Escape gaps introduced, one x 51 x 304 mm, increased to one x 54 x 
304 mm in 1971 and processing factories required a licence. 
• 1973 – Multiple necks and parlour pots banned. 
• 1978 – Season shorten by six weeks to 30 June. 
• 1979 – Boat replacement policy relaxed to give fishermen greater flexibility 
when replacing their boats.  It allowed between seven and 10 pots per meter of 
boat length. 
• 1984 – Pot dimensions restricted: 
o maximum pot volume of 0.257 cubic meters; and 
o large wire traps and large batten and beehive pots restricted; 
• 1986 
o 5 per cent pot reduction if a boat were less than six years old when 
replaced (rule not revoked until 1995). 
o Escape gaps increased from one to three/four x 54x304mm. 
o Temporary 10 per cent pot reduction for one season, from 76,623 to 
68,961. 
• 1987-91 – Permanent 10 per cent pot reduction at two per cent per year over 
five years. 
• 1992 (one year only) 
o Summer closure (10 Jan to 9 Feb) in Zone B. 
o Maximum female size 115 mm. 
o Setose and tarspot females to be returned to the water between 15 
November and 28 February. 
o 10 per cent pot reduction in Zone B (15 Nov-10 Jan). 
o Up until April 1993, boats had to nominate landing zones in Zone C. 
• 1993 – Sustainability management package to address breeding stock decline. 
o 18 per cent pot reduction (i.e. pot usage reduced from 68,961 to 
56,548). 
o Maximum sizes for females (105mm northern sector. and 115mm 
southern sector). 
o An increase in the minimum size from 76 to 77mm from 15 November 
to 31 January. 
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o Protection of all setose and tar spot females continued.12  
• 1997 – Boat replacement rule abolished, i.e. pot numbers no longer linked to 
boat length.  Maximum pots per boat 150 and minimum 63. 
• 2003 – Abolition of the 150-pot rule, i.e. the rule that set the maximum 
number of pots a boat could use. 
• 2005 – Sustainability management package to address breeding stock decline 
(particularly in Zone B). 
o Zones A and B – A 26-day summer closure from 15 January to 9 
February, and Sunday closures from 15 March to 30 June in Zone B, 
plus 10 per cent pot reductions in Zone B from 15 November to 10 
February and in Zone A from 15 March to 15 April. 
o Zone C – A closure from 15 to 24 November and a 3-day moon 
closure from 1 February to 30 June. 
Catch, Effort and Boat History 
 
Catch in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery increased steadily until the late 1970s 
when it appeared that they had reached a maximum sustainable level (Figure 1).  
Fluctuations in catch over the subsequent period reflect the level of puerulus (young 
rock lobster) settlement, which determines the catch three to four years later.  It is 
changing environmental conditions, particularly the strength of the Leeuwin Current 
that controls the level of puerulus settlement and hence catches.13
 
Fishing effort (the number of pot lifts) increased rapidly during the period up to 1963 
as men, vessels and traps entered the open access rock lobster fishery (Figure 1).  
Effort declined for a few years after 1963 when the fishery became limited entry and a 
cap was placed on the number of boats and traps.  However, it began to increase 
again, but not as rapidly, up until 1993, when a major sustainability management 
package (approximately 23 per cent effort reduction, including a 18 per cent pot 
reduction) was introduced to protect and rebuild the breeding stock, since then the 
number of pot lifts has stabilised.  It must be noted, however, that the measure of 
fishing effort, the pot lift, does not take into account any increases in fishing 
efficiency (better boats and pot setting, advances in technology, etc) that have 
occurred since 1944-45.  If increases in fishing efficiency were taken into account, the 
measure of effective effort would be greater. 
 
Catch rate or catch per unit of fishing effort (average weight of rock lobsters caught 
per pot lift) has decreased steadily from 1944-45 and in the past decade has been 
reasonably steady at an average of about one kilo per pot lift.14
 
                                                 
12 For further details see Fisheries Management Paper No.55 Rock Lobster Industry Advisory 
Committee, Chairman's report to the Minister for Fisheries on management proposals for 1993-94 and 
1994-95 western rock lobster seasons (September 1993).  Department of Fisheries publication. 
13 It was only in the late 1980s to early 1990s at the Abrolhos Is., that there was evidence that the 
breeding stock had fallen to a level that had affected the level of puerulus settlement. 
14 If increases in fishing efficiency were taking into account in the catch rate calculation, it would that it 
has continued to decline in real terms. 
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Figure 1:  Western rock lobster catch in millions of kg and nominal fishing effort 
in millions of pot lifts (unadjusted for increases in efficiency/technology). 
Catch Predictions 
 
Table 1 below shows the rock lobster catches that are predicted for Zones A, B and C 
for the next three seasons, based on the levels of puerulus settlement that occurred 
three and four year previously and the expected level of fishing effort. 
 
Table 1.  Catch predictions for Zones A, B and C for the three seasons 2005/06 to 
2007/08 and the 10-year average catch 1995-96 to 2004-05 (the predictions do not 
take into account the 2005-06 management changes). 
Catch predictions (tonnes) 
Season  
Zone 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 10 yr av. 1995-96 to 
2004-05 
A 1,750 1,800 1,800 1,823 
B15 3500  3,600  3,600 3,571 











                                                 
15  Includes Big Bank (approx 100 tonnes) 
16 Predictions using all puerulus collector sites in Zone C. 
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Zone A Zone B Zone C
 
 
Figure 2: Shows the decline in the number of boats taken place in the fishery 
since 1988. 
 
Boat numbers have declined from 836 in 1963, when limited entry was introduced, to 
495 in December 2005.  The decline accelerated after the freeing up of the boat 
replacement rules (1979), pot reductions (1986 and 1993) and for economic reasons 
(particularly in 2002 and 2005).  The removal in 1997 of the rule that limited the 
number of pots a boat could use (know as the ‘seven and 10 rule’17) and in 2003 of the 
maximum 150 pot/boat rule, have also played a part in the reduction in boat numbers. 
Economic Issues Affecting Fishers – Cost-price Squeeze 
 
The profitability of rock lobster fishing is affected by a few key factors and the degree 
to which these affect profitability is influenced by environmental factors and 
management constraints.  They are: 
 
1 The prices received for rock lobsters 
• Up to $10/kg variation in price has occurred from one season to the next in 
the past decade; and  
• Up to $15/kg variation within a season (normally $2-$5/kg). 
 
2 Catches 
The quantity of rock lobsters caught can vary significantly from season to 
season, e.g. by up to 4,000 tonnes from one season to the next and by almost 
100 per cent over a few seasons in Zone C.  Catch predictions (Table 1) 
                                                 
17 Boats were allowed between seven and 10 pots per metre of length. 
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indicate that there will be a significant reduction in catch over the next two 
seasons in Zone C, while Zone A and B are predicted to remain relatively 
stable. 
 
3  Fishing cost including 
• increases in fuel costs, which have risen significantly over the past five 
years and in particular from January to September 2005, 
• increases in bait costs, 
• labour costs have been increasing steadily over the past five years and are 
set to increase more rapidly in future due to the boom in Western 
Australia’s resource sector.  Fishers are finding it difficult to attract and 
keep crew, particularly in the Mid-West region where there is increasing 
competition for labour from the mining sector. 
 
See Attachment 3 for a more detailed discussion of the economic factors affecting the 
rock lobster industry’s profitability. 
Accompanying Reports and Previous Reviews and Studies 
 
Three other reports have been prepared as part of this management review and it is 
important that they are read in conjunction with this paper. 
 
• Bio-economic modelling A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options 
for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery – compares the economic benefits 
that can be realised under different fishing effort and quota management 
systems. 
• Social impact study A Social Assessment of Coastal Communities Hosting the 
Western Rock Lobster Fishing Fleet – presents results of research on the 
possible social impacts of fishing effort and quota management systems, 
particularly on small coastal communities. 
• Quota experience in other rock lobster fisheries How do Quota 
Management Systems Work in Rock Lobster Fisheries?  The Experience in 
New Zealand, Tasmania and South Australia – describes the rock lobster 
quota management experience in South Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand. 
 
Previous rock lobster management reviews and associated studies that are 
recommended reading are listed in Attachment 4.  Of particular interest are the four 
volumes produced in 1994 that compared fishing effort and quota management 
systems in relation to the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery and the Food and 
Agricultural Organisation’s (FAO) review papers on fishing effort and quota 
management. 
 
• Bowen, B. 1994, ‘Long-term Management Strategies for the Western Rock 
Lobster Fishery’, in Volume 1, Fisheries Management Paper No. 67, Fisheries 
Department of WA. 
• Lindner, B. 1994, ‘Economic efficiency of alternative input and output based 
management systems in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery’, in Volume 2, 
Fisheries Management Paper No. 68, Dept of Fisheries of WA. 
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• Marec Pty, 1994,  ‘Long-term Management Strategies for the Western Rock 
Lobster Fishery.  A Market-based Economic Assessment for the Western Rock 
Lobster Industry’, in Volume 3,  Fisheries Management Paper No.69. 
• McLaughlan, N. 1994, ‘Long-term Management Strategies for the Western 
Rock Lobster Fishery.  Law Enforcement Considerations.’ in  Volume 4,  
Fisheries Management Paper No. 70. 
• Shotton, R. 2001, Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota 
Rights in Fisheries,  Food and Agricultural Organisation, Fisheries Technical 
Report No. 411, p373. 
• Shotton, R. 2001, Case Studies on the Effect of Transferable Fishing Fights 
on Fleet Capacity and Concentration of Quota Ownership,  Food and 
Agricultural Organisation, Fisheries Technical Report No. 412, p246. 
 
NOTE:  To aid the current discussion on management options, the documents listed 
above plus this paper, have been made available on the Department of Fisheries’ web 
site at www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site at 
www.rocklobsterwa.com and are available in hard copy by phoning the Department of 
Fisheries on 9482 7267. 
 
Objective of Fishing Effort and Quota 
Management 
 
Catch quota (output control) management systems can appear to be radically different 
compared to fishing effort (input control) systems, like the rock lobster management 
system.  However, from a stock sustainability point of view they are used to achieve 
exactly the same result.  The objective of both quota and effort management systems 
is to ensure the long-term sustainability of the rock lobster stock and fishery by taking 
into account: 
• biological (e.g. protecting the breeding stock)18; 
• economic; and  
• social factors. 
 
Fishing effort and quota management systems achieve their objective by controlling 
the level of exploitation19, that is, they limit the catch of rock lobsters that can be 
taken each season.  Moving from fishing effort to quota management does not change 
the fact that the primary aim of any fishery management system will be to keep the 
rock lobster stock at a sustainable level by limiting the catch that fishers can take. 
 
                                                 
18 And also maintaining the ecological stability of the marine environment in which rock lobsters live, 
in particular by ensuring an appropriate abundance (density) of legal size lobster are present on the 
fishing grounds (particularly in deeper water). 
19 Exploitation, often referred to as exploitation rate, refers to the number or weight (kg) of fish, in this 
case rock lobsters that are caught each season from what is available on the fishing grounds. 
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Comparing Effort and Quota Management 
Options – Key Issues and Benefits 
 
This section summarises and compares some of the key issues, benefits and costs of 
the fishing effort and quota management systems that have been assessed in the 
review of the Western Rock Lobster Fishery.  It also includes a discussion on how the 
different options would be implemented and what type of legislation, enforcement and 
research would be required to ensure they were managed successfully and sustainably. 
 
No matter what management system is used for the rock lobster fishery, it will be 
necessary to retain the current breeding stock decision rules framework (a working 
document) that clearly sets out the trigger points for taking management action to 
ensure a safe level of breeding stock. 
 
Attachment 5 provides a summary of the management arrangements and assumptions, 
such as price premiums and increases in pot efficiency that have been used in the bio-
economic modelling and social research that has been undertaken for this review. 
Management Systems Assessed 
 
Below are the management systems that have been modelled, assessed and compared. 
 
1. Current fishing effort control system – individual transferable effort 
(ITE) 
The system we have today is individual transferable effort (ITE).  To ascertain 
if the current system could produce benefits similar to the modified more 
flexible effort control and quota management systems, a hypothetical effort 
(pot) reduction scenario of 20 per cent phased in at 2 per cent per year over 10 
years was also examined. 
 
2. Modified more flexible individual transferable effort (ITE) system 
Total fishing time and effort would be set for each zone at the start of the 
season.  Each fisher would be allocated a share or “quota” of the total fishing 
time and fishing effort for his zone and would have the flexibility to use it 
when he wanted during the season.  A longer season to 31 August would 
apply. 
 
3. Individual transferable quota (ITQ) system with effort controls 
A system whereby a catch quota would be set for each zone and each unit 
(pot) would be allocated a share of the zone quota.  Fishing effort (pot 
numbers) controls would remain and a longer season to 31 August would 
apply.  If it were decided to move to an ITQ system, it would initially retain all 
the current effort controls, which could gradually be relaxed over time to 
produce greater benefits as the new system stabilised.  Pot catching efficiency 





4. Individual transferable quota (ITQ) system without effort controls20 
A system whereby a catch quota would be set for each zone and each unit 
(pot) would be allocated a share of the zone quota.  There would be no 
controls on effort (pot numbers).  However, from experience in other ITQ 
fisheries doing away with controls on pot numbers does not lead to fishers 
putting hundreds of additional pots in the water, as it is not a cost effective 
way to take the quota.  Pot numbers are largely limited by the carrying 
capacity of the vessel and how many can be efficiently operated each day.  
Therefore in the bio-economic model, pot numbers were allowed to increase 
by 20 per cent and pot catching efficiency was increased by 40 per cent 
through changes in pot design.  This system has the potential to provide the 
greatest freedom to fishers in terms of harvesting their quota.  A longer season 
to 31 August would apply. 
 
The Current Rock Lobster Effort Management 
System (ITE) 
 
This section discusses the key issues and benefits of the current rock lobster 
management system.  Attachment 5 provides a summary of the current management 
rules/arrangements that were used as the base case to assess its performance against 
the other management options. 
Key Issues 
 
The current fishing effort control system for the rock lobster fishery is known as an 
individual transferable effort management system, or ITE system (see Attachment 1 
for a definition).  This management system has served the fishery well for more than 
40 years.  As long as timely management decisions are made to control and reduce 
fishing effort to ensure the breeding stock levels are maintained, this system should 
continue to ensure the long-term sustainability of the rock lobster stocks.  However, 
industry needs to be aware that the continued increase in fishing effort and 
exploitation under the current effort management system can lead to serious 
disagreements within the industry over what management action should be taken to 
reduce it (e.g. time off as opposed to pot reductions) and encourages economic 
inefficiencies, particularly overcapitalisation and higher fishing costs. 
Reaching consensus regarding management action 
 
The current system offers so many different options for reducing the catch (via effort 
reductions21) that it is very difficult for industry to come up with one option that 
satisfies everyone. 
 
                                                 
20 The ITQ system without effort controls that was modelled for this review does not have uncontrolled 
effort.  It has been limited to a 20 per cent increase in the number of pots fishers can use because 
experience in other ITQ lobster fisheries has shown that fishers do not use excessive numbers of pots, 
when controls on pot numbers are removed. 
21 Changes to minimum and maximum sizes and protection of particular classes of lobsters (e.g. 
spawners and tar spots) can also be used to maintain the breeding stock. 
 31
 
There is divergence of opinion within industry because different effort reduction 
options – for example, time period closures and pot reductions – can potentially have 
very different impacts on a fisher’s catch.  These differences split the industry and 
make it very difficult for it to present the unified front that is necessary for it to be 
able to work in a corporate partnership manner with the Government and other 
stakeholders to resolve sustainability issues. 
 
Under a quota management system, this is less of a problem, as the only option that 
can be used to protect the stock is to reduce the catch, i.e. reduce each fishers’ ITQ.  It 
could be argued that a reduction in individual quotas is more equitable than an effort 
reduction (for instance, reducing pots or closing a particular time of the season), as 
each fisher bears the burden of the reduction in direct proportion to the size of the 
quota.  This could avoid the equity arguments that arise with effort reductions, e.g. 
that they affect small boat/unit holders more than large holders, or shallow water 
fishers more than deepwater fishers, or Abrolhos boats more than coastal boats.  
Under ITQs, the debate focuses on the pivotal issue: “How many kilos does the quota 
need be reduced by to protect the breeding stock?”. 
Risk to the breeding stock and ecology 
Breeding stock 
 
Under the current management system, which has a decision rules framework to deal 
with the issue of breeding stock levels, there is little risk of overfishing the breeding 
stock to the point where it would affect subsequent puerulus settlement, provided 




Some fisheries scientists are concerned that the current level of exploitation may have 
reduced the number or density of legal size lobsters to such low levels that it may 
begin to have an impact on the general ecology in which the rock lobster lives (i.e. the 
interactions rock lobsters have with other organisms).  This is particularly true for 
populations of large lobsters in deeper water.  It is difficult to evaluate if ITQs would 
offer a better system to deal with ecological issues than the current system.  The most 
important factor regardless of whether it is an effort or quota management system is 
the commitment of industry, managers and the State Government to resolve 
ecological issues if and when they arise. 
Competition between fishers – fishing “harder” and “smarter” 
 
Under an effort control management system, the exploitation of the stock – the 
number of lobsters caught each season from what is available on the fishing grounds – 
gradually increases due to intense competition between fishers (pots) to maximise 
their share of the catch.  High levels of competition are always generated in effort 
control fisheries and it is referred to as the “rush to fish”.  Competition encourages 
fishers to fish “harder” (e.g. by fishing more days, taking more time or risks to set 
pots, travelling longer distances to fish the higher catch rate hot spots and “big runs”, 
using more bait, etc) and “smarter” (e.g. by using technological advances such as 
larger and faster boats, GPS, colour sounders, computers, etc) and hence the 
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exploitation increases.  This gradual increase in fishing efficiency is sometimes 
referred to as “effort creep”. 
 
Competition encourages innovation and hard work and in itself is not a bad thing.  
However, the more rock lobsters a fisher catches, the more he is exploiting the stock 
and the more pressure he puts on it.  This inevitably leads to fewer rock lobsters being 
left on the fishing grounds at the end of each season, and hence fewer breeding 
lobsters. 
 
Because of the high exploitation, the abundance (number, density) of legal size 
lobsters on the fishing ground is usually very low at the end of each season and hence 
the catch from the fishery becomes very dependent on the new young lobster that 
recruit (grow) into the fishery each year.  High exploitation leads to fewer and fewer 
resident residual lobsters surviving from year to year to act as a “buffer” if 
recruitment into the fishery declines.  The catch from a recruitment dependent fishery 
can go sharply up and down as it follows the level of new recruits coming in each 
season, as seen in the rock lobster fishery. 
 
The competitive nature of the current fishery and the need to pay off loans or meet 
leasing obligations can lead to fishers taking risks with safety (e.g. going out in bad 
weather, fishing too close to reefs or in dangerous swell conditions, etc).  The 
competitive pressure can also make fishers work long hours each day with few breaks 
during the season, which can have social (family/relationship) and safety (tiredness) 
implications. 
The need to reduce fishing effort 
 
The second issue is a consequence of the intense competition between fishers and the 
very high exploitation this generates.  As a consequence, the breeding stock begins to 
decline towards the point where it could affect the future levels of puerulus (young 
lobsters) settling, which would result in lower catches three to four years later.  If this 
occurred, tough conservation strategies to reduce fishing effort would have to be 
implemented. 
 
Under effort control management systems, it is always necessary to periodically 
reduce fishing effort (exploitation) to ensure the breeding stock is maintained at a safe 
and sustainable level so that it does not affect recruitment.  Reductions in fishing 
effort create debate and concern within the rock lobster industry and people have 
different opinions on how it should be done (e.g. time closures verses pot reductions), 
based on their particular type of fishing operation and personal circumstances.  In 
particular, pot reductions are often seen as reductions in a fisher’s capital asset, 
whereas in fact a fisher’s percentage share of the units (pots) – and hence potential 
catch – in the fishery is not altered. 
 
Reductions in fishing effort and exploitation are commonly achieved by: 
• closing the fishery for periods of time, for example: 
o moon closures; 
o start and end of season closures; 
o closures over low catch rate periods; 
o regular weekly, monthly, etc closures; 
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o closing areas of the fishery for specific times (e.g. the Abrolhos Is.); 
• reducing pot numbers (i.e. over the whole season or during particular periods, 
or for example, the whites or reds); 
• restrictions on pot designs to make them less efficient (e.g. size and shape of 
pots, one neck, etc); 
• increasing the minimum legal size; and 
• decreasing the maximum female legal size (there could also be one for males). 
 
Fishing effort in the rock lobster fishery would have to be significantly reduced to 
reach the point where competition between fishers (pots) was reduced to the same 
extent as could potentially occur under ITQs.  However, even at this much lower level 
of effort, fishing efficiency under the current management system would increase 
through advances in technology and increases in an individual fisher’s experience and 
expertise (i.e. fishers would still fish “smarter”). 
Competition leads to over capitalisation and increased fishing costs 
 
Competition between fishers for a share of the catch results in individual fisher’s (and 
hence the fleet) overcapitalising their fishing operations.  In the fully exploited 
Western Rock Lobster Fishery, the only way a fisher can consistently catch more than 
those fishing around him, is to fish “harder” and “smarter” than they do.  Therefore, 
fishers invest a lot of money in heavier baiting, larger and faster boats (which cost 
more to purchase and operate) and the latest technology to try and maintain or 
increase their share of the catch. 
 
For example, if one fisher purchases a new technology or is baiting more heavily and 
he catches more than those fishing around him, then to maintain their share of the 
catch, the other fishers have to buy the same or equivalent technology or use more 
bait, or both.  If they don’t, they will lose some of their potential catch to the more 
competitive fisher.  Extra expenditure required to maintain catch forces the overall 
cost of fishing to increase and net profits from the catch to decline. 
 
Due to the competitive nature of the rock lobster fishery under the current effort 
control management system, it is not easy for fishers to reduce their fishing costs and 
still maximise their share of the catch.  For example, if a fisher decided to trade in his 
large vessel for a smaller more economic vessel, but he could not carry all his pots in 
one load, he would not be able to respond as quickly as other fishers to changes in 
catch rates in other areas of the fishery.  That is, the fisher’s ability to keep up with 
and compete with the mobile fleet would be reduced and his share of the catch would 
decline.  Another example would be if a fisher decided to reduce costs by using less 
bait than those fishing nearby.  His pots would be out-competed and his share of the 
catch would also decline.  In both of these examples, the reduction in catch would be 
offset to some degree by a reduction in fishing costs. 
 
If under the current management system, fishing effort could be reduced to the point 
where there was little competition between fishers (pots) for the available catch, it 
would encourage fishers to reduce their fishing costs – for example, by using less bait 
and fuel (less travel), and replacing large boats with smaller more economic ones.  A 
large reduction in fishing effort would be likely to accelerate the rate of decline in the 




It is important to note that time closures (e.g. shortened seasons, moon closures and 
days off) can reduce fishing costs and help protect the breeding stock, but they do not 
reduce competition between fishers.  In fact, they can increase competition, as there is 
an even shorter period of time for each fisher to take a share of the catch. 
Benefits of the Current Management System 
It’s a familiar management system 
 
One of the major benefits of the current effort management system, which should not 
be underestimated, is that it is familiar to all fishers.  They have grown up with it over 
the years and seen it evolve from a simple set of rules to the much more complex set 
of management arrangements it is today.  Generally, fishers know how changes in the 
current system will affect them and there is a substantial body of experience and 
knowledge amongst fishers themselves, processors, marketers, accountants, boat and 
pot brokers, banks, insurance companies and other institutions to help them adapt 
their businesses to any management changes that occur under this system. 
 
Effort control is also the management system that fisheries manager, researchers, 
enforcement and legal officers and governments have dealt with over the past 40 
years.  They feel reasonably certain of being able to predict the results of any 
management changes that are made to the fishery and how they might impact on rock 
lobster stocks and the fishery generally. 
Research 
 
There is a wealth of research data and information that has been painstakingly built up 
over the last 60 years, which makes the rock lobster itself and the fishery one of the 
most studied and best understood in the world.  A significant aspect of this 
understanding is how the catch rate (catch per pot lift) of lobsters relates to their 
abundance on the fishing grounds.  The catch rate to abundance relationship is based 
on understanding the catching efficiency or fishing power of the “standard” pot types 
(batten and beehive).  If the management system is changed, for example to an ITQ 
system and pot numbers and design are to allowed vary, it would require additional 
fishery independent monitoring and modelling to ensure estimates of abundance 
(especially of the breeding stock) remained accurate.  The cost of the additional 
research for ITQs is estimated to be approximately $1.1 million per year on top of the 
current research budget, which would have to be met through cost recovery.  The 
additional costs have been included in the bio-economic modelling. 
Enforcement 
 
The current fishing effort enforcement system has been developed over a long period 
of time and it monitors the main areas of illegal activities such as over-potting, 
consigning undersize and prohibited females, and boundary violations.  The 
Department’s compliance program delivers very cost effective enforcement outcomes 
and the great majority of industry has confidence in the system.  Enforcement under 
the current system depends on reasonably straightforward observations of illegal 
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activities, such as pot counts and inspecting and measuring lobsters at processing 
factories. 
 
If a decision were made to move to a quota management system, the enforcement 
emphasis would have to shift significantly to reflect the fact that the most important 
aspect from a sustainability and fisher equity perspective would be to ensure that 
individual quotas were not exceeded.  A slippage of just 1 per cent to the black market 
would cost the industry about $2.5 million annually and a 5 per cent slippage would 
cost more than $12 million.  Additional enforcement expertise would be required to 
monitor the quota electronic/paper trail and investigate fraud, especially collusion 
between fishers and processors.  Also, investigation procedures would be far more 
intrusive in relation to fishers and processors financial affairs than they currently are. 
 
It is estimated that there would be a one-off enforcement/management cost of about 
$1 million to set up an ITQ system and an additional ongoing 
enforcement/management cost of about $2.5 million annually22, which would be cost 
recovered.23  The additional costs have been included in the bio-economic modelling. 
Effort control systems “reward” more competitive fishers 
 
Under the effort control management system used in the rock lobster fishery, half the 
fishers catch more on average (sometimes a lot more) than the other half, despite the 
fact that they may fish the same general area and have very similar fishing operations 
(boat type, number of pots, bait, GPS, sounders, etc).  Effort control systems 
“reward”, with additional catch, fishers who fish “harder” and “smarter”. 
 
This can be seen as an advantage of an effort control system in that it rewards hard 
work, skill, knowledge and innovation.  However, it is also its Achilles heel, because 
at the same time it encourages increases in fishing effort and hence exploitation, 
which can lead to the need to implement conservation (effort reduction) measures. 
 
2003-04 Annual catch (kg) per pot per year 
 Minimum24 Average Maximum 
Zone A less than 100 210 350+ 
Zone B about 100 175 350+ 
Zone C less than 150 277 420+ 
 
The above table provides an indication of the large variation in annual catch (kg) per 
pot per year for the three zones of the fishery for the 2003-04 season.  Some fishers 
catch more than twice the annual catch (kg) per pot per year of other fishers. 
 
 
                                                 
22 This could vary depending on the type of ITQ system that was finally adopted. 
23 See report ‘How do Quota Management Systems work in Rock Lobster Fisheries?’ for further 
discussion on enforcement implications and cost under quota systems at www.fish.wa.gov.au or 
www.rocklobsterwa.com  
24 Note the low minimum values are significantly affected by the low number of days fished recorded 
by some fishers. 
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Implementation and Costs 
 
For the purposes of the review and the bio-economic modelling, the current 
management system has remained unchanged to what it was in 2004-05, so that it 
could be compared against the other management options.  However, it was decided 
prior to the review that a unit register would be developed to aid in the identification 
of unit holders and unit transfers.  In addition, since the review commenced, industry 
and management have been discussing the possibility of installing Vessel Monitoring 
Systems (VMS) on all boats in the fleet.  These are additional costs, which will be 
covered by cost recovery or individual boat owners.  These cost would be the same 
for all the management options reviewed. 
Modelling the Current Effort Control System 
 
It is recommended that the full economic modelling report A Bio-Economic 
Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, by 
consultants Economic Research Associates be read in conjunction with this summary.  
It is available at www.fish.wa.gov.au or www.rocklobsterwa.com  
 
The main assumptions and management arrangements used to model the current 
management system were: 
 
• there is a strong “rush to fish”, i.e. to catch as much as possible; 
• no increase in pot efficiency; 
• effort creep/increases in fishing efficiency is 1 per cent per year;25 
• boat numbers decline at 1 per cent per year; 
• no increase in season (15 Nov to 30 June); and 
• no price increases. 
 
See Attachment 5 (Tables A and B) for further details of management rules and model 
assumptions for each management option reviewed. 
 
The following is a brief summary of the results of modelling the current management 
system over a 10-year period. 
 
• The average increase in net benefit to the fishery under the current 
management arrangements was estimated to be $15.4 million.  This is the 
“base” value against which the other management options are compared.  It is 
significantly less than the net benefits estimated for the ITQ systems. 
• Boat numbers were reduced from 549 to 505 (total 44), i.e. it is about the 
historic rate of boat decline. 
• Catch was slightly higher and nominal fishing effort was at least 19 per cent 
higher compared to the other management options. 
                                                 
25 Efficiency gains due to “effort creep” come about through technology and other changes that 
improve fishing (catching) efficiency. 
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Could the Current Effort Control System Deliver Similar 
Benefits Compared to ITQs? 
 
There are a number of ways the current management system could deliver some of the 
benefits that economic modelling has predicted for ITQ systems that would help ease 
the “cost-price squeeze” being experienced by industry today.  In general, however, 
the benefits from effort reductions (closures and/or pot reductions) and increases in 
pot catching efficiency under the current management system would not be expected 
to be as large as those predicted for the ITQ systems.  This is because effort control 
systems (like the current system) encourage catch competition between fishers, which 
would not allow the maximum potential benefits of increasing efficiency (reducing 
fishing costs) to be fully realised.  Having said this, there would still be merit in 
exploring the potential benefits that may be obtained by making the current system 
more efficient. 
Increasing the catching efficiency of pots 
 
With a little more flexibility in the current system, fishers could be allowed to develop 
more efficient pots.  For example, they could be larger, have multiple necks, side 
entrances, and parlours to stop escapement.  In particular, more efficient pots could be 
used effectively over two- and three-day pulls and so on during high catch rate 
periods (e.g. the whites).  This might however, further exacerbate the current catch 
peaks.  Fewer, but more efficient, pots could result in greater net profits for a fisher 
due to: 
 
• savings on pot costs, bait and fuel; and  
• allowing the use of smaller, more economic boats. 
Extending the fishing season 
 
If processors and the marketers could demonstrate that there were substantial 
economic benefits to be gained by extending the current season into the winter and 
spring months (July to October), it could be accommodated under the current 
management system.  However, a reduction in fishing effort (for example, the number 
of pots used or closures) would be necessary during other times of the season (e.g. the 
whites when catch volumes are very high and $ returns/kg to fishers can be at their 
lowest) to compensate for the extra effort during the extended season.26
Closures during low catch periods 
 
Closures during low catch periods at the beginning and end of the season, between the 
whites and reds and over the full moon, would enhance the rock lobster fleet’s overall 
economic performance.  However, within season closures of any significant length of 
time could impact on some markets. 
                                                 
26 It was not possible to estimate with complete accuracy factors influencing prices, noting that most of 
the price variation is driven by exchange rates, supply from other sources, cold storage holdings 





Pot reductions can produce economic efficiencies by reducing the amount of fishing 
gear that needs to be operated.  Fewer pots can mean: 
 
• less bait used; 
• less fuel used to set and retrieve pots; and 
• potentially smaller, more economic boats could be used. 
 
Based on pervious experience, a reduction in pots would also increase demand for and 
the value of units (pot) entitlements and could to some degree accelerate the rate at 
which boats redistributed (sold) their units (pots) and left the fishery.  For example a 
significant pot reduction in the order of 20 per cent over 10 years could help drive 
further fleet rationalisation and result in a fleet of around 400 to 450 boats.  However 
as seen in Figure 2 boats are already leaving the industry at a fairly rapid rate.27  It is 
argued on purely economic grounds that a smaller fleet would be more efficient and 
thereby produce considerable economic benefits for the industry as a whole. 
Possible consequences of staying with the current management system 
 
If fishing efficiency continues to increase under the current system, further effort 
reductions will be needed to protect the breeding stock.  Effort reductions could be in 
the form of fewer fishing days (e.g. moon closures) or pot reductions or both.  It is 
likely that in all cases effort reductions would lead to further reductions in the number 
of vessels and a larger number of pots per boat (and possibly larger boats).  In the bio-
economic model, the reduction in boats for the current system is factored in at 1 per 
cent per year.  In reality, this could be significantly higher (e.g. due to the “cost-price 
squeeze”) and therefore the model could be underestimating the reduction in boat 
numbers that may occur. 
Modelling a 20 per cent Pot Reduction 
 
It is recommended that the full economic modelling report A Bio-Economic 
Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, by 
consultants Economic Research Associates be read in conjunction with this summary.  
It is available at www.fish.wa.gov.au or www.rocklobsterwa.com  
 
The main assumptions and management arrangements used to model the 20 per cent 
pot reduction were: 
 
• there is a “rush to fish”; 
• extra cost (above normal costs) of fishing for the season $5,000;28 
• efficiency of pots increased by 10 per cent. 
• effort creep/increases in fishing efficiency is two per cent per year; 
• boat numbers decline at 1.5 per cent per year; 
                                                 
27 Boat numbers have declined from 549 to 495 (down 54) from December 2004 to December 2005. 
28 The extra costs are due to fishers working their remaining gear harder, e.g. taking more time/care to 
set pots, using more bait, etc). 
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• no increase in season (15 Nov to 30 June); and 
• no price increases.  
 
See Attachment 5 for further details of management rules and model assumptions for 
each management option reviewed. 
 
The following is a brief summary of the results of modelling a 20 per cent pot 
reduction at two per cent per year over 10 years. 
 
• The average net benefit to the fishery was estimated to be $16.9 million, only 
$1.5 million above the net benefit produced by the current management 
system with no pot reduction.  It is also significantly less than the net benefits 
estimated for the ITQ systems. 
• Boat numbers were reduced from 549 to 480 (total 69), which is 25 more than 
the model estimated would leave the fishery under the current management 
system with no pot reduction. 
 
A Modified, More Flexible Effort Control 
System 
 
This section discusses the key issues and potential benefits of moving to a modified, 
more flexible individual transferable effort (ITE) control management system and it 
briefly compares the economic modelling results of this system with the other 
management options that were modelled for this review. 
 
The current system could be modified to allow fishers greater operating flexibility, 
while at the same time meeting the ecologically sustainable development 
requirements for the stock.  However, to gain the potential economic benefits this ITE 
system could offer, would require fishers to accept that fishing effort (i.e. the number 
of pots they could fish and the number of days they could go fishing) may be varied 
up or down each (or every second or third) season according to: 
 
• the catch predictions; 
• fishery sustainability issues, such as breeding stock levels; 
• ecological issues, e.g. legal size abundance levels; 
• economic factors, such as levels of supply, market demand and prices; and 
• social considerations. 
 
This system would retain the current competitive nature of the fishery (the “rush to 
fish”) and it would be a more complex system to administer and manage than the 
current system. 
How a Flexible ITE System Would Work 
 
A flexible ITE system would work in a similar way to ITQs, except it would be the 
level of fishing effort (pot numbers and fishing days) that would be varied rather than 
the level of catch.  Fishers would have a fixed number of days they could fish over an 
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extended season (e.g. November to August) and it would be up to each individual to 
decide how to use his fishing days. 
 
An ITE Committee would need to be established and it would recommend to the 
Minister for Fisheries the appropriate level of fishing effort each season (or for a 
number of seasons).  Effort levels could be set up to three seasons in advance based 
on catch predictions, and the other considerations listed above.  The ITE Committee 
would review the available information each year and set the appropriate level of 
effort to take the available sustainable catch.  The simplest and most direct way to set 
fishing effort levels would be to vary the number of pots and days that could be fished 
each season. The ITE Committee could also recommend closing the fishery during 
low catch periods (e.g. for five days over the full moon) or to reduce fishing effort 
during the peaks of the whites and reds to help smooth the flow of product and 
increase the value of the catch and hence the beach price paid to fishers. 
A hypothetical example of a flexible ITE system 
 
Zone X has 30,000 unit (pot) entitlements and a season that runs from 15 November 
to 31 August (289 days).  If the catch predicted for Zone X was 4.5 million kg and the 
ITE Committee could, after taking breeding stock levels and other ecological and 
economic factors into consideration, set the level of fishing effort for the season at 
4,100,000 pot lifts over 185 days29.  Therefore, the combination of 30,000 unit 
entitlements and 185 fishing days would have to equal 4,100,000 pot lifts and the 




4,100,000 (pot lifts) ÷ [185 (days) x 30,000 (units)] = 0.72 
To calculate the number of pots a fisher could use, the fisher would multiply the 
number of units owned by 0.72.  For example, a fisher with 110 units would be able to 
use 79 pots (110 x 0.72 = 79). 
 
Note:  A number of different combinations of pots used and days fished would have 




Most of the key issues and benefits of a more flexible ITE system are the same as 
those discussed above under the section Current Rock Lobster Effort Management 
System (ITE), therefore they will not be repeated here.  However, the additional 
complexity of this system compared to the current system needs to be acknowledged 
and fishers would have to accept that their fishing effort would be varied each season 




An additional benefit of this system compared to the current system, is that it enables 
fishing effort to be controlled through a flexible system of limits on pot usage and 
                                                 
29 The average number of days currently fished per season. 
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days fished, which are fully transferable between seasons.  And, once the system 
“matured”, could be transferable within season.  This would allow fishers to trade in 
ITEs to increase or decrease their potential catch and to take their catch at the most 
profitable time (i.e. depending on rock lobster catchability, abundance and price/kg).  
It would also encourage fishers to use more multiple day pulls, particularly during the 
lower catch rate periods of the season. 
Implementation and Costs 
 
A modified, more flexible ITE system could be implemented through the current 
management licensing systems with some additional modifications and costs.  A unit 
(pot) register would be necessary to keep track of unit trading and management and 
enforcement software and hardware would need to be modified and updated to enable 
it to interface with the new system in “real time”.  In addition, all vessels would have 
to be fitted with Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMS).  These management 
requirements and additional costs would be the same for all the management options 
reviewed. 
Assumptions and limitations of the modelling 
 
It needs to be emphasised that due to the complexity of this management option, the 
bio-economic model used a much simpler version of the system than described in the 
section How A Flexible ITE System Would Work above.  In the simplified model 
version, effort levels were not set based on the catch predictions or breeding stock 
levels.  Instead, the number of fishing days for each year was held constant at 185, 
and there was no variation in the number of pots that could be used.  This means there 
is significantly less flexibility in the modelled system than there would be in practice 
and hence the opportunity for the industry to increase efficiencies (e.g. reduce capital 
and operating costs) could be significantly underestimated in the model outputs.  
Therefore, the average annual net benefits could also be significantly greater for this 
option than the model estimates. 
 
A CATCH QUOTA SYSTEM (ITQs) 
 
This section discusses the key issues and potential benefits of moving to an individual 
transferable quota (ITQ) management system.  Two ITQ systems – one with the 
current effort (pot number) controls and one without30 (significantly fewer) fishing 
effort controls – are assessed, and the bio-economic modelling results from both 
systems are compared with the other management options that were modelled for this 
review.  Also discussed are the use of constant, variable and competitive quotas and 
quotas for the whites and reds periods of the rock lobster fishery. 
                                                 
30 The ITQ system without effort controls that was modelled for this review does not have uncontrolled 
effort.  It has been limited to a 20 per cent increase in the number of pots fishers can use because 
experience in other ITQ lobster fisheries has shown that fishers do not use excessive numbers of pots, 




Risks associated with constant (fixed), variable and competitive quotas 
 
If it was decided to move to an ITQ system, there are two ways of setting the quota: 
 
• a constant quota which does not vary from year to year (i.e. it could be set for 
five, 10, or more years at a time), or  
• a variable quota based on catch predictions, which would vary each year. 
 
Modelling has shown that the annual $ benefits of a constant quota are greater than for 
a variable quota system.  However, there is a far greater risk of depleting the breeding 
stock under a constant quota (particularly during low recruitment years), unless it is 
set at a very conservative level,31 which significantly reduces the $ benefits.  
Therefore, from a sustainability and economic perspective, the use of a constant quota 
from year to year would be difficult to justify.  So while a constant quota has been 
modelled and reported on as part of this review, it is not considered a viable or 
practicable management option.  Therefore, variable quotas would be the basis of any 
ITQ system for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery. 
 
Variable quotas would be set annually based on the catch predictions for the season 
(using puerulus settlement) and would take into account the level of breeding stock, 
ecological factors, quota cheating, etc.  Variable quotas would go up and down 
annually in response to the predicted level of catch. 
 
The use of a competitive Total Allowable Commercial Catch quota (TACC), i.e. 
where a total quota is set for the commercial fishery and fishers compete for their 
share of the catch (with either limited or unlimited pots), was not considered a viable 
alternative management option.  Experience around the world has shown that 
competitive quotas combine the worst aspects of both quota and effort control systems 
and they are the most unpredictable regarding their impact on long-term sustainability 
(e.g. breeding stock levels).  Therefore, this review has focused on ITQs. 
Quota allocation 
 
The State Government has stated that if it were decided that the rock lobster fishery 
should move to an ITQ management system: 
 
• the catch would be allocated on the basis of the number of units (pots) a 
person owned; 
• a fisher’s catch history would not be taken into account; 
• a quota would be set for each zone of the fishery (A, B and C); and 
• each fisher’s share of the zone quota would be calculated on the number of 
units (pots) he owned. 
 
Catch history would not be used in an ITQ allocation process because it would distort 
the value of authorisations (entitlements) for the following reasons: 
                                                 
31 possibly as low as 9 to 9,500 tonnes/year 
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• It is possible in this fishery to link catch at a given time to a managed fishery 
licence (MFL).  But the MFL is not the ‘currency’ of the fishery – the gear 
unit (pot) is the currency of the fishery.  The extent of trading in units (buying, 
selling and leasing) that has occurred within the market over the years means 
that it is simply not possible to track with administrative efficiency or 
accuracy, the ownership or fishing history of each unit in the fishery. 
• The market for rock lobster units of entitlement factors in the expected 
earnings into the value of the units, and this therefore represents the truest 
judgement of their worth.  The market does not differentiate between low and 
high catches of lobster when valuing units for sale.  All units have equal value 
in the market. 
• The strength of the lease market for rock lobster units of entitlement means 
that “owners” are not limited to fishing in order to use their entitlement to 
develop an income stream. 
 
Allocation issues are often the stumbling block for the introduction of an ITQ system 
in a fishery that is already well established. This is because when it is done on the 
basis of units owned, it significantly changes many fishers’ share of the catch. 
 
Often fisheries that make the transition to quota management do so from a 
management system where there has not been sufficient controls on fishing effort.  In 
these cases, they have failed to protect the breeding stock and ecology generally and  
cannot ensure the long-term sustainability of the fish stocks being exploited.  The 
review of the current rock lobster effort control system has not been initiated because 
the current system has not ensured the sustainability of the rock lobster stocks.  
Rather, the review was undertaken to see if a different management system could 
offer any additional benefits (ecological, social, economic) that would warrant a 
change.  
Maintaining biological controls to ensure sustainability 
 
Under a quota system, the biological controls such as minimum size, protection of 
berried, tar spot, setose and maximum size females, would be maintained in one form 
or another as part of the long-term sustainability settings. 
Maintaining effort (pot number) controls 
 
If it were decided to move to an ITQ system, there are two main ways it could be 
introduced – with effort controls or without them.  Initially, an ITQ system would 
have to be introduced with the current effort controls in place to enable everyone 
(fishers, processors, government, fisheries managers, researchers and other 
stakeholders) to become accustomed to the new arrangements and to monitor its effect 
on the fishery.  This is known as the transition period, during which the system can 
stabilise and all the teething problems can be sorted out.  Once the ITQ system has 
stabilised, consideration could be given to relaxing fishing effort (pot number) 
controls.  An ITQ without any fishing effort controls (e.g. controls on pot numbers, 
pot design, season, etc) would theoretically provide the maximum economic benefits 




This review does assess an ITQ system without effort (pot) controls.  However, in the 
model the increase in pot numbers under this system has been limited to 20 per cent, 
as experience in other fisheries has shown that when fishers are allowed to use as 
many pots as they like to take their quota, they do not use excessive numbers.  In New 
Zealand for instance, fishers use about 20 per cent more pots.32  Pot usage is 
controlled largely by the vessel’s carrying capacity and how many pots can be worked 
effectively each day.  It is not cost effective for a fisher to buy and use more pots than 
is necessary to take his quota in the most cost effective way. 
Exploitation 
 
Under a catch quota system, fishers don’t have to be concerned about increases in 
fishing effort leading to increases in exploitation and hence the need to reduce fishing 
effort.  This is because the exploitation of the stock is controlled by setting tight limits 
on the amount that can be caught rather than on fishing effort.  If breeding stocks 
levels declined, quotas would need to be reduced. 
 
Catch quotas are usually set at a level a little below what could be obtained under an 
effort control system because of the uncertainties inherent in quota setting.  This can 
allow more lobsters to survive each season and hence the overall abundance of 
lobsters to increase, which provides a ‘buffer’ against: 
 
• uncertainties in the catch predictions that are used as the basis of quota setting; 
• illegal catches going to the black market (i.e. quota cheating); and 
• unanticipated responses of the fishing fleet and the rock lobster stocks to 
exploitation and environmental factors. 
 
Conservative quota setting also ensures that fishers can catch their quota each season 
without risking the sustainability of the stock. 
 
If fishery independent monitoring shows that the abundance of rock lobsters has 
increased and is consistently above the level required for ecological sustainability, 
then the quota could be set higher to harvest some of them. 
Competition Between Fishers 
 
Under an ITQ management system, the emphasis shifts from competition between 
fishers to maximise the amount of catch they take to maximising the $ value of their 
quota (i.e. catching the highest value lobsters) and minimising their fishing costs.  
There is no “reward” or incentive for fishers to fish harder to try and maximise their 
catch because their quota limits it.  The only way to increase catch is to buy or lease 
more quota. 
 
When a fisher knows prior to the commencement of the season what his catch quota is 
and is confident he will catch it, competition between fishers is significantly reduced 
and the emphasis shifts to fishing “smarter” to reduce the costs of the fishing 
                                                 
32 Information provided by Economic Research Associates.  It has also been note in New Zealand that 
fishers will use extra pots to secure and retain ground rather than to increase their effort, which could 
generate significant ecological and resource sharing issues. 
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operation to maximise net profit.  This is the fundamental and important difference 
between effort and quota management systems. 
 
Although a quota system may produce on average a little less catch than an effort 
control system, it could provide greater stability in economic, social and ecological 
terms.  This could translate into higher net profits for fishers and greater benefits to 
the community and marine environment generally. 
Impact of ITQ allocation on a fisher’s catch and behaviour 
 
The ITQ allocation could encourage fleet restructuring to occur at an accelerated rate, 
particularly within the first few years, as those who remain in the fishery seek to 
adjust their quota holdings to the level of catch they had prior to ITQ allocation.  
People who own multiple boats and ITQs could be inclined to aggregate their ITQs 
onto fewer boats.  The more proficient fishers are more likely to drive this adjustment.  
 
When fishers and other people who own pots weigh up the advantages and 
disadvantages of effort controls versus quota control systems, they usually do so from 
the perspective of whether the catch they would be allocated under a quota system 
would be more or less than the catch they would expect to take under the existing 
effort control system.  ITQ systems, where initial allocation is based on the number of 
units (pots) owned, make all fishers average catchers. Whereas effort control systems 
encourage fishers to maximise their catches by being highly competitive.  ITQs allow 
fishers to concentrate their efforts on reducing their fishing costs without the fear of 
being out-competed by other fishers. 
 
Competition between fishers may continue to some extent under ITQs (e.g. it could 
still concentrate in the highest catch periods – whites and reds) until fishers adjust to 
the new system and the market may take some time to provide the appropriate 
feedback on when to fish.  Therefore, the increase in profits due to greater 
efficiencies, reduced costs and increased prices could take some time to be fully 
realised. 
 
The advantages and disadvantages of effort and quota systems are much more 
complex than just who would catch the most under the different management systems.  
The amount of rock lobsters a fisher catches is only one part of the equation that 
generates the net profit of the business.  The other very important parts of the profit 
equation are: 
 
• how much it costs to catch each kg of rock lobsters; and 
• the opportunities the different management systems offer to maximise the 
price received for the catch. 
 
It may appear at first glance that an above average fisher would be worse off under 
quota, because his share of the catch would be less than what he would get under a 
competitive effort control system.  However, the potential to reduce fishing costs and 
maximise the price received for his catch could significantly offset or out-weigh the 
reduction in catch.  Below-average fishers could be seen as the big winners in moving 
to a quota system, as their share of the catch would increase and they may also be able 
to reduce their fishing costs and maximise the price they received for their catch.  
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However, some below-average catchers may have to fish more days and/or use more 
pots to achieve their quota or they may choose to sell or lease some of it. 
 
It also needs to be noted that fishers who catch above-average under the current 
management system do not always make the most profit per kg of lobsters caught.  
Indeed as the cost of fishing increases – as is occurring now with increases in prices 
such as diesel, bait, labour, maintenance, and insurance – fishing “harder” for a few 
extra kilos is sometimes not cost effective, i.e. the cost of fishing can exceed the profit 
from the catch. 
Impact of ITQs on the peak catching periods 
 
ITQs could encourage fishers to concentrate on the most productive periods of the 
season (whites – December/January, and reds – March/April).  This would be more 
likely to occur if there were no controls on pot numbers or if there weren’t a price 
differential throughout the season (e.g. higher prices paid at the end of the season).  
As already stated, ITQs would initially be implemented using the same controls on 
pots (numbers and design) as apply under the current system. 
 
The annual starting date of the ITQ season could be critical in determining fishing 
patterns.  If the season started in November, fishers may be reluctant to forgo any 
fishing during the ‘high catch rate’ whites period, because of concerns about their 
ability to achieve their full quota during the ‘low catch rate’ periods later in the year, 
particularly May-August.  This could even exacerbate the catches in the peak periods.  
However, if the season started in February/March, fishers could maximise their effort 
through to the end of August and if they had achieved a significant proportion of their 
quota, they may reduce their effort in the following whites period. 
Effects on new entrants and potential new business approaches 
 
It has been suggested that, compared to the current system, ITQs could limit the scope 
for new entrants to the fishery to fish hard and maximise their catch to help them to 
pay off their loans.  Under an ITQ system, fishers maximise their profit by focusing 
on reducing the cost of fishing, rather than increasing catch.  Under an effort control 
system, new entrants have the opportunity to work harder to increase their catch and 
hence their profits, which could give them greater capacity to meet their loan 
repayments. 
 
ITQs could see significant new innovations around fishing operations such as: 
 
• pots with multiple necks; 
• bait savers; 
• more fuel efficient engines; 
• fishing closer to port to reduce costs, etc. 
 
Under quotas, there is likely to be much greater heterogeneity of the fleet (i.e. a 
greater variety of boats and gear).  These could include new vessel designs to optimise 
the quota arrangements for a particular vessel (e.g. a vessel that specialises in fishing 




Experience in other fisheries has also shown that some fishers (particularly if 
financially pressed) would reduce their maintenance costs on boats and gear, which 
could affect vessel safety. 
Cheating on quota 
 
Unfortunately, no matter what management system is used, there will always be a 
small number of fishers and processors/buyers that break the rules.  The amount of 
quota cheating that takes place would have to be quantified and taken off the 
commercial quota that was set to ensure that the total catch (legal + illegal catch) was 
sustainable. 
 
For example, if it were estimated that the commercial quota for a zone should be 
4,000,000 kg, but it was estimated that there was a 5 per cent illegal commercial take, 
then the commercial quota that would be allocated would be 4,000,000 kg minus 5 per 
cent, that is, 3,800,000 kg.  That is, each fisher’s ITQ would be reduced by 5 per cent 
from what it would have been if there were no illegal catch. 
 
In some quota fisheries in Australia and New Zealand (e.g. abalone and lobster), 
illegal quota is a serious management problem that the industry has to pay for by 
reducing ITQs and increasing enforcement costs.  If a fisher is under financial 
pressure, there is considerable incentive to cheat on quota.  And if there is collusion 
between a fisher and a buyer/processor, it likely that it would be more difficult to 
detect him taking 10 per cent more illegal quota than it would if he were working 10 
per cent more pots illegally under the current management system. 
Compliance 
 
Quotas require a very high degree of enforcement, significantly more than the current 
management system.  There would need to be very tight security around and 
surveillance/inspection of weigh-in stations (which may need to be restricted in 
number and require special supervision) and consignment dockets (the electronic and 
paper audit trail) to enable a fisher’s catch to be followed from his fishing boat to the 
“dinner plate” (end user), on a daily basis, i.e. in real time.  There would be a 
requirement for fishers to keep accurate documentation for every kilo of lobster that 
they sold and they may also have to count all lobsters they consign, as they do in 
South Australia. 
 
Enforcement would become much more intrusive, black and white, and knifed-edged 
under a quota system33.  There would also need to be severe penalties for quota 
cheating to keep the black market from undermining the ITQ system. 
 
It is estimated that there would be a one-off enforcement/management cost of about 
$1 million to set up an ITQ system and an additional ongoing 
enforcement/management cost of about $3 million annually.  The additional costs 
have been included in the bio-economic modelling. 
                                                 
33 For further discussion see report ‘How do Quota Management Systems work in Rock Lobster 





Historic catch and effort information would not be comparable to that under ITQs 
because of changes in fishing behaviour, pot catching efficiency, etc.  Fishery data 
collected from commercial research logbooks and statutory monthly returns under an 
ITQ system would not be as useful for stock assessment purposes.  Therefore, 
additional research would have to be undertaken particularly the collection of fishery 
independent (not obtained from the commercial fishery) stock data.  For example, this 
data could include length frequencies, breeding stock abundance, stock densities, etc, 
to ensure that accurate stock assessments were produced and that quotas were being 
set at sustainable levels. 
 
In addition, any changes to pot design to increase catching efficiency would have to 
be calibrated against a ‘standard’ pot to allow comparisons of catch rates and hence 
abundance estimates, if commercial fishing data were to be at all useful for stock 
assessment purposes. 
 
It is estimated that the additional ongoing research cost would be about $1.1 million 
annually.  The additional costs have been included in the bio-economic modelling. 
Legal Framework and Procedures Required for ITQs 
 
If it were decided that the fishery was to move to an ITQ system, the details of the 
framework and process would be developed in conjunction with all relevant 
stakeholders at the time.  Below is an example of what such a legal framework and 
process might look like. 
Legal framework 
 
A legal framework would need to be established to allocate quota in the first instance 
and to set quota on an ongoing basis.  The main aspects could include: 
 
• a specific Act of Parliament to enshrine the initial quota allocation and perhaps 
the annual quota setting procedure; 
• a Quota Setting Committee established under the current Fish Resources 
Management Act (FRMA) 1994, which would recommend quota levels to the 
State Government.  The committee could comprise relevant members of 
government, commercial and recreational fishers, processors, the conservation 
sector, and community stakeholder groups. The composition of the committee 
would depend on whether a Total Allowable Catch (TAC – for all sectors, e.g. 
customary, commercial and recreational) was being set for the fishery as a 
whole, as distinct from a quota for the commercial fishery; 
• a Technical Advisory Committee for quota allocation, which would calculate 
quota levels based on a clear set of sustainability principles.  This committee 
would be comprised of scientific experts and fisheries managers and they 
would advise and make recommendations to the Quota Setting Committee; 
• a new management plan under the FRMA to clearly set out the rules of the 




• new regulations and penalties for quota enforcement; and 
• development of new systems or modification of the current legal, licensing, 
quota registrations and enforcement systems (e.g. paper trail audits of fishers 
and processors). 
Quota setting procedure 
 
A possible quota setting process for the commercial fishery is briefly described below.  
Quotas would always be set at ecologically sustainable levels. 
 
• For each zone (A, B and C) the biological information on puerulus settlement, 
catch predictions, rock lobster stock status (size and sex frequencies, 
abundances, etc), breeding stock levels and ecological issues would be 
compiled, modelled, analysed and documented by research scientists. 
• The Technical Advisory Committee (comprising scientific experts) would use 
a set of clear business rules to review and assess the biological information 
and calculate the level of quota that it believed should be set for each zone (A, 
B and C).  The Technical Advisory Committee would then make a 
recommendation to the Quota Setting Committee. 
• The Quota Setting Committee would assess the Technical Advisory 
Committee’s recommendation and supporting documentation. It would also 
take into account any other ecological, economic, social or management issues 
it considered relevant before it made its recommendation on quota levels to the 
Minister for Fisheries. 
• The Quota Setting Committee would meet at least annually, with a view of 
setting quota three years in advance. 
The Basis of Quota Setting 
Conservative quota setting 
 
To account for uncertainty around catch predictions and unforeseen environmental 
influences, catch quotas are traditionally set below the catch that could potentially be 
realised in an effort controlled fishery.  In the short term (e.g. five years) this could 
produce slightly lower catches (though not necessarily lower $ returns).  However, 
conservative quota setting can lead to an increase in abundance of the overall lobster 
population, which could result in: 
 
• greater catching efficiency, i.e. because of the generally higher abundance of 
lobsters, they are easier and quicker to catch and hence there can be significant 
savings on operating costs (e.g. pot numbers, bait, travelling time, etc); 
• higher catches at times of the season when catches are normally low; and 
• greater ecological stability due to a higher density of all sizes of lobsters on 
the fishing grounds, which would result in less impact overall on the 
general/rock lobster ecology.34 
                                                 
34 It could be argued that it would also be possible to gain these benefits under an effort control system 
if the level of fishing effort was set conservatively enough.  In addition, industry could argue for higher 
quotas if the lobster abundance went above that required for ecological sustainability. 
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Quota management issues 
 
Commercial35 catch quota setting for each zone would be done taking into account the 
following: 
 
• Catch predictions: The catch predictions, which are predictions of 
recruitment levels to the fishery based on the levels of puerulus settlement that 
occurred in the previous three to four years, would be used to set the quota for 
each zone.  For example, if the catch prediction for a zone was between 4.5 
and 5.0 million kg, then the quota could be set at 4.5 million kg.  The lower 
end of the catch prediction would initially be used to minimise the risk of 
impacting on the ecological sustainability of the stock, due to the uncertainties 
inherent in predicting catch, unforseen changes in fishing fleet responses and 
lobster behaviour due to changing patterns of exploitation and the natural 
variations that occur in environmental factors. 
• Breeding stock: The level of breeding stock in each zone would be 
maintained above the level it was in the late 1970s-early 1980s (the current 
trigger points for management action).  Quotas would be adjusted to ensure the 
breeding stock was maintained above this level. 
• Ecological sustainability: The broad requirements of ecologically sustainable 
development would also be taken into account in quota setting. 
• Illegal catch: A reduction in commercial quota allocation would be required 
to offset any illegal (unreported) catch, due to some fishers cheating on their 
quota.  See the section Cheating on quota below for further discussion. 
• Increases in lobster abundance: If over a number of years, fishery 
independent research monitoring showed that rock lobster abundances on the 
fishing grounds had increased and were consistently well above the level 
required for both sustainability and ecological purposes, then the quota could 
be increased for a number of seasons to harvest the surplus. 
• The timing of the start of the season: There could be a big impact on fishers’ 
behaviour depending on which month the quota season started.  For instance, 
if the season started in February after the whites or in May after the reds, 
fishers may adopt different fishing strategies to those they currently use.  This 
would be further compounded if there were also significant difference in 
price/kg for different periods of the season (e.g. lower prices in the whites). 
Zone Quotas 
 
If the rock lobster fishery moved to an ITQ system, a quota would be set for each 
zone – A, B and C.  Quotas could be set in the following way: 
 
• ‘A’ fishers would have a quota in Zone B that they could catch up until the 14 
March.  ‘A’ fishers would then move to Zone A where they would have a 
quota from 15 March to the end of the season, allocated on the basis of how 
many units (pots) were held on a licence. 
                                                 
35 There would be a separate quota set for recreational fishers, based on the percentage share of the total 
catch negotiated through the Integrated Fisheries Management process, which is currently underway. 
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• ‘B’ fishers would have one quota in Zone B up until 14 March and another 
quota in Zone B from 15 March to the end of the season, allocated on the basis 
of how many units (pots) were held on a licence.  ‘B’ fishers could also be 
allowed to shift whites quota into the reds fishery, but not vice versa. 
• ‘A’ and ‘B’ fishers could have their quotas for the period 15 November to 14 
March calculated as a proportion of total catch taken in Zone B in the 
following way: 
o Catch for the period 15 November to 14 March could be averaged over 
a 10-year period as a percentage of total catch in Zone B (15 
November to end 30 June) and this percentage could then be used to 
split future quotas between these two periods of the season. 
o The quota calculated for the period 15 November to 14 March would 
be allocated to ‘A’ and ‘B’ fishers on the basis of the number of units 
held on a licence. 
• Zone C fishers could have one quota for the whole season allocated on the 
basis of how many units (pots) were held on a licence. 
Whites and Reds Quotas 
 
Industry may decide that within an ITQ system there are significant processing, 
marketing – and hence beach price benefits – in having quotas on the whites (e.g. 
December-January) and reds (March-April) catch periods.  Whites and reds quotas 
could be used to reduce some of the peak catches and make more lobsters available in 
traditionally lower catch periods (e.g. February and May-August).  A quota for the 
whites could also be used to ensure sufficient migrating lobsters escaped the fishery to 
replenish the breeding stock on the offshore deeper water reefs and at the southern 
and northern ends of the fishery. 
 
If there were significant economic advantages to be obtained, a catch quota could also 
be considered for the first two to four weeks of the Abrolhos Islands season to help 
reduce the very high catch peak and spread product over a longer period.  As 
previously mentioned, the way fishers would distribute their quota between the whites 
and reds peaks would depend to a large extent on the start time to the quota season. 
Potential Benefits of ITQs 
 
The main potential benefits that ITQ systems could offer are described below: 
 
• substantial potential economic benefits; 
• competition between fishers for catch would be significantly reduced over 
time,36 provided the quota was set at a level where it could always be taken; 
• fishers are able to use innovation and technology to reduce fishing costs 
without the fear of loosing catch to more competitive fishers.  For example: 
o more efficient pot designs (pots that catch more and retain lobsters 
better), 
o  more economic boats and baiting strategies,  
                                                 
36 Some local competition may occur as local rock lobster abundances are fished down, i.e. to fill their 
quota fishers may have to travel further than they would prefer. 
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o greater use of two- or more day pulls using more effective pots (i.e. 
pots that keep catching over a longer period of time and don’t allow 
lobsters to escape), etc; 
• if quotas help to flatten out the catch peaks (whites, reds and Abrolhos) and 
processors/marketers can realise price premiums through more stable and 
extended supply (fewer peaks and longer season), then quotas have the 
potential to generate higher returns from the catch; 
• fishers can choose when they fish to maximise their profits and to suit their 
lifestyle. 
 
ITQs with Effort Controls 
 
This section describes how a variable ITQ system with the current fishing effort (pot 
numbers) controls would work in practice. 
 
Variable ITQs would be used for the reasons discussed above.  Zone quotas would be 
set annually based on catch predictions and the status of the breeding stock. 
 
Note:  As stated above, if it were decided to move to a quota system, then ITQs with 
fishing effort controls would be the system that would initially be introduced.  If 
additional economic benefits could be gained, then effort controls could be relaxed 
over time as the new system stabilised and evolved. 
How an Effort Controlled ITQ System Would Work 
 
Under an ITQ system which is effort controlled, a fisher would be allocated a quota 
based on the number of units held on his licence and he would only be able to use the 
number of pots he can use under the current system.  However, the pots could be 15 
per cent more efficient due to changes in pot design.  Below is a description of one 
way such a system could work. 
Quota allocation 
• Initial and all subsequent quota allocations would be based on the number of 
units held on a licence and the units would relate directly to the number of pots 
that could be used, as is the case under the current system. 
• Prior to the commencement of each season, unit holders would be told what 
their quota was for the season based on the zone quota and the number of units 
they held. 
• For example, if the zone quota were 3,500,000 kg and the number of units in 
the zone were 27,000, then each unit would be allocated 129.6 kg.  A person 
with 110 units would have a total ITQ of 14,256 kg at the start of the season.  
If, as is currently the case, a fisher could use only 0.82 of his units, he would 
be able to fish his quota with 90 pots (i.e. 110 units x 0.82 = 90 pots in the 
water). 
Quota/pot transfers and pot usage 
 
A clear set of business rules for quota/pot transfers would need to be developed with 
stakeholders.  Transfers of quota and pots (buying, selling, leasing) would initially 
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only be allowed prior to the season, but as the system evolved over time, transfers 
during the season could be considered.  The more flexible the transfer system was 
required to be, the more complex it would be, particularly if there was a strict link 
between quota and pot usage.  For examples of how within season transfers could 
work see Attachment 6. 
 
ITQs Without Effort Controls 
 
Note:  As stated above, if it were decided to move to a quota system, then ITQs with 
fishing effort controls would be the system that would initially be introduced.  If 
additional economic benefits could be gained, then effort controls could be relaxed 
over time as the new system stabilised and evolved. 
 
An ITQ system without effort controls is theoretically the management system that 
offers the greatest potential economic benefits for the rock lobster industry.  However, 
these potential benefits have to be weighed up against the risks, as described under the 
Key Issues section above. 
 
This section describes how a variable ITQ system without effort controls would work 
in practice.  Variable ITQs would be used for the reasons discussed above and zone 
quotas would be set annually based on catch predictions and the status of the breeding 
stock. 
 
From experience in other fisheries, ITQs without effort controls (no controls on pot 
numbers) do not lead to excessive increases in pots in the water.  Pot numbers are 
largely limited by the carrying capacity of the boats and the number that can be 
effectively worked each day.  Once fishers become used to an ITQ system, they 
appear to use the most cost-effective number of pots to take their quota. 
 
For this review and the bio-economic modelling exercise, it has been assumed (from 
experience in other fisheries) that in practice fishers would not increase their fishing 
effort excessively under this system (as discussed under Maintaining effort (pot 
number) controls), even though no pot limits would apply.  Therefore, an increase in 
pot numbers of 20 per cent and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of a 
pot (through changes in pot design) has been used in the model.  This equates to an 
increase in catching efficiency of the “standard” boat of about 68 per cent.  Under the 
model’s assumptions, the ability to significantly increase the catching efficiency of 
the boats would encourage a significant number of them to sell their quota and leave 
the fishery. 
How an ITQ System Without Effort Controls Could Work 
 
A variable ITQ system without effort controls would work in almost the same way as 
described for a variable ITQ system with effort controls.  A fisher would be allocated 
a quota based on the number of units held on the licence and he would only be able to 
use 20 per cent more pots (as modelled) than he could use under the current system.  




• Initial and all subsequent quota allocations would be based on the number of 
units held and 20 per cent more pots than the current number could be used to 
take the quota. 
• Prior to the commencement of each season, unit holders would be told what 
their quota was for the season based on the zone quota and number of units 
held. 
• For example, if the zone quota were 3,500,000 kg and the number of units in 
the zone were 27,000, then each unit would be allocated 129.6 kg.  A person 
with 110 units would have a total ITQ of 14,256 kg at the start of the season. 
• A fisher could use 20 per cent more pots than his current units to fish his 
quota, i.e. 110 units x 120 per cent (or 1.20) = 132 pots in the water). 
Quota transfers and pot usage 
 
A clear set of business rules for quota/pot transfers would need to be developed with 
stakeholders.  Transfers of quota (buying, selling, leasing) would initially only be 
allowed prior to the season, but as the system evolved over time, transfers during the 
season could be considered.  For an example of how within season transfers could 
work, see Attachment 6. 
 
Comparisons Between Effort and Quota 
Management Systems – Results of Bio-economic 
Modelling 
 
This section describes and discusses the main assumptions and management rules that 
have been used in the bio-economic model37, some of the model’s limitations, and the 
care that needs to be taken in interpreting the model’s results.  A summary and 
general comparison is made of the model estimates of average annual $ benefits for 
the 11 management option variations that were assessed.  A more detailed description 
and discussion of the model outputs for breeding stock levels, annual catch and 
fishing effort, boat numbers and economic benefits is also provided for four of the 
management options, which had the most conservative assumptions (e.g. lowest price 
increases). 
 
A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock 
Lobster Fishery, produced by Economic Research Associates (ERA) and referred to 
as the ERA report, should be read in conjunction with this section.38
                                                 
37 More details of the management arrangements and model assumptions for each of the management 
options are provided in Attachment 5 (Tables A and B). 
38 See A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster 
Fishery, produced by Economic Research Associates on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at 
www.fish.wa.gov.au or the Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site www.rocklobsterwa.com or 
phone the Department of Fisheries on 9482 7267 for a hard copy. 
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Key Issues and Assumptions Of The Bio-Economic Model 
Accuracy of the model 
 
ERA, the consultants who have undertaken the bio-economic modelling of the 
Western Rock Lobster Fishery have obtained the information on the assumptions that 
underpin the model from: 
 
• a survey of commercial fishers (postal questionnaire – 21 respondents); 
• detailed discussions with focus groups of fishers, processors, research 
scientists and managers; 
• scientific publications; 
• Department of Fisheries’ databases; and 
• Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
 
ERA have tested the model outputs against the historical fishery information (e.g. 
catch and fishing effort, catch rate (kg/pot lift), distribution of catch by month, boat 
and pot numbers, beach prices, etc) and the fits are good, therefore they believe the 
model is behaving in a realistic and reliable way.  ERA believe that based on the 
assumptions used, the model outputs provide robust estimates of what could happen to 
the fishery under the different management options. 
 
For example, under the ITQ system with reduced effort (pot number) controls – i.e. 
options 4a to 4d where pot usage has been allowed to increase by 20 per cent) the 
fishing season was lengthened to 31 August, the average beach price was increased by 
between $1.25/kg and $5.50/kg, and the catching efficiency of the pots was increased 
by 40 per cent through changes in pot design – the model predicts the fishery would 
gain a significant annual benefit in excess of $80 million.  The model estimates these 
large benefits because it assumes that fishers would make changes to their normal 
fishing behaviour to maximise their profits by, for instance, catching some of their 
quota in July-August when the price is higher and the increase in pot efficiency could 
allow them to work two- and three-day pulls very economically. 
 
The model shows that the major catch peaks in the whites and the reds are still 
dominant under ITQs but are reduced a little, which allows more rock lobsters to be 
available in traditionally low catch rate periods and during the extended season, when 
prices are higher.  The model appears to be realistic in that it does not allow fishers to 
concentrate their entire quota in periods of high price, because the 
catchability/availability of lobsters in those periods is relatively low, so only a modest 
portion of the quota could be taken at that time. 
 
If the price increases and efficiency gains used in the model are lower than expected, 
the $ benefits that would flow from the management options based on these 
assumptions would be significantly reduced. 
 
To give an indication of how “realistic” the model outputs are, the average number of 
pot lifts and the average catch (kg) per month for Zone C are shown below as 
examples of what the model estimates for some of the different management options.  
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Zone C: Pot lifts by month 
[Note:  Sc = Scenario; Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current 
management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3c and 3d = variable ITQ with the 
current effort (pot number) controls and price increases of $2.00/kg and $1.00/kg respectively; 
Scenario 4c and 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are 
increased by 20 per cent, and price increases of $2.50/kg and $1.25/kg respectively.  Graphs 3c and 3d 
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 Zone C: Catch by month  
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[Note:  Sc = Scenario; Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current 
management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3c and 3d = variable ITQ with the 
current effort (pot number) controls and price increases of $2.00/kg and $1.00/kg respectively; 
Scenario 4c and 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are 
increased by 20 per cent, and price increases of $2.50/kg and $1.25/kg respectively.  Graphs 3c and 3d 
and 4c and 4d overlay each other, so it is difficult to distinguish between them.] 
 
One factor that has not been modelled, which would be likely to have a significant 
impact on fisher behaviour and the potential $ benefits that could be gained by 
moving to an ITQ system, is the start time for the quota season.  For instance, if the 
quota season started in February or May, fishers would use different fishing strategies 
to what they would use for a traditional November start. 
Modelling fleet efficiency/economic gains 
 
An important aspect of ERA’s bio-economic modelling was to determine if any of the 
management options offered additional gains in fleet efficiency, that is, greater annual 
net economic benefits ($ profits) compared to the current system.  In the model, the 
fleet efficiency gains were calculated and expressed as reductions in boat numbers.  
That is, economic theory implies (and the model assumes) that fewer boats in the fleet 
mean more catch per boat = lower costs/kg of lobsters caught.  This, in turn, means a 
more efficient fleet overall and greater net profits/benefits. 
 
However, increasing fleet efficiency and net profits do not necessarily just involve 
boats leaving the fishery.  Fleet efficiency can also be increased, particularly under an 
ITQ system, if fishers reduce their individual operating costs, e.g. use smaller, less 
costly and more economic boats and implement strategies to save on fuel, bait, labour 
and costs.  Therefore, the significant economic gains ($), due to fleet efficiency 
increases (the significant reduction in boat numbers), that the model has predicted for 
the ITQ system with reduced effort (pot number) controls (i.e. it allows a 20 per cent 
increase in pot numbers) are, in practice, more than likely to be made up of a 
combination of reduced operating costs and fewer boats, rather than just fewer boats 
in the fleet.  The current model cannot provide separate estimates of reductions in 
individual boat operating costs compared to the economic gains that can be attributed 
to reductions in boat numbers.  However, it is reasonable to assume that the economic 
efficiency gains from fleet reduction can be used as a proxy for the efficiency gains. 
ITEs and pot reductions 
 
Bio-economic modelling shows that under the current ITE (effort control) 
management system, a pot reduction (e.g. 20 per cent at two per cent per year over 10 
years) would reduce the number of boats faster than the current system with no pot 
reduction, but not to the same extent as the ITQ system with reduced controls on pots 
numbers.  A 20 per cent pot reduction under the current system would, according to 
the model, also result in slightly greater fleet economic ($) benefits than the current 
system without a pot reduction.  But it would not yield nearly the same $ benefits as 
ITQs.  The majority of the gains under the ITE systems (including the 20 per cent pot 
reduction) would come through a reduction in the number of boats (i.e. the fleet 
would comprise fewer boats with larger numbers of pots) rather than a reduction in 
individual fisher’s operating costs.  This is because under the current ITE system 
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(with or without a 20 per cent pot reduction), the competitive nature of fishing is 
encouraged and therefore there is less scope for fishers to reduce their operating costs. 
Uncertainty around the economic benefits of ITQs 
 
The potential benefits of ITQs that are predicted from the bio-economic modelling are 
derived from hypothetical price increases and efficiency gains that industry 
representatives considered were reasonable.  However, there are risks that these gains 
may not be fully realised. 
 
Hypothetical price increase of up to $5.50/kg for the total catch 
 
The price increases used in the model apply to the total annual catch and are 
composed of: 
 
• $2/kg due to the longer season of supply November to August (this also 
applies to the more flexible effort control option that was modelled); 
• $1.50 to $3.00/kg if ITQs result in less variation in the catch from season to 
season; and 
• $0.50/kg if ITQs result in a more stable supply of product within a season, i.e. 
catch is spread a little more evenly throughout the season (e.g. lower catch 
peaks in the whites and reds). 
 
If these hypothetical price increases were less than estimated, or did not materialise as 
an additional benefit to the normal price changes due to changes in exchange rates or 
economic conditions, then the potential economic benefits of an ITQ system with or 
without effort controls would be significantly reduced.  This would considerably 
reduce the economic incentive to change the current management system.  To allow 
for this uncertainty, the model used what was considered to be a conservative 
$1.00/kg and $1.25/kg increase in price for two of the ITQ options (options 3d and 
4d). 
 
See the section below on Sensitivity of $ benefits to increases in price/kg for 
discussion on how increases in beach prices influence model outputs, i.e. the 
proportion of the estimated $ benefits due to price increases compared to efficiency 
gains. 
 
Hypothetical efficiency gains from changes in pot design 
 
It is estimated that changes in pot design (e.g. larger pots with side entrances, parlour 
pots that stop escapement, etc) could yield efficiency increases of between 15 per cent 
and 40 per cent.  This would mean that a fisher could use fewer but more efficient 
pots, to reduce his overall operating costs, which could result in the purchase of a 
smaller, more economic boat with lower fuel, bait, and labour costs.  The model 
shows that there are significant economic benefits to be gained by increasing the 







Modelled efficiency gains from boat reductions 
 
The modelling results for ITQs showed the potential for significant increases in fleet 
efficiency (hence annual $ benefits) that could flow from a large reduction in the 
number of boats in the fishery.  This was particularly so for the ITQ system with 
reduced fishing effort controls (i.e. fishers could use up to 20 per cent more pots than 
they currently use and the pots could be up to 40 per cent more efficient at catching).  
Under this ITQ option, the number of boats declined from 549 to 256 (i.e. 293 boats 
left the fleet).  In practice, the $ gains from increases in fleet efficiency may not be as 
great as predicted by the model because: 
 
o a significant portion of the efficiency gains may come through individual 
fishers reducing their costs, rather than boats leaving the industry; 
o the reduction in boat numbers could be less than estimated; 
o efficiency gains assumed for a significantly smaller fleet size may not be as 
large as anticipated; and  
o the decline in boat numbers may occur over a very long period of time. 
 
If the efficiency gains obtained by significantly reducing the size of the fleet were not 
as great as predicted and/or were slow to materialise, the significant benefits of ITQ 
systems, particularly with reduced controls on pot numbers and increased pot catching 
efficiency, could be significantly lower than the model estimates. 
Time required to realise the benefits of ITQs 
 
If the fishery moved to ITQs, it may take as long as one generation of fishers to 
realise the full potential economic benefits.  The time would depend largely on two 
factors: 
 
• how quickly the management system could be deregulated under ITQs to 
allow fishers to design more efficient pots and to use more pots (e.g. 20 per 
cent more) to catch their quota.  Deregulation could only proceed if it did not 
impact adversely on the sustainability of the stock and the integrity of the 
management and enforcement system (particularly the control of the black 
market for illegal catch); and 
• how rapidly the industry (fishers, processors and marketers) would adjust to 
the new ITQ system and deliver the price increases (processors would need to 
play a lead role) and efficiency gains (fishers would have to reduce their 
operating costs and boats would have to retire from the fishery). 
Modelling Results – the Different Management Options 
Profit Optimising Behaviour 
 
The bio-economic model assumed that the operators of its average representative boat 
in each fishing zone would engage in profit optimising behaviour.  This means, for 
instance, the operator would not go fishing on days when it was not profitable even 
when an entitlement (fishing days or quota) may not be fully utilised.  In reality, 
individual fishers may not always behave in this way because of non-economic 
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factors that may influence their decisions about when and where to fish that may not 
be economically optimal. 
Processing and marketing 
 
Generally, when processors and marketers assess effort and quota systems, they do so 
from the point of view of how they might be able to maximise the value of the catch 
they process.  Generally, processors agree that the following factors could help to 
increase the value of the total catch: 
 
• having the catch come in more constantly during the season and from one 
season to the next, without big peaks and troughs, so a mix of products could 
be produced that would maximise the overall value (e.g. lives compared to 
frozen tails, etc); 
• catching less of the low-value lobster and more of the high-value ones (e.g. 
reds compared to whites); and 
• having a longer catching and marketing season. 
 
The bio-economic model results indicate that ITQ systems generally offer greater 
scope to optimise these factors. 
Summary of the bio-economic model results of the annual $ benefits for 
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Figure 3.  The bio-economic modelling results for average annual benefits in $ 
millions, for the 11 management option variations that were modelled for the Western 
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15.41 16.92 28.03 61.24 51.61 43.03 35.84 87.61 96.58 91.35 82.68
 
Table 2 above shows the bio-economic modelling results for average annual benefits 
in $ millions, for the 11 management options modelled for the Western Rock Lobster 
Fishery. 
Management options modelled 
Input (effort) controls (ITEs).  The three fishing effort (pot number) control 
management options (Scenarios) produced the lowest benefits of all the options that 
were modelled: 
 
• 1 – the current system gave an estimated annual net benefit of $15.4 million 
• 1c – the current system with a 20 per cent pot reduction gave an estimated 
annual net benefit of $16.9 million; and 
• 2 – a flexible effort control system39 where pots and fishing days could be 
adjusted annually, the season extended to 31 August, and there was a $2/kg 
                                                 
39 The main assumptions and management arrangements used to model the flexible ITE system were 
an extension of the season to the 31 August; 1 per cent per annum productivity gain through effort 
creep; minimum unit entitlement of 43 to operate in the fishery; price increase of $2.00/kg due to the 
extended season; $7,200 in extra costs (i.e. above normal operating costs) for fishing during the 
extended season; limit of 185 fishing days allowed per season, with no flexibility to change it from 
season to season or for different parts of the season; and limits on the number of pots used in each 
zone, with no flexibility to vary them from season to season or for different parts of the season.  See 




increase in the average beach price, gave an estimated annual net benefit of 
$28 million. 
 
Quotas (ITQs) with input controls.  The four ITQ system options (Scenarios 3a to 
d) with the current effort (pot number) controls produced $ benefits that were 
significantly greater than the effort control options (1, 1c and 2) but significantly 
lower than the comparable “pure” ITQ options (4a to d) with reduced effort (pot 
number) controls. 
 
• 3a – constant (fixed) ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price 
increase of $5/kg and a 15 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of pots 
gave an estimated annual net benefit of $61.2 million.  However, there are 
significant sustainability risks with fixed quotas (quotas that do not vary from 
year to year) as described under the section Risks associated with constant 
(fixed) and variable quotas, that make fixed quotas a less attractive 
management option. 
• 3b – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price increase of 
$3.50/kg, and a 15 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of pots gave an 
estimated annual net benefit of $51.6 million. 
• 3c – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price increase of 
$2.00/kg, and a 15 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of pots gave an 
estimated annual net benefit of $43.0 million 
• 3d – variable ITQ with current pot number controls, a beach price increase of 
$1.00/kg, and a 15 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of pots gave an 
estimated annual net benefit of $38.8 million. 
 
Pure ITQ – ITQs with reduced effort controls.  The four ITQ system options 
(Scenarios 4a to d) without the current effort (pot number) controls40 produced $ 
benefits that were significantly greater than any of the other management options.  
Under these ITQ options, controls on pot numbers were relaxed and the number of 
pots was allowed to increase by 20 per cent. 
 
• 4a – constant (fixed) ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price 
increase of $5.50/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of 
pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $87.6 million.  However, there are 
significant sustainability risks with fixed quotas (quotas that do not vary from 
year to year) as described above under the section Risks associated with 
constant (fixed) and variable quotas, that make fixed quotas a less attractive 
management option. 
• 4b – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price 
increase of $4.00/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of 
pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $96.6 million. 
• 4c – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price 
increase of $2.50/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of 
pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $91.4 million. 
• 4d – variable ITQ with reduced controls on pot numbers, a beach price 
increase of $1.25/kg and a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of 
pots gave an estimated annual net benefit of $82.7 million. 
                                                 
40 Pot numbers were allowed to increase by 20 per cent. 
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A Detailed Examination of Four Management Options 
 
The section below is based on Chapter 6 of A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the 
Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, produced by 
Economic Research Associates and should be read in conjunction with this section.41
 
This section describes and compares in more detail the model outputs of one example 
of each of the main management options that have been summarise above.  They are 
the options that have the most conservative model assumptions (e.g. lowest price 
increases) and appear to provide the most robust results.  Attachment 5 (Tables A and 
B) provides the details of the management arrangements and the assumptions used in 
the bio-economic modelling for all the management options assessed in this review. 
The current management system (Scenario 1) 
 
The main management arrangements and assumptions used for modelling the current 
ITE management system compared to the other management options were: 
 
• “rush to fish” (fishers compete for catch); 
• no extension of the season (other management options have the season 
extended to 31 August); 
• 1 per cent per year productivity gain through effort creep (not relevant to 
ITQs); 
• no price increase (other management options had a price increase of $1 to 
$5.50/kg); and 
• no increase in the catching efficiency of pots due to changes in pot design (the 
ITQs had efficiency gains from changes in pot design of between 15 per cent 
and 40 per cent); 
The current management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction 
(Scenario 1c) 
 
The main management arrangements and assumptions used for modelling the current 
ITE management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction compared to the other 
management options were: 
 
• “rush to fish” (fishers compete for catch); 
• 20 per cent pot reduction; 
• no extension of the season (other management options have the season 
extended to the 31 August); 
• 2 per cent per year productivity gain through effort creep (not relevant to 
ITQs); 
• no price increase (other management options had a price increase of $1 to 
$5.50/kg); 
                                                 
41 See ERA’s full report on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au or the 
Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobserwa.com or phone the Department of 
Fisheries on 9482 7267 for a hard copy. 
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• a 10 per cent catch efficiency gain through an increase in catchability (the 
ITQs had efficiency gains from changes in pot design of between 15 per cent 
and 40 per cent); and 
• a $5,000 increase in costs per average boat due to fishers fishing their 
remaining pots harder and expending on technology to make them more 
competitive. 
A variable ITQ system with the current effort (pot numbers) controls 
(Scenario 3d) 
 
The main management arrangements and assumptions used for modelling the variable 
ITQ system with the current effort (pot number) controls were: 
 
• pot numbers the same as under the current system; 
• an extension of the season to the 31 August; 
• $7,200 worth of additional operating costs for the extended season (i.e. an 
extra $120 per day on top of normal operating costs per average vessel); 
• a 15 per cent catch efficiency gain through changes in pot design; 
• no “rush to fish” (significantly reduced competition between fishers); and 
• a price increase of $1.00/kg due to greater stability in the catch. 
A variable ITQ system with reduced effort (pot number) controls 
(Scenario 4d) 
 
The main management arrangements and assumptions used for modelling the variable 
ITQ system with reduced effort (pot number) controls were: 
 
• pot numbers were allowed to increase by 20 per cent compared to the current 
system;  
• an extension of the season to the 31 August; 
• $7,200 worth of additional operating costs for the extended season (i.e. an 
extra $120 per day on top of normal operating costs per average vessel); 
• a 40 per cent catch efficiency gain through changes in pot design; 
• no “rush to fish” (significantly reduced competition between fishers); and 
• a price increase of $1.25/kg due to greater stability in the catch. 
Presentation of the Modelling Results  
 
Key comparative results by fishing zone for each of the four options (outlined above) 
over a 10-year modelling period are presented in relation to: 
 
• breeding stock levels; 
• annual catch; 
• annual number of boats; 
• annual number of pot lifts; 
• average annual net economic benefits; and 
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• sensitivity of annual net $ benefits to increases in price/kg average, i.e. the 
level of annual net benefits that result from various increases in beach price. 
Breeding stock levels 
 
The breeding stock (biomass) index for Zone C is described below as an example of 
the model’s breeding stock estimates for the different management options.  A more 
detailed discussion on the model’s breeding stock level estimates and the results for 
Zones A and B can be found in Chapter 6 of A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the 
Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster Fishery, produced by 
Economic Research Associates42. 
 
The model was required to adhere to a sustainability rule, for example in the case of 
Zone C, the breeding stock had to stay above an index of 800,000. 
 
Figure 4 shows the levels of the breeding stock in Zone C under each of the four 
alternative management options.  The variables that explain the differences between 
the level of breeding stock are how and when the catch was taken, and the overall 
stock abundance under each management option. 
 
As Figure 4 shows, none of the options reduced the breeding stock below the 800,000 
“trigger point” (the level of the late 1970s).  However, for those management options 
where the breeding stock level fell below the opening level at the end of the ten year 
period (the X-marked horizontal line – Op Stock = opening stock – represents the 
opening breeding stock level), some adjustment to future fishing effort or quota levels 
may have been required to ensure that the decline did not continue.  The 20 per cent 
pot reduction option (Sc 1c = Scenario 1c) was the most conservative, in that it 
produced breeding stock levels over the 10 years that were always above its opening 
level. 
 
                                                 
42 See ERA’s full report on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au, the Western 
Rock Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobsterwa.com or phone the Department of Fisheries on 
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Figure 4:  Zone C breeding stocks levels over the 10-year modelling 
period 
[Note:  Sc = Scenario; Op Stock = opening stock; Sc 1 = the current management 
system; Sc 1c = the current management system with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Sc 
3d = variable ITQ with the current effort (pot number) controls; Sc 4d = variable ITQ 
without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers are increased by 20 
per cent.] 
Annual Average Catch 
 
Figure 5 below shows average annual catch over the 10-year modelling period by 
zone for the four alternative management options (Scenarios 1, 1c, 3d and 4d).  They 
are similar for each of the zones and in total.  This indicates that the model is 
behaving in a realistic way, in that the catches under each of these management 
options do not differ very much from those predicted under the current management 
system and they are maintained at levels that are necessary to ensure the long-term 
























Zone A Zone B Zone C 
Zone C 5,826,471 5,616,955 5,826,471 5,826,471
Zone B 3,999,879 3,232,342 3,360,244 3,310,251








Total 11,530,601 10,5192,80 10,890,966 10,837,456
Figure 5: Annual catch by zone 
 [Note:  Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current management system 
with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3d = variable ITQ with the current effort (pot number) 
controls; Scenario 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers 
are increased by 20 per cent.] 
 
If there were a management mechanism in place that allowed the build-up in lobster 
abundance under options 1c and the ITQ systems (3d and 4d) to be harvested by 
adjustments to effort or quotas, then the benefits estimated by the model for these 
options would be under-estimates. 
Boats 
 
Table 3 below shows what happens to boat numbers under each of the four 
management options.  The boat numbers are after the implementation phase (which 
could be one or two years, or five or 10 years) and are dependent on the number of 
fishing days, pot efficiency and pot lifts.  The boat numbers described in Table 3 as 
current are as at December 2004.  The number of boats as at December 2005 was 
495.43
 
As can be seen, the model estimates that under the variable ITQ system with a 20 per 
cent increase in the number of pots, boat numbers are reduced by 293, i.e. over half 
the fleet retires under this option.  It should be noted, however, that the model 
                                                 
43 Number of boats is defined as the number of Managed Fishery Licences with the minimum number 
of units (pots) required to operate in the fishery. 
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expresses efficiency gains by reducing the number of boats.  Whereas in reality, it is 
likely that there will be a combination of efficiency gains through reduced boat 
numbers and individual fishers making significant reductions in the costs of fishing.  
Therefore, the large reduction in boat numbers under option 4d may well be 
overestimated. 
 
Reference Points Boat Numbers Reduction in Boat Numbers
10 Years Ago 639  
Current at December 2004¹ 549 - 90 
Closing Fleet at the End of 
the 10-year period: 





- 44 ² 
Scenario 1c – 20 per cent pot 
reduction 
480 -69 ² 
Scenario 3d – ITQ with 
current pot controls 
505 -44 ² 
Scenario 4d - ITQ with a 20 
per cent increase in pots  
256 -293 ² 
Notes:  
¹ The current boat numbers (December 2004) makes no allowance for the impact of removal of the 
150-pot rule where adjustments to this rule change are still taking place within the industry.  The 
number of boats as of December 2005 was 495. 
² Compared to the current  (December 2004) boat numbers.  The number of boats as of December 2005 
was 495. 
Table 3:  The decline in rock lobster boat numbers 
Annual Pot Lifts 

























Zone A Zone B Zone C  
Zone C  5,190,121 4,250,429 4,071,189 3,629,544  
Zone B  3,418,159 2,838,471 2,439,501 2,277,907  
Zone A  1,203,233 1,005,272 858,933 961,556  
Scenario 1 Scenario 1c Scenario 3d Scenario 4d  
Total   9,811,513  8,094,172 7,369,623 6,869,007  
Figure 6: Annual pot lifts by zone 
[Note:  Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current management system 
with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3d = variable ITQ with the current effort (pot number) 
controls; Scenario 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers 
are increased by 20 per cent.] 
 
The lower number pot lifts under Scenarios 1c, 3d and 4d achieve broadly similar 
average annual catches compared to the current system (Scenario 1), as shown in 
Figure 5 above.  This means that the catch per pot lift and per boat for these scenarios 
has increased compared to the current management system (Scenario 1), resulting in 
greater productivity gains, which are reflected in greater $ benefits as shown in Figure 
7 below.  In the case of Scenarios 3d and 4d, a significant factor in the reduction in 
pot lifts is the use of improved pot designs that increases pot catching efficiency by 15 
per cent in 3d and 40 per cent in 4d. 
Average Annual Net Benefits  
 
Figure 7 shows the average annual net $ benefits over the 10-year period of the model 






























Zone A/B Zone C 
Zone C  12,101,428  12,864,621 22,640,503 45,867,652  
Zone A/B 3,309,887  4,058,537 13,199,199 36,805,714  
Scenario 1  Scenario 1c Scenario 3d Scenario 4d  
Total   15,411,315   16,923,158 35,839,702 82,673,366   
 
Figure 7: Average annual net benefits over the 10-year period ($million) 
[Note:  Scenario 1 = the current management system; Scenario 1c = the current management system 
with a 20 per cent pot reduction; Scenario 3d = variable ITQ with the current effort (pot number) 
controls; Scenario 4d = variable ITQ without the current effort (pot number) controls, i.e. pot numbers 
are increased by 20 per cent.] 
 
The average annual $ benefits shown above are the same as those shown in Figure 3 
above.  The large increases in net benefits of the ITQ options (3d and 4d), compared 
to the current system (1) and a 20 per cent pot reduction (1c), are due to price 
increases and more particularly increases in fleet efficiency. 
 
• Price increases –Increase in the beach price of $1.00 for 3d and $1.25/kg for 
4d would increase profits by about $10 and $12 million for 3d and 4d 
respectively, based on an average 10 million kg catch.  There are various 
views within the industry as to whether these beach price increases are 
realistic.  Based on discussions with the processing sector, ERA believe the 
price increases are achievable under ITQs due to the longer season of supply 
(season runs to 31 August) and greater stability in the catch between and 
within seasons, which help processors maximise the value of the catch. 
• Fleet efficiency gains – Significant increases in efficiency due to changes in 
pot design that increase catching efficiency.  Scenario 1c has a 10 per cent, 3d 
has a 15 per cent, and 4d a 40 per cent increase in the catching efficiency of 
pots.  Pots with greater catching efficiency allow fishers to reduce costs and 
hence increase profits.  There are a variety of views within industry regarding 
how much more efficient pot designed could be.  In the past, fishers have 
shown great ingenuity and innovative when it comes to designing pots which 
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catch much better under a variety of conditions than the standard pots.  For 
instance, very large circular wire traps with side entrances, for the whites and 
parlour type traps, which prevent lobsters form escaping over two- to five-day 
pulls. 
 
Under the various management options (particularly ITQs), fishers will have 
incentives to seek out ways to make their fishing business more efficient.  They will 
respond to management rule and other changes in their fishing/business environment 
by assessing and reassessing the best way to fish.  For example, fishers’ adjustments 
to the 18 per cent pot reduction in 1993-94 and the more recent removal of the ‘150 
pot rule’, and the effort rule changes for the 2005-06 season, which are yet to fully 
play out in the industry. 
 
Changes in fishing behaviour/patterns do not usually occur in a single season but 
rather it is several seasons before the impacts of any management changes have fully 
played out in the industry.  Management changes (e.g. pot reductions, moon closures, 
changing management to ITQs, etc) can generate efficiency gains in ways that cannot 
easily be foreseen and incorporated into modelling.  These gains are what economists 
refer to as dynamic efficiency gains.  For example, at the moment, there is 
undoubtedly “capital stuffing”44 under Scenarios 1 and 1c, as some capital 
expenditure (on boats, equipment and technology) is about catching lobster ahead of 
anyone else, as opposed to catching lobster more cost effectively.  Under the ITQ 
management options, the incentive is for fishers to develop fishing strategies and to 
invest in boats, pots, and other gear that will enable them to catch their quota in the 
most cost effective way possible45.  This is a dynamic adjustment that cannot be 
modelled at this stage. 
Sensitivity of $ benefits to increases in price/kg 
 
Price increases were built into the some of the management options to reflect the 
enhanced marketing opportunities associated with an extended season and within and 
between years catch stability.  The price levels and price increases used in the 
modelling exercise were derived from a variety of sources, including processors.  The 
price data and rationale for the price increases used in the model are discussed in 
detail in Chapter 5 of ERA’s report. 
 
The price increases used change the absolute price levels between the various 
management options, but the pattern of prices within the season is the same for all 
management options (generally, there is a price increase from the beginning to the end 
of the season).  The assumed price increases for having an extended season and 
having greater within and between years catch stability, are based on information 
from the processing sector.  They reflect the current state of knowledge about the 
world lobster markets and the product prices achievable under different seasonal 
supply patterns. 
                                                 
44 Capital stuffing in the sense used here means that fishers spend a lot of money on items (boats, 
technology, etc) to catch the maximum number of lobsters they can, even though some of the 
expenditure may not be very cost effective. 
45 It has been noticed in some ITQ fisheries (e.g. New Zealand) that fishers (particularly those leasing 
quota who are on slim profit margins) neglect or put off boat and other gear maintenance to reduce 




In order to show the contribution of different price increases on the average annual $ 
benefit outputs estimated by the model for the alternative management options, ERA 
have compared two sets of ITQ options where the only feature to change between 
them was the price increases.  The options compared were ITQs with the current 
controls on pot numbers (3c and 3d) and ITQs with reduced effort controls that 
allowed pot numbers to increase by 20 per cent (4c and 4d).  The price increase in 3d 
and 4d ($1.00 and $1.25/kg respectively) were only half of those used in 3c and 4c 
($2.00 and 2.50/kg respectively).  The comparative results are shown for the total 
fishery in Figure 8. 
 
These results show that, while the annual $ benefit outputs of the model do change 
due to the different price increases used, they do not change markedly.  The level of 
recruitment to the fishery (and hence catch) and efficiency gains are of much greater 
significance in explaining the level of annual $ benefits the model estimates for the 
different management options.  In short, the price increases assumed in the model are 
not the key drivers of the estimated profits the fishery makes under the different 
management options, the size of the annual catch and the efficiency gains are more 
important. 
 
For example, halving the price increases used in the model, as shown for the ITQ 
options 3c ($2.00/kg) compared to 3d ($1.00/kg), changes the net benefits obtained by 
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Scen 3c Scen 3d Scen 4c Scen4d
 
Figure 8: Total industry net benefit sensitivity to price increases 
[Note:  Scenario 3c and 3d are variable ITQs with the current effort (pot number) controls and price 
increase of $2 and $1/kg respectively; Scenario 3c and 3d are variable ITQs without the current effort 





It should be noted that if there was a different pattern of within season price increases 
than the model assumes, it will almost certainly induce fishermen to change their 
fishing behaviour, which could affect both the gains from the assumed price increases 
and the efficiency gains.  Hence, the model results using different price increases 
should be seen as indicative only. 
 
There is an important conclusion to be drawn from these results.  Across all the 
management options, the efficiency gains (i.e. the reductions in fishing costs) that are 
achieved are generated from within the industry itself.  Competitive pressure will 
ensure that these gains are achieved over time and in this sense the efficiency gains 
are relatively more certain of being achieved (i.e. they are more “bankable”), than the 
$ benefits estimated from the price increase components of the model.  The gains 
from the price increases are dependent on many factors associated with world 
markets, which are outside the direct control of the industry.  Gains achieved due to 
prices increases just enhance the more significant efficiency gains associated with 
each management option. 
 
Rock lobster is increasingly being seen as a commodity in the market place. 
Commoditisation means that producers face internationally determined world prices 
and must be cost competitive at those prices to ensure long-run viability.  With prices 
set in world markets, the key is to be able to reduce fishing costs to levels consistent 
with those prices. 
 
The relative ranking of the different management options is not affected by the price 
increases.  Changes in the price increases only change the absolute magnitude of the 
annual $ benefits, but leave ITQ option 4 (a to b) the highest ranked. 
 
The model results show that ITQ option 4 (a to b) offers the greatest scope for 
efficiency gains because it allows the greatest flexibility to adjust capital inputs (pots 
and vessels) to optimise effort to best match the ITQs.  The other management options 
(1, 1c, 2 and 3 (a to b)) do not allow the maximum efficiency gains to be realised. 
Compliance – Illegal Fishing and Selling of Lobsters 
Effort control system 
 
Under an effort control system, the main areas of compliance concern are over 
potting, selling (consigning) undersize and protected females (over the legal size, 
setose and tarspots) and unlicensed or recreational fishers selling lobsters.  
Enforcement resources are focused on these areas and under the current system there 
appears to be sufficient levels of inspection, along with severe penalties, to keep these 
illegal activities under control. 
 
There are no checks on the amount of legal size lobsters a fisher can catch or sell 
under the current system which, compared to an ITQ system, makes enforcement 
relatively simple and cost effective, as each fishers’ daily catch does not have to be 






Under a quota system, the biological controls (minimum size, protection of berried, 
tar spot, setose and maximum size females) would be maintained, whereas controls on 
pot numbers, closed seasons and pot design could be relaxed, either on 
implementation of an ITQ system or after a transition period when the new system 
had stabilised.46
 
Under ITQ systems, it is generally considered that there is a significant risk of a black 
market developing for illegal catch.  This is because lobsters (like abalone) are high-
value, low-volume species, which means significant $ amounts can be easily transport 
in the boot of a car or hidden among other cargo on trucks (as has occurred in the past 
with undersize lobsters).  By comparison, it would be very difficult to see a black 
market developing for low-value, high-volume fish, such as mullet, if they were 
managed under an ITQ system.  The black market risk is increased considerably with 
western rock lobsters because there is a very long and, in places, isolated coastline 
along which illegal lobsters could easily be landed with little possibility of detection.  
There would need to be very tight security and inspection of boat movements, weigh-
in stations and consignment dockets and severe penalties to keep quota cheating from 
undermining the ITQ system. 
 
Under ITQs, enforcement would be likely to become much more intrusive (e.g. to 
check the quota paper trail), black and white, and knifed edged (i.e. there would be no 
warnings given for cheating on quota) and the penalties would have to be severe. 
 
See the Compliance section under A Catch Quota System (ITQ), above, and 
Mclaughlan, M. 1994, ‘Long-term Management Strategies for the Western Rock 
Lobster Fishery.  Law Enforcement Considerations’, in Volume 4, Fisheries 
Management Paper No. 7047, for more discussion of compliance/enforcement issues 
relating to quotas. 
Modelling Different Variations of Effort and Quota Systems 
 
There are different ways to manage fishing effort and quota systems and many 
different assumptions that can be put into the bio-economic model that will give 
different results to those presented above.  Because space is limited, and the desire not 
to get bogged down in the complexity of testing too many possibilities, four major 
options with variations have been tested (options 1, 2, 3 and 4).  These provide a large 
spectrum of possible outcomes, which should indicate the upper and lower boundaries 
for the main issues of interest, i.e. breeding stock levels, catch and effort, boat 
numbers and $ benefits that the different management systems could potentially 
deliver (upper boundary – ITQ option 4 with a 20 per cent increase in pot numbers, 
and lower boundary – the current management system option 1). 
 
                                                 
46 If it were decided to introduce an ITQ system, it would initially be implemented with the full set of 
effort controls (including controls on pot numbers) that are used under the current system. 
47 Available on the Department of Fisheries web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock 
Lobster Council web site www.rocklobsterwa.com  Copies can also be obtained by phoning the 
Fisheries Department on 9482 7267. 
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Social Issues  
 
Below is a summary of the initial findings of a three-year research project funded by 
the Fisheries Research and Development Corporation, titled A Social Assessment of 
Coastal Communities Hosting the Western Rock Lobster Fleet, produced by V. 
Huddleston of the Institute for Regional Development, the University of Western 
Australia, December 200548.  This report should be read in conjunction with this 
section.  This project still has about 18 months to run, so the results presented are 
preliminary and are likely to change as additional information becomes available.  
The project will also track the current management review process and industry’s 
perceptions of the likely impact of the different management options. 
 
Community development extends beyond the formal economy to consider 
the needs of the population at large, and that in setting about its task it 
aims to balance economic, social and environmental concerns, rather 
than prioritising the economic approach above all else (Haughton, 1999, 
p. 8)49. 
 
Analysis of 17 coastal communities between Kalbarri and Augusta revealed trends in 
population, employment and housing that are important in assessing the general socio-
economic characteristics of the communities.  The growth of most of these 
communities can be traced to the development of the rock lobster industry in the late 
1950s and early 1960s.  The rapid expansion of the lobster fishing industry led to ad 
hoc residential development at many points along the coast, many of which were 
reached by sea and virtually inaccessible by road in the early years. 
 
Most of the communities experienced substantial population growth between 1991 
and 2001.  The median age increased because of ageing in situ, and the increasing 
number of retirees from inland communities and larger centres.  Most of the 
communities also exhibit high dependency ratios50 compared with the Australian and 
Western Australian ratios.  This has significant economic implications, given the need 
to invest in social infrastructure such as schools and health care for the dependent 
population. 
 
Some communities also exhibit a large seasonal population change, with the number 
of dwellings not permanently occupied ranging between 15-20 per cent and 60-70 per 
cent of the total number of dwellings.  This seasonality is likely to affect business 
activities in the communities. 
 
Localities or regions with diverse economies are generally more able to withstand 
downturns in a particular sector or industry.  With the 17 communities, economic 
diversity has been measured by using the proportion of persons employed in the top 
three sectors to the total number of persons employed per community.  A higher ratio 
                                                 
48 Available on the Department of Fisheries web site www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock 
Lobster Council web site www.rocklobsterwa.com  Copies can also be obtained by phoning the 
Fisheries Department on 9482 7267 
49 Haughton, G. (ed.) 1999, Community Economic Development, The Stationery Office, London. 
50 Defined as the combined child population (0-14 years) and the aged population (65 years and over) – 
persons in the dependent ages, to every 100 people of the intermediate age population (15-64 years) – 
economically active ages 
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would indicate that the community is highly dependent on the top three sectors of 
employment and is thus less diversified in economic terms. 
 
With the exception of Yanchep, Jurien Bay, Geraldton and Fremantle, the rest of the 
communities exhibit lower- to moderately-diversified economies.  In the smaller 
fishing communities, unemployment rates are almost double the national average.  
Smaller fishing communities also have high levels of part-time employment.  Median 
weekly incomes for most communities are comparable to the national average ($300-
$399). 
 
The number of boats operating in the lobster fishery declined across the 17 
communities resulting, in some cases, in a potential loss of fishing-related physical 
facilities in some communities.  The number of persons engaged in the fishery also 
declined, with important implications to small businesses operating in the 
accommodation, cafes and restaurant sector.  Some communities have been found to 
be less resilient and more sensitive to external changes while others have greater 
capacity to handle change. 
 
Measuring Community Resilience 
 
In measuring community resilience, time-series indicators to describe the resilience or 
sensitivity of communities and regions to change51 were used to provide an indication 
of the “fragility” or “robustness” of the community to change or shocks.  The 
selection of the indicators in this 
research has been restricted to those that 
are available in a time series format and 
for which 2001 Census data are 
available. In addition to Census data, 
two fishery-related indicators were also 
included in the computation of the 
resilience scores.  Data from the 
Department of Fisheries were those of 
the 1991-92, 1996-97, 2001-02 and 
2004-05 WRL seasons.   
 
The specific time series indicators used 
in measuring community resilience 
include percentage changes in: 
 
1. Total resident population; 
2. Elderly dependency ratio 
defined as the number of 
elderly people for every 100 
people of working age; 
 
Resilience is the ability to cope with change.  To express
more fully: 
 
Resilience is the capacity of human groups or 
communities to cope with environmental, 
economic, political or other kinds of change 
stemming from internal or external factors. It is 
related to uncertainty  vulnerability and risk and it 
can be considered at various geographical and 
temporal scales. An alternative interpretation of 
resilience is the capacity and speed of an 
ecosystem to recover from a disturbance. This 
refers either to the elasticity of the ecosystem 
which enables it to accommodate change while 
maintaining its original state, or to the elasticity of
an ecosystem which permits the assimilation of 
change by transformations of the ecosystem 
(Sustainability and Public or Private Environmental
Management web-accessible database of glossary 




3. Child dependency ratio defined as the number of children for every 100 
people of working age; 
4. Number of occupied dwellings; 
                                                 
51 Coakes Consulting 2002, Socio-Economic Assessment of the Forest Management Plan prepared for 
the Conservation Commission and the Forest Products Commission, August 2002. 
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5. Labour force participation rate, calculated by expressing the number of 
persons in the labour force as a percentage of the population aged 15 years 
and over; 
6. Unemployment rate defined as the number of unemployed people 
expressed as a percentage of the labour force; 
7. Economic diversity, measured as the proportion of persons employed in 
the top three sectors to the total number of persons employed; 
8. Total pot lifts for the whole season; and 
9. Number of boats recorded in December. 
 
To derive the composite indicator of community resilience to change, a scoring 
system was adopted ranging from -3.0 to 3.0 points.  The scores for each of the 
indicators are then summed to provide a Total Resilience Score (TRS) for each 
community.  The TRS is based on the direction and magnitude of the percentage 
change in each of the indicators between the 1996 and 2001 census periods and 
between 2001-02 and 2004-05 WRL seasons.  The resilience scores vary between -27 
to 27, with high positive values indicating greater robustness to change and large 















































Two Rocks 90 
Ledge Point 55 
Lancelin 124 
Cervantes 92 
Jurien Bay 78 





Figure 9 showing Overall Community Resilience Scores and 
Table 4 showing number of persons engaged in the WRL fishery in December 
2004 
 
While the overall resilience scores may change with the inclusion/refinement of other 
indicators, as data becomes available during the course of this research52, these 
resilience scores indicate that some communities are better able to handle change (i.e., 
                                                 
52 For example, once the community surveys are complete, indicators on social capital and human 
capital will be incorporated in the overall resilience scores. 
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they are more resilient) and others less so.  More resilient communities are Mandurah, 
Busselton, Two Rocks, Yanchep and Fremantle.  Less resilient communities are 
Geraldton, Green Head, Jurien Bay, Cervantes, Bunbury and Augusta.   
 
Analysis of interviews revealed fishers’ perceptions of the problems and issues 
confronting them during these times of uncertainty over the price of lobsters and 
increasing input costs such as fuel.  Lower profitability has resulted in some fishers 
leaving the industry and an ongoing struggle for others who remain.  As one 
respondent put it: 
 
“The economics of fishing are now far more important than they used to be.  It 
used to be lifestyle, but this is changing now, with people thinking monetary 
wise [in financial terms] before any other reason.” 
 
Fishers’ perceptions on alternative management options indicate a number of potential 
positive and negative impacts at the economic, social, environmental and management 
levels. 
 
The preliminary findings from interviews and consultations highlight the fact that: 
 
• Lobster fishers had been instrumental in the earlier growth and development 
of coastal communities, with business operations and employment revolving 
primarily around rock lobster fishing. 
 
• While rock lobster fishing is no longer the dominant economic activity in 
some of these communities, it is still regarded as a significant economic and 
social contributor to local economies and communities. 
 
• These communities/locations have offered good fishing grounds and a relaxed 
secure lifestyle. 
 
• For communities that have young families, these towns offer a good 
environment for raising children. 
 
As the towns grew, their populations increased and their economies became more 
diversified, they were less dependent on the lobster fishery.  The decline in the 
number of rock lobster fishers, coupled with younger fishers being less community 
oriented, have resulted in rock lobster fishers becoming less involved in community 
events and activities and generally becoming less community-minded.  Nonetheless, 
there are still some fishers who contribute both financially and physically to 
community activities.  With the increased mobility of the fleet, the number of wives 
participating in community/school activities is also higher because they are left behind 
to look after the children.  Rock lobster fishers spend their income mostly in their 
community of residence and contribute to the financial well-being of these 
communities. 
 
As in most small towns, there is some social segregation (e.g. old residents and new 
residents).  There are also disadvantages especially for those with children of high 
school age.  Parents face the dilemma of sending the children to boarding school or 
having split families, with the husband staying behind in the coastal towns and the 
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wife and children relocating somewhere else.  For the older population who require 
more intensive health care, these towns have limited medical care. 
 
A key finding of this report is that a workable management arrangement for the 
fishery requires the support of those involved – fishers and industry managers – and 
the other stakeholders in the communities, including business groups, local 
government and community residents.  Having an intensive and open consultation 
and ongoing information flow among the various stakeholders would go a long way 
towards ensuring that any management changes that may be introduced in the fishery 
will result not only in a sustainable fishery but also in viable and contented 
communities.53
Boats Numbers and Employment 
 
This section, which is based on Chapter 7 of ERA’s report,54 looks at the possible 
employment impacts of the various management options, due to a reduction in boat 
numbers. 
 
As previously mentioned, the number of boats in the fishery has declined from 836 in 
1964, to 495 as at December 2005.  The decline does not appear to be slowing and 
under the current price-cost squeeze the industry is experiencing, it could even 
accelerate. 
 
Modelling results show that the number of boats declines under all management 
options, including the current management system, where the model estimates that 44 
boats will leave the fishery.  However, as shown in Table 3 above, the decline is 
greater under the 20 per cent pot reduction option (69 leave the fishery); and 293 
(more than half) leave the fishery under the ITQ option with reduced controls on 
effort (pot numbers).  How long it will take for the fleet to rationalise under the 
different management options is difficult to assess.  However, if fishers’ responses to 
other changes in the management system can be used as an indicator (e.g. the 18 per 
cent pot reduction in 1993), it is likely that any major change to the current 
management system (e.g. a significant pot reduction or moving to ITQs) would 
initially see a rapid reduction in boat numbers.  It is likely that boat numbers would 
then decline more gradually and as the fleet got smaller the decline would become 
even slower. 
 
Employment in the rock lobster fishery is considered to be a function of the catch and 
effort measured as pots per vessel, pot lifts and vessel numbers55.  Currently the most 
                                                 
53 A Social Assessment Of Coastal Communities Hosting The Western Rock Lobster Fleet, produced by 
V Huddleston of the Institute for Regional Development, University of Western Australia, December 
2005.  Available on the Department of Fisheries web site www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock 
Lobster Council web site www.rocklobsterwa.com Copies can also be obtained by phoning the 
Fisheries Department on 9482 7267 
54 See A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster 
Fishery, produced by Economic Research Associates on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at 
www.fish.wa.gov.au or the Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobsterwa.com or 
phone the Department of Fisheries on 9482 7267 for a hard copy. 
55 For further details see A Bio-Economic Evaluation of the Management Options for the West Coast 
Rock Lobster Fishery, produced by Economic Research Associates on the Department of Fisheries’ 
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common configuration per vessel is three crew members, consisting of one skipper 
plus two deckhands.  This seems to be relatively stable because the current 
management regime has produced a fairly stable annual pot lift figure over the years. 
 




















































Figure 10: Vessel, pot lifts and catch (kgs): 1993-94 to2003-04 
While vessel numbers have declined, the other key driver – pot lifts – has not changed 
as much and has held up at a stable level, which indicates that pots and pot lifts per 
vessel have increased. 
 
Figure 11 shows the results of using two different methods vessels numbers only and 
of using combined vessel numbers and pot lifts to estimate the employment impacts of 
the various management options.  Figure 11 shows the position 10 years ago, at the 
Census year, currently, and then for each of the management options at the end of the 
10-year modelling period. 
                                                                                                                                            
web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au or the Western Rock Lobster Council’s web site at 











current scen 1 scen 1c scen 3c scen 3d scen 4c scen 4d
Employment Based on Vessels Empoyment Based on Vessels and  Pot Lifts
 
Figure 11: Employment change by scenario based on vessel numbers and 
pot lifts 
Employment is highest under the management options where effort (pot numbers) are 
controlled (scenario 1 – the current management system, 1c – the current system with 
a 20 per cent pot reduction and 3c and 3d – the ITQs with the current pot number 
controls maintained).  Employment is lowest under 4c and 4d, the ITQs with reduced 
effort (pot number) controls, where vessels are allowed to fully adjust to quota. 
Flow on Employment Consequences 
 
ERA state in their report that previous impact studies of commercial fishing have 
estimated an employment multiplier of 3.28 for rock lobster fishing in Western 
Australia, i.e. for every person directly employed in rock lobster fishing, there are 
3.28 people employed in other areas (for example, processing, boat building, and so 
on).  Using this estimate, we can estimate the total employment impacts of each 
management option as shown in Table 5. 
 
Using the vessel number and pot lifts method, employment is just over 5,900 currently 
and reduces to 5,739 for Scenario 1; to 5,031 for Scenario 1c; to 4,801 for Scenario 
3c; to 4,794 for Scenario 3d; and to just 3,800-3,900 for Scenarios 4c and 4d. 
 
While there will be some flow-on or indirect employment impacts associated with any 
reduction in direct employment of skippers and crews, their magnitude is not easy to 
assess.  In broad terms, much the same quantity of fuel and bait will be purchased, 
boats will need to be repaired although there may be fewer of them, and pots and 
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other fishing gear will need to be replaced.  Hence, these conventional multiplier 
impacts are likely to overstate the negative impact on employment. 
 
Table 5: Estimates of employment by Scenario based on pot lifts and vessels 
 
10years 







Vessel Based Estimates 
Aggregate 
Direct 
Employment 1917 1647 1515 1440 1515 1515 777 768 
Employment 
Multiplier 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 
Total 
Employment 
Impact 6288 5402 4969 4723 4969 4969 2549 2519 
Change Compared to Base Case 0 % -5 % 0 % 0 % -49 % -49 % 
Combined Vessels and Pot Lift Based Estimates 
Aggregate 
Direct 
Employment 1917 1808 1750 1534 1464 1462 1188 1178 
Employment 
Multiplier 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 3.28 
Total 
Employment 
Impact 6288 5930 5739 5031 4801 4794 3897 3864 
Change Compared with Base 
Case 0% -12% -16% -16% -32% -33% 
 
There are fewer representative boats in the fishery in all zones, whichever scenario is 
adopted. In the case of Scenarios 1, 1c, 2 and 3, the change is broadly in line with past 
trends.  Under the ITQ Scenario 4, the boat numbers are approximately halved, with 
the adjustment occurring largely during the implementation phase. 
 
Fewer boat numbers under all scenarios means reduced direct employment 
opportunities for skippers and deck hands in the lobster fleet.  In the case of Scenario 
4, the reduction in employment opportunities for crew over the implementation phase 
is most pronounced.  This, on the other hand, should see incomes rise among the 
fewer boats that remain. 
 
If any of ITQ management alternatives (Scenario 3 or Scenario 4) were adopted, the 
changed employment requirements would pose a new set of challenges for industry if 
it were to attract and hold suitably skilled, experienced and reliable pool of deck 
hands. These challenges are additional to those already confronting the industry under 
the existing arrangements as a consequence of very competitive remuneration being 





The bio-economic modelling is based on profit optimising behaviour of the operator 
of the representative boat in each lobster fishing zone.  In practice, business choices 
made by individual fishers about when they fish, where they fish, and how they fish 
may be a trade-off against lifestyle preferences that are about lifestyle optimisation, 
particularly where family-run businesses are generally involved.  This should not be 
taken as suggesting that such behaviour is less than optimal from society’s viewpoint.  
However, such trade-offs can result in the net $ benefits being different to the 
modelling results and outcomes.  This may see more boats remaining in the fleet, and, 
consequently, the employment impacts may be less. 
Who will own the quota and will wealth distribution changes? 
 
The marketplace may view ITQs as a more secure and reliable share of the catch than 
pots.  Therefore if the fishery were to move to an ITQ system, investors and 
processors may show more interest in owning or leasing quota than they currently do 
in owning or leasing pots.  However, for investors in particular, there is still a similar 
level of security around “quota rights” in the same way as there is around unit (pot) 
and boat licences. That is, the Minister for Fisheries will have the authority to vary, 
suspend and cancel quota in a similar same way as currently applies to unit (pot) and 
boat licences.  Investors and processors would make their investment decisions based 
on the $ return they could receive on their ITQ compared to other investment 
opportunities (e.g. real estate, shares, etc).  Processors may also want to hold quota to 
ensure a continuity of supply at particular times of the year. 
 
In other fisheries around the world, there have been mixed experiences with changes 
in quota ownership.  Some ITQ fisheries, particularly those with large volumes and 
high processing/catching infrastructure costs, appear more prone to purchase by 
processors/corporations than other low-volume, high-value fisheries, which appear 
more likely to stay in the hands of family fishing businesses. 
 
A trend towards a change in the composition of ownership of rock lobster entitlements 
is already apparent under the current system (investors buy unit – pot – entitlements 
and lease them out) and it is likely to continue.  This trend may accelerate under an 
ITQ system for the reasons discussed. 
 
The experience in some ITQ fisheries where there has been a significant shift in the 
ownership of quota entitlements to investors/processors, and hence in the wealth 
distribution, is that it has resulted in a reduced sense of stewardship towards the 
resource. That is, the industry takes less ownership and responsibility for 







Quota Experience in other Rock Lobster 
Fisheries 
 
The following section describes the rock lobster quota management experience in 
South Australia, Tasmania and New Zealand and has been extracted from paper titled 
How do Quota Management Systems Work in Rock Lobster Fisheries?  The 
Experience in New Zealand, Tasmania and South Australia, by Tim Bray, Steven Gill 
and Ron Edwards, Department of Fisheries, 2005.56
Findings 
 
Quota management systems are now in place for the New Zealand, Tasmanian and 
South Australian rock lobster fisheries.  New Zealand was the first to move to QMS 
(1989), followed by the Southern Zone of South Australia (1993), Tasmania (1998) 
and Northern Zone of South Australia (2001). 
 
Throughout the world of fisheries management, there are a number of assumptions 
made about quota management systems.  Most common are that under a QMS the 
fleet size falls, the ownership of commercial fishing access rights will concentrate, 
and there will be vertical integration through the catching and processing sectors.  
These assumed effects are made because the economic theory is that there are strong 
incentives for fishing fleets to restructure in order to become more efficient and focus 
on maximising the value of their catch as opposed to investing in inputs to maximise 
their catch.   
 
As part of a review of the system of management used for the West Coast Rock 
Lobster Fishery, a Western Australian delegation visited New Zealand, Tasmania and 
South Australia in 2004 to learn more about the management systems used for their 
respective rock lobster fisheries.   
 
The delegation wanted to test the quota management theories by observing and 
learning from the experience of similar fisheries that are quota managed.  In 
particular, the delegation went to learn about the regulatory approach taken, and 
understand what effect that approach has had on the fishery and the industry from a 
resource sustainability, economic and sociological perspective. 
 
Each of the fisheries visited targets the southern rock lobster (Jasus edwardsii).  The 
delegation found that common to all these management systems is the use of a total 
allowable commercial catch (TACC) to constrain the industry’s annual catch.  The 
TACC is then divided into transferable quota units held on licences that are renewed 
annually.  All fisheries complement the TACC with the use of biological controls, i.e. 
size limits and protection of animals in a breeding condition.   
 
Further analysis reveals that the regulatory approach taken beyond these common 
areas differs.  Key differences include the presence or absence of: zones within the 
                                                 
56 Available on the Department of Fisheries’ web site at www.fish.wa.gov.au and the Western Rock 
Lobster Council’s web site at www.rocklobsterwa.com and available in hard copy by phoning the 
Department of Fisheries on 9482 7267. 
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fishery, closed seasons, limitations on pot use, pot design and restrictions on the 
transferability of units of entitlement (both pots and quota).  
 
The delegation observed that the absence or presence of these add on measures 
influences the behaviour of the industry both with respect to investment and fishing 
strategy decisions.  Relevant literature supplied to the delegation supports many of 
these observations.   
 




For each of the fisheries observed, the decision to move to a QMS was primarily 
based on the need to address sustainability concerns.  In all cases, the inability to 
successfully manage under the pre-existing input-based systems made the decision to 
adopt a QMS one that was ultimately supported by the government and the majority 
of industry. 
 
Subsequent to implementing a QMS, each of the fisheries have experienced 
significant improvements in key sustainability indicators.  The notable exception is 
the Northern Zone South Australian Fishery where the QMS is just in its second 
season of operation.   
 
Most have attributed the success of QMS to the setting of a TACC that actually 
constrained or reduced catch and in doing so allowed the stock to rebuild, and in some 
cases rebuild quite rapidly.  The need to set a TACC has meant that the stock 
assessment process now comes under even further scrutiny – even though the TACC 
in each of the fisheries has changed very little in percentage terms since first 
introduced.   
 
Noting that QMS has been largely successful for management of these rock lobster 
fisheries, it is important to note that the failure of the previous management systems 
cannot be solely attributed to the fact that they were input managed.  For example, 
senior South Australian research scientists believe that the over-reliance on catch per 
unit effort data obtained from the industry in the stock assessment for the Northern 
Zone Fishery process was a major contributing factor.   
 
The level of information available to the delegation on the cost of managing the 
fisheries under QMS varied and was not complete.  However, the clear indication 
from fisheries managers and industry alike was that the greatest cost burden is 
experienced in the first few years as the fishery goes through a transition.  The 
experience has been that the most significant cost impact has come from compliance 
and, to a lesser extent, research. 
 
Without exception, compliance was identified as an issue and there are two key 
elements: (i) accountability of the catch recording system for the licensed commercial 
fishers; and (ii) illegal take by unlicensed operators for the black market.  A 
successful compliance program needs to have strategies to address both of these risks.  
The temptation to focus on tracing the catch of licensed commercial operators could 
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result in the expansion of black market activity – undermining the entire management 
process. 
 
Industry dynamics and fishing patterns 
 
The response of industry to the introduction of a QMS in terms of their behaviour was 
an area of particular interest to the delegation, and there were some interesting 
findings. 
 
The first point of interest is that for three of the four fisheries there was recognition, 
either explicitly or implicitly, that prior to entering the QMS there was an over-
capacity issue and that the new system should facilitate fleet restructure.  Accordingly 
in New Zealand, Tasmania and Northern Zone South Australia, there has been a 
reduction in both boat numbers and the number of entities owning quota units.   
 
The key elements that are present for each of the fisheries where there has been a 
significant level of restructuring are: (i) a TACC that constrains catch and in doing so 
created or exacerbated fleet over-capacity – the greater the imbalance, the greater the 
force for restructuring; and (ii) a system that allows a market for units of entitlement 
to function relatively freely.   
 
The rate at which the fleet adjusts following the introduction of a QMS is a separate 
issue, and is most likely dependent upon the extent to which the management system 
limits aggregation of quota units and the degree to which the initial allocation of quota 
redistributed catch.   
 
When considering the Southern Zone South Australian Fishery, where there has not 
been any significant change in fleet size, it is apparent that the economic forces that 
would drive the fleet to restructure can be considerably dampened by regulation 
designed to prevent aggregation.  In this case, it is also relevant to note that at the time 
the fishery moved into QMS the market for southern rock lobster was particularly 
buoyant and industry was highly profitable. 
 
This combination of circumstances has created an environment in which participants 
in the fishery have a particularly good lifestyle.  The price for this lifestyle is a 
relatively constrained quota market, and the risk is that the fundamentals that underpin 
the economics of the fishery change and regulation inhibits the industry’s ability to 
adjust in order to maintain profitability. 
 
As trading and leasing in quota (and pots within the Australian fisheries) occurred, the 
value of entitlement both increased and increased quite rapidly.  The rapid increase in 
the value of entitlement is a function of demand.  The demand to buy and lease quota 
immediately following the introduction of a QMS is spurred by the need for 
participants to adjust the volume of catch to the size of their operation.  It is also 
apparent that the improving health of the fisheries under QMS and the resultant 
increase in catch rates improved profitability and added confidence to the market. 
 
The trade in quota is mostly fuelled by people leaving the fishery, and to date the 
majority of investment in quota entitlements has come from within the existing rights 
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holders.  These investors are typically “topping up” their own operations or putting 
quota into the lease market.  Retiring fishers who choose not to sell their stake in the 
fishery also supply the lease market.  Across all of the fisheries, it is apparent that the 
profitability of fishing is less for a fisher who leases entitlement as opposed to an 
owner/operator.   
 
The growing presence of lease fishermen (quota catchers) in these fisheries has both 
fisheries managers and industry leaders concerned that there is less stewardship of the 
resource. 
 
The development of the Chinese live market for southern rock lobster in the 1990s 
resulted in very high prices being realised during the southern hemisphere winter.  
This coincided with a move to QMS for all but the Northern Zone South Australian 
Fishery.  In the QMS fisheries, there was a change in fishing patterns.  The industry 
has moved away from targeting high catch rate periods and landing a variety of 
lobster with respect to size and colour, to an industry that increasingly supplies a size 
and colour of lobster to the market when the market is prepared to pay the highest 
price. 
 
This change in fishing strategy has occurred because the rush to fish no longer exists 
and it is therefore possible for processors to provide direct market signals to fishermen 
through regular changes in beach price.  The change has been greatest in Tasmania 
and New Zealand, where the fishing season is structured so that the quota year ends at 
a traditionally high catch rate period giving fishers confidence that they will be able to 
take their full allocation.   
General Observations 
 
The transition into QMS for the New Zealand, Tasmanian and South Australian 
fisheries has, on the whole, been positive.  Where the systems have been in place for a 
number of years, it is clear that the setting of a TACC can be a very effective tool for 
managing sustainability, provided that the TACC setting process is underpinned by 
quality research and reinforced by a comprehensive compliance program.   
 
Where fleet over-capacity is an issue, the move to a QMS can accelerate the process 
of restructuring when combined with a management system that allows the trade and 
lease market to function relatively freely.  
 
The price of access to the fishery inevitably rises.  On the one hand, this has a positive 
effect with respect to return on investment, however it will inevitably make the cost of 
entry high.  
 
It is possible for within season price premiums to be realised through changed fishing 
behaviour when market signals are provided directly to fishers via processors.   
 
There are opportunities under QMS for participants to improve their quality of life by 








The aim of this review report was not to recommend one form of management over 
another, but rather to provide stakeholders with information on the management 
options that are available and the major issues involved with them and benefits they 
have to offer.  The debate on the most appropriate management system for the 
industry has been given additional momentum over the last few years because the 
industry is experiencing a significant “cost-price squeeze” that is unlikely to diminish 
in the near future.  If changes to the management system can improve the industry’s 
efficiency and produce significant extra benefits, then they need to be thoroughly 
evaluated. 
 
It is hoped that stakeholders will find the information provided useful for the 
forthcoming discussions on which management system (effort controls or ITQs) 
provides the best long-term social, economic and biological benefits for the Western 
Rock Lobster Fishery. 
 
If, after full consultation involving all stakeholders, it were decided to change the 
fishery’s management system (i.e. to make changes to the current system or introduce 
quotas), the changes would be implemented cautiously and gradually.  This would 
ensure all stakeholders became accustomed to the changes and to carefully monitored 
them to determine if they were having any negative or unforseen impacts. 
 
The bio-economic model that the consultants ERA have developed to assess the 
performance of the fishery under different effort control and ITQ management 
systems has produced interesting results that need to be carefully evaluated by fishers 
and the industry generally.  This report has highlighted the assumptions in the model 
that have the greatest impact on the performance (particularly economic) of the 
different management options.  The large efficiency gains (i.e. reductions in fishing 
costs through more efficient pots and reduced boat numbers) and, to a lesser extent, 
price increases are the major drivers in the model for fleet rationalisation and hence 
the net $ benefits this results in. 
 
ERA’s modelling results indicate that overall the ITQ management systems offer 
greater scope for fishers to be more efficient (i.e. to reduce their costs) and for 
processors to maximise the value of the catch (and hence the beach price paid to 
fishers).  However, as explained in the report the significant $ benefits that the model 
estimates for the ITQ options are dependent on fishers maximising the potentially 
large efficiency gains and processors maximising the potential market opportunities 
that ITQs offer. 
 
The bio-economic modelling results need to be balanced against the risks regarding 
the breeding stock, non-compliance and quota avoidance, together with the increased 
economic and social dislocation costs that could flow from the implementation of the 
different management options.  These costs will flow through to management charges 
and, as a consequence of fleet rationalisation (e.g. reduced boat numbers, fleet 
centralisation at a reduced number of ports, etc) and operation cost adjustments, they 
will also flow through to regional communities.  The modelling does not take into 
account the impacts of the transition time that it takes to move from the current, 
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steady state management arrangements to a steady situation under a new system of 
management, which could vary from a few years to a decade or more. 
 
Noting that there are additional costs and risks associated with changing to a different 
management system, the benefits would need to be significant.  Industry would 
possibly need to gain a 10% increase in annual net ($) benefits ($20 to $30 million per 
year) compared to the current system to warrant implementing a new approach. 
 
Desirably, the Western Rock Lobster Council will work with industry to identify the 
two or three key options (including the status quo) early in the consultative process, so 
that the focus of the debate can be brought to bear on those options that could have the 
greatest benefit for the industry and the community. 
 
The challenge is for industry members to understand the reports that have been 
provided, with the assistance of the industry appointed facilitator and relevant 
Department of Fisheries staff, in order to develop an informed view.  This will 
facilitate effective communication with colleagues, fishermen, relevant peak bodies 
and the Rock Lobster Industry Advisory Committee, to enable industry to recommend 
future directions for the management of this fishery. 
 












DEFINITION OR MEANING 
(in relation to the Western Rock Lobster Fishery) 
Breeding stock Rock lobsters that are sexually mature. 
Catch rate or 
catch per unit of 
fishing effort 
The average weight of rock lobsters caught each time a pot is pull, 
i.e. it is the total weight of rock lobster caught each season 
divided by the total number of pot pulls for the season.  For 
example, if a fisher catches 15,000kg and makes 20,000 pot lifts 
for the season, then his average catch rate for the season is 0.75kg 
of lobsters per pot lift. 
Exploitation, 
also referred to 
as the 
exploitation rate 
The number (or weight) of legal size rock lobsters that are taken 
from the population/stock each season out of the estimated total 
biomass of legal size lobsters in the population. 
Effective fishing 
effort 
Effective fishing effort takes into account the increases in fishing 
efficiency that have taken place over time. 
Fishing effort The number of pot pulls or lifts a fisher makes in a year.  For 
example, if a fisher had 100 pots and fished them for 185 days in 
the season, he would have made 18,500 pot pulls for the season.  
If every fisher’s fishing effort is added up at the end of the season, 
it gives the total fishing effort expended in the fishery. 
This measure of fishing effort does not take into account the 
efficiency increases that have occurred in fishing operations since 
1964, when a pot was not nearly as efficient/effective as it is now. 
Fishing 
efficiency 
This is the measure of how efficient the fishing effort is, i.e. how 
effective a pot lift is.  Fishers did not fish as efficiently in 1964 as 
they do in 2005.  This is because they now have much better 





An ITE is a unit of fishing effort (e.g. a rock lobster pot) that can 





Each fisher’s individual share of the total allowable catch (TAC) 
in their zone. 
Recruitment to 
the fishery 





The number of rock lobsters that survive fishing and grow to 
become mature/breeders each year. 
Stock and 
recruitment 
The relationship between the numbers of breeders (eggs) and the 
number of puerulus settling (level of recruitment of young 
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relationship lobsters). A good number of breeders are required to ensure that 
the number of eggs produced do not affect the level of puerulus 
settlement (and hence level of catch 3-4 years later), no matter 
what the environmental conditions are. 
In other words, you always want the environmental conditions to 
be the factor that determines the level of puerulus settlement, not 
the number of breeding lobsters.  If you reduce the number of 
breeders too far, then the number of eggs produced will not be 
sufficient to give you average or good levels of puerulus 
settlement, even if the environmental conditions are favourable.  
Even worse, in years of poor environmental conditions and too 
few breeders (low egg production), it could produce disastrously 
low levels of puerulus settlement and hence very low lobster 
catches three to four years later.  This has occurred in many 
fisheries around the world, in Australia and in Western Australia 
(e.g. the Exmouth Gulf tiger prawn fishery, which declined to less 
than a quarter of its potential long-term production in the early 
1980s due to not enough breeding stock). 
At the current levels of rock lobster breeding stock, it is the 
environmental conditions (e.g. strength of the Leeuwin Current) 





The total amount (kg) of rock lobsters that can be caught by all 
fishers (commercial, recreational, indigenous, etc) in a season.  











Scope of the Review of Management Options for 
the Rock Lobster Fishery 
Objectives Of The Review 
In the context of ecologically sustainable development, the objective for the review of 
the rock lobster management system is to: 
 
Assess and compare alternative management systems using the current 
management system (fishing effort/input controls) as the benchmark.  Using this 
comparison, make a decision as to which system offers the best long-term socio-
economic return to the State of Western Australia from the ecologically 
sustainable use of the western rock lobster resource based on: 
 
a) providing the greatest incentives and opportunity for growth in 
economic return for all sectors of the rock lobster industry and the 
Western Australian economy in general; and 
b) in the context of providing the best socio-economic benefit to the 
Western Australian community, encourage the maintenance and 
development of regional communities. 
 
It is important to reiterate that the current effort management system has served the 
fishery well over the years and would continue to do so in future provided managers 
and industry reduce fishing effort if overexploitation threatens the breeding stock.  
However, there is a need to assess if additional benefits (ecological, economic, social 
and management) can be obtained by moving to an alternative management system, 
while still ensuring long-term sustainability. 
Timetable Of Review 
 Jan 04 –
Oct 05 
Oct 05 – 
Sept 06 
Oct 06 – 
Feb 07 
March 07 
– Nov 08 
Phase 1 
Establishing objectives of the study 
and undertaking the assessment of 
the four management systems to be 
compared 
    
Phase 2 
Communicate assessment and 
comparison of management systems 
with stakeholders 
    
Phase 3 
Poll of stakeholder views and 
RLIAC has final meetings with 
industry and prepares advice for 
Government 
    
Phase 4 
State Government makes its 
decision and any new management 
system is put in place for the 2008-
09 season 
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Phase 1 – Objective Analysis of Management Scenarios 
Commencing in October 2003, a joint departmental and industry Steering Committee 
chaired by the Executive Director of Fisheries, Dr Peter Rogers, oversaw the 
development of papers that assessed the relative advantages and disadvantages of the 
effort control and quota management systems outlined above, with respect to the 
review’s stated objective.  The areas of study covered are: 
 
1. Broad issues – Impacts on the fishing industry and fisheries management 
Assessment of the likely shift in catch shares, changes in fishing behaviour 
and fleet dynamics, and size and the risk of breeding stock depletion and 
management failure. 
2. Economic modelling – Cost efficiency comparisons of effort control and 
quota management systems 
A cost-benefit analysis of the four management systems, including the cost of 
fisheries management, compliance and research; cost of production; and the 
identification of any economic opportunities that can be realised under the 
alternative management systems.  Also included in the economic evaluations 
are some initial assessments of market development/advantage opportunities 
under effort control and quota management systems. 
 
3. Social impacts – Assessment of the likely impacts on social infrastructure of 
effort control and quota management systems 
Through the establishment of appropriate social indicators, develop a 
conceptual model to predict the behaviour of the rock lobster industry under 
the various management options and therefore their impact on existing host 
communities. 
 
4. Experience in other fisheries – Assessment of management systems used in 
other countries and Australian States 
Building on work already completed, review and update the current experience 
in places such as New Zealand, South Australia, Tasmania and Victoria. 
Phase 2 – Communicate Analysis of Management Scenarios 
with Stakeholders 
The purpose of Phase 2 is to communicate to all stakeholders (commercial and 
recreational fishers, processors, conservation sector, etc) the results of the assessment 
and comparison of the four management options in the context of the review’s 
objective.  The studies that have been conducted will be published and the 
information will empower stakeholders to arrive at their own conclusions as to which 
management system is best.  Phase 2 will commence in October 2005 and be 
completed by September 2006. 
 
The communication process will use an independent facilitator who will conduct a 
series of workshops with professional fishermen’s associations and other interested 
parties.  In the interests of fairness and the transparency of this process, it is desirable 
that an independent facilitator, who understands fisheries management and resource 
allocation issues and is independent of both the rock lobster industry and the 
Department of Fisheries, facilitates the workshops.  The meetings will be co-ordinated 
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by the Western Rock Lobster Council, the Western Australian Fishing Industry 
Council and Western Rock Lobster Development Association. 
 
The importance of the role to be played by professional fishers’ associations, the 
Western Rock Lobster Council and the Western Rock Lobster Development 
Association in this phase cannot be overstated.  There is an opportunity for industry 
leaders to facilitate and guide industry’s discovery of the issues and development of a 
broadly supported position in such a way as to enhance the prospect of a very positive 
outcome. 
Phase 3 – RLIAC Prepare Advice for Government 
At the commencement of the third phase, stakeholders by now should understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of the four management options that have been assessed, 
and have made a decision as to which one they believe is the best. 
 
During this period, RLIAC will receive submissions from stakeholders and engage 
with them to clarify their positions.  Stakeholder submissions and results from the 
studies that have been undertaken will be used by RLIAC to develop advice to the 
Government on which management option would best meet the future needs of the 
rock lobster industry and the community generally.  RLIAC will continue to 
communicate with stakeholders throughout this period to ensure its understanding of 
the respective stakeholder positions is well understood. 
 
At this point, the Western Rock Lobster Council will conduct a poll of the rock 
lobster fishing sector to ascertain which management option is preferred.  It is 
important to note that the results of this poll will not necessarily determine RLIAC’s 
advice to the Minister or the Government’s final position.  The poll will make it clear 
to the Government what the majority view of fishers is, but the ultimate decision will 
be made based on the substantial merits of the case for or against management 
change.  A case for changing the current management system would need to produce 
convincing arguments that there are significant benefits in an ecologically sustainable 
development context to be realised under a new system of management. 
 
By October 2006, RLIAC will be in a position to communicate the substance its 
intended advice to the Government on the coastal tour before formally presenting this 
advice to the Minister for Fisheries in early 2007.  This final step provides further 
transparency for the process, and the opportunity for RLIAC to ensure it has properly 
accounted for all stakeholder views and on balance has developed the best advice. 
 
Phase 4 – Government’s Decision and Implementation 
Once the Minister for Fisheries has received RLIAC’s advice, he will take his position 
to Cabinet.  Cabinet’s view on the long-term management of the rock lobster fishery 
in the context of ecologically sustainable development and national competition 
policy is likely to be known in 2007 and will immediately be communicated to all 
stakeholders. 
 
If the decision is to move to a new management system, it is anticipated it will be 





Economic Issues Impacting on the Western Rock 
Lobster Industry  
Introduction  
 
Rock lobster fishing has traditionally been seen as a lucrative business when 
compared to some other forms of agriculture and fishing.  Armchair commentators 
point to the considerable capital value tied up in unit (pot) entitlements as evidence of 
the fishery’s wealth.  As recently as three years ago, this was estimated to be worth 
almost $1.8 billion in Western Australia alone.  But a closer examination of the rock 
lobster industry suggests that rock lobster fishing is suffering from similar pressures 
as other agricultural and fishing industries.  The cost of fishing has been increasing 
while the value of rock lobsters have been declining – this cost-price squeeze is more 
commonly associated with industries such as the dairy and wheat industries.  The 
recent intensification of these trends may be one of the reasons the price of rock 
lobster unit authorisations (pot entitlements) has declined by about 27 per cent in the 
last two years. 
 
However, the changing economics in the industry are not new.  Boat numbers in the 
Western Rock Lobster Fishery have been declining for as long as 40 years as fishers 
have moved to larger boats with higher pot numbers per boat where they can take 
advantage of economies of scale.  This is similar to the story told in the dairy industry, 
as farmers have responded to increasing costs and reducing prices by developing 
larger and larger herds.  The concern is that in recent years, economic pressures have 
been increasing to a point that can no longer just be addressed by fishers moving to 
larger, more efficient vessels. 
 
The problem facing the industry is determining which management arrangement will 
provide the right incentives for fishers to improve their fishing efficiency and 
marketing efforts in new and innovative ways, so they can collectively tackle the 
ongoing cost-price pressures.  
 
The concern is that the current individual transferable effort (ITE) control system of 
management has restrained the ability of fishers to manage their input costs as 
effectively as they might otherwise been able to under a quota system of management.  
The issue of how much value could be derived from a quota system compared to a pot 
restriction system is one of the questions being addressed in the study presented in the 
related review report. 
 
The Cost-price Squeeze 
 
The profitability of rock lobster fishing is affected by a few key economic and 




1. the prices received for rock lobsters, considering the fluctuations in price from 
season to season and the fluctuations in price within a season; 
2. the catch of rock lobsters, considering the timing of the catch and variation in 
the catch across seasons;  
3. input costs including, 
o fuel costs, 
o bait costs, 
o labour costs, 
o capital costs (namely the cost of boats, debt servicing and the cost of 
replacing or upgrading fishing equipment), and 
o administration and other sundry on-costs. 
 
Like other primary industries, the rock lobster industry has been increasingly 
confronted with rising costs and stagnating or declining prices.  The following is a 
summary of these factors – showing the historical trends and providing some insight 
to the future. 
 
Rock Lobster Prices  
 
More than 95 per cent of rock lobsters caught in Western Australia are exported.  The 
major markets for lobster are in the United States and South-East Asia. This means 
the Western Australian export market is very dependent on the fluctuations in the 
Australian dollar against the US dollar57.   
 
While Western Australia’s lobster fishery is the largest spiny lobster producer, it 
represents less than 10 per cent of world total lobster supply, suggesting that monthly 
(or intra-seasonal) fluctuations in local supply are not likely to have a major impact on 
prices received within a given season, although annual fluctuations (season to season) 
could have some impact.  It is noted that if monthly prices are averaged over 10 years, 
there is about a $2 per kilogram variation from the low price month of December to 
the high priced month of June.  However, there have been much greater fluctuations 
in the average price from year to year with the average annual price fluctuating 
between $36 per kilogram and $20 per kilogram (CPI adjusted) over the last ten years.   
  
As noted earlier, prices for rock lobsters have, over the longer term, been declining in 
real terms. The downward trend in rock lobster prices is even more pronounced if they 
are adjusted to eliminate fluctuations in exchange rate.  Figure 1 below shows the CPI 
adjusted price (termed the real price) of rock lobsters, plotted against the price 
adjusted for exchange rate and the CPI (termed the real trade weighted price).  The 
‘best fit’ trend line (the solid straight line in Figure 1) is down from $32 per kilogram 
in the early 1990s, to about $21 per kilogram now.  The trend line can be considered 
as the price fishers would have received if exchange rates had remained constant at 
their current levels and inflation were taken into account. 
 
                                                 
57 Note that most South-East Asian currencies are pegged to the US dollar, which means they go up and 
down in value as the US dollar fluctuates.  Therefore, export prices are almost solely related to the 




Figure 1: CPI Adjusted Beach Price for Rock Lobsters – With and Without 













































The important point is that the favourable exchange rate movements in 1999 and 2000 
have probably provided a short-term buffer against a decline in the world price for 
rock lobsters (see dotted line in Figure 1).  The major concern now is the Australian 
dollar could remain strong and if this occurs prices are likely to remain low in 
Australian dollar terms.  At the time of writing (December 2005), the Australian 
dollar was valued at US75 cents and the outlook for a strengthening or weakening 
dollar was mixed, with some commentators predicting US80 cents and others 
predicting US68 cents over the next 12 months.  
 
Catch History and Outlook  
 
Catch rates in the Western Rock Lobster Fishery have steadily increased (with 
seasonal fluctuations), although the rate of growth in catch has slowed considerably 
since the late 1970s.  Over the long-term, there are unlikely to be any changes to 
current catch levels of around 11,500 tonnes per annum.   
 
Year to year fluctuations in catch reflect the changing seasonal conditions.  Effort 
levels within the fishery have also impacted on catch with effort reductions in 1992 
and 1994 resulting in reductions in catch in the following season.  However, in each 
case, the fishery has recovered and catch rates have increased slightly beyond those 
prior to the effort reduction.  The reason for increased catches could be twofold, being 
i) better protection of the breeding animals (e.g. the policy of returning breeding 
animals to the water, if caught); and ii) improvements in the effectiveness of fishing 
methods has increased the catch rate per pot.  In the recent modelling exercise 
conducted to compare management options, it was assumed that there is a 1 per cent 




In the short term, a 13 per cent reduction in catch is expected in the 2005-06 season 
and a further 9 per cent reduction in the 2006-07 season. Some recovery in catch is 
expected in 2007-08.  
 
The predicted reductions in catch over the next two years will have a major impact on 
the fishers' bottom line as it is likely to coincide with increased cost-price pressures.  
A reduction in the value of catch will also impact on deckhands’ and skippers’ wages 
because most are paid under revenue sharing arrangements.    
 
Concerns about the status of the fishery’s stock have led to the adoption of further 
effort reduction measures across the fishery.  These effort reduction measures are 
likely to reduce catch further than expected in the next season, although the negative 
impact of effort reduction measures should be dissipated within two years.   
 
Short-term reductions (and increases) in catch have an immediate impact on fishers’ 
profit margins because any corresponding efficiency gains are occurring at a much 
slower rate.   
 
A 10 per cent reduction in catch would have an average impact of about $50,000
in reduced revenue per fisher.  Given that most fishers cannot reduce their fishing
costs in poorer years, this is likely to affect the average profit margin by about the
same amount. 
Input Costs  
 
Operational costs (such as fuel, bait and labour) make up nearly 60 per cent of the 
total costs of ‘an average’ rock lobster fisher with fuel accounting for about 14 per 
cent (net of crew’s contribution and tax), bait 11 per cent and labour 34 per cent of 
costs.  The balance (41 per cent) of costs can be attributed to the servicing of capital 
for boats (assuming depreciation at 5 per cent per annum and the cost of capital at 7 
per cent per annum), administration, insurance, and other non-fishing costs.  These 
figures have been derived from the analysis undertaken in February this year 
(Thomson and Caputi, 200558) with supporting assumptions from the study 
undertaken by Economic Research Associates.   
Fuel 
 
For most fishers, depending on the zone fished and the price of diesel fuel, their 
annual fuel bill is between $40,000 and $60,000 per year, after the government tax 
rebate is returned to the boat owner/operator.   The trend in fuel prices is a worrying 
development for the industry as it attempts to remain profitable.  Prices have 
increased 22 per cent in a 12-month period from December 2004 and 52 per cent over 
a four-year period from February 2001.   
 
 
                                                 
58 Thomson, N., Caputi, N., 2005. An Economic Analysis of Management Options in the Western Rock 
Lobster Fishery of Western Australia., In: Proc of 3rd Bi-Annual Conference of the North American 







Figure 2:  Average Diesel Fuel Prices in the State’s Mid-West Region – Fuel Watch 
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Increasing fuel prices are being driven by the rising demand for fuel in emerging 
economies such as China and India. These same economic drivers are fuelling higher 
wages in the Western Australian mining sector, which potentially add to the labour 
shortage in the rock lobster industry.  Demand is predicted to continue to expand and 
over the longer term there are real concerns about the long-term supply of oil.  Given 
these factors, it is likely that there will be ongoing price pressure on diesel fuel prices.   
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Figure 3:  The Impact of Fuel Prices on Fishers’ Profits 
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Figure 3 demonstrates the likely relationship between fuel prices and profit of rock 
lobster fishers.   
 
For every 10-cent increase in fuel prices, there is about a $4,000 reduction in
profit.  Naturally, some fishers would see greater reductions than this if their
annual fuel bill were more than $50,000 per year. 
Labour 
 
In September 2005, economic analysts BIS Shrapnel predicted average wages growth 
of 6.5 per cent in 2006, which if it occurs, will place enormous pressure on labour 
availability for the 2005-06 season.  This impact is likely to be more pronounced in 
the State’s Mid-West where mining is expanding.  Already, deckhand earnings are 
falling behind average weekly earnings.  If catch is reduced in the 2005-06 season (as 
it is expected to), then this will reduce the earnings of deckhands further, widening the 
gap between average earnings and deckhand earnings.  The industry is concerned with 
its ability to retain labour and predicted catch reductions in the next two years are 
likely to exacerbate the problem.   
 
Under the current revenue sharing arrangements, crew are paid as a percentage of the 
catch which provides a buffer for the owner if the catch is poor (because deckhands’ 
payments will be low) but provides a bonus for deckhands if the catch is good 
(because deckhands’ payments will be high).  However, this buffer comes at the cost 










































Figure 4 shows the fluctuation in average deckhand earnings compared to the average 
Australian weekly earnings rate.  Since 2001, average weekly earnings have been 
higher than the estimated deckhand weekly earnings and the gap is likely to widen in 
2006 (denoted by the dotted lines).  This decline in deckhand earnings is a function of 
the predicted decline in total catch (although prices are assumed to increase by $2 per 
kilogram). 
 
One solution to the declining attractiveness of working in the rock lobster industry 
may be to pay crew a greater proportion of the value of the catch (either as a fixed 
payment or under a revenue sharing arrangement).  But any increase in wages (over 
and above current revenue sharing arrangements) would have a considerable impact 
on the fishers’ profit margin, unless the increase is associated with improved 
efficiencies.   
 
An increase in wages of 6.5 per cent, without a similar increase in revenue would
mean that average profits could decline by about $7,000 (assuming the boat was






It is estimated that fixed costs make up about 41 per cent of fishing costs.  Fixed costs 
include the cost of servicing debt, paying regular expenditure on land-based 
operations and paying for vessels (including depreciation). The estimate is based on 
the assumption that the interest rate on debt is 7 per cent per annum and boats are 
depreciated at a rate of 5 per cent per annum).   
 
Depending on the level of indebtedness, fluctuations in the cost of capital can exert a 
significant effect on fishers’ profit margins.  The prospect of an interest rate rise, of 
say 0.5 percentage points during the 2005-06 season, has been heightened by strong 
wages growth.  
 
If it is assumed that 40 per cent of capital costs are financed, then a 0.5 percentage
point increase in interest rates could represent an additional cost of about $1,000
per boat per year.  Similarly, a 1 percentage point increase in interest rates could
lead to a reduction in average annual profit of less than $2,000.  The impact of
interest rate rises would naturally be much more dramatic if the level of
indebtedness is higher. Note these calculations do not include the cost of financing
pot entitlements if money is borrowed against these. 
Value of Pot Entitlements  
 
The market value of rock lobster unit (pot) entitlements (that are individually 
transferable as a restricted entitlement of fishing effort) has increased considerably 
over the last 15 years (particularly after the pot reduction of 1993), although in the last 
two seasons the sale price of pot entitlements has declined.  This is not surprising, 
given the number of risk factors facing the industry at the present time and the fact 
that the market for rock lobster unit (pot) entitlements reflects the expected future 




Figure 5: Trends in Rock Lobster Pot Prices Since 1990 




































If a new management system increases profits in the industry, then it is likely that the 
value of entitlements (whether they be pots or quota) will increase.  The willingness 
of fishers to pay higher prices for entitlements reflects the expectation of future 
earnings.  So profits drive entitlement values, and not the other way around.   
 
The modelling exercise does not consider the value of entitlements but rather 
measures the likely change in profit without any regard to entitlement values.  This 
approach is sufficient for the purposes of comparing management options because the 
profitability of the industry is the key issue of concern.  Capital gains in entitlements 
will logically follow if profits can be improved through new management methods. 
Fleet Size and Composition  
 
The rock lobster fishing fleet has been steadily declining since the 1960s and by 
December 2004 consisted of 549 operational boats, down from a peak of 836 in 1963.  
The trend of declining boat numbers is likely to continue as the average number of 
pots per boat increases.   It is noted that the trend (as shown in Figure 6) accelerated 
for a short time immediately after the introduction of pot reduction in 1993.  Figure 6 
would also suggest that changes in the catch rates have some impact on the rate at 
which boats are exiting the fleet.  It appears to be reasonable to assume that boat 
numbers will continue to decline in the future, given the ongoing challenges being 
posed by the continuing cost price pressures. 
 
This decline is likely to be accelerated if further pot reductions are introduced or if a 





Figure 6: Fleet Numbers and Catch 
 

















































































Profitability of Industry  
 
The economic outlook for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery appears somewhat 
pessimistic at this stage and this heightens the need for management reform, 
particularly if that reform results in improved efficiency within the fishery.   
 
Presently, the outlook for major cost and revenue parameters are: 
 
• exchange rates, which are likely to remain at their current higher levels; 
• diesel fuel costs, with prices likely to escalate, possibly at a rate above 
inflation; 
• interest rates, where there is some possibility of a modest interest rate rise; 
• labour competition, which is increasing; 
• prices of rock lobsters, which could continue to be negative over the longer 
term – as world lobster production increases; and 
• catch, which is negative in the next two years, particularly in Zones B and C. 
 
In order to make sense of the aggregate impact of changes an index of profitability has 
been estimated over the last 15 years using the following formula.   
 
π =  1 - [(Fuel ($) + Bait ($) + Labour ($) + Boat Capital Costs* 30%59*Interest Rate Charges ($)]
     Revenue (Prices ($/kg) * Catch (kg))  
 
 
                                                 





o π is the aggregate index of industry profitability;  
o all costs (fuel, bait, labour, 40 per cent of estimated boat capital * interest 
charges) and revenues are estimates of nominal aggregate costs and revenues; 
and 
o boat capital costs are scaled to boat numbers over time, assuming average 
inputs per boat remain unchanged. 
 
The index shows costs increasing as a percentage of revenue (by about 2.5 per cent 
per annum) over the last six years and that this will increase further in the 2005-06 
season. This raises concerns that the viability of the industry may be being threatened 
to a much greater extent than has previously been the case. 
 
Figure 7: Aggregate Industry Profitability Index 1999-2000 to 2005-06 
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Figure 7 indicates that in 1999-2000 about 60 per cent of revenue was captured by 
industry as profit (excluding some onshore costs and servicing of pot entitlements). 
But in 2005-06, it is expected that only 47 per cent of revenue will be captured in the 
same way (that is, costs make up over 50 per cent of direct operational revenues). 
 
In 2005-06, there is likely to be a combination of low catches, low prices, possibly 
higher interest rate charges (an assumed 1 per cent increase) and higher fuel prices. 
 
Assumptions for the 2005-06 season are: 
 
• Price $23/kg, up $2/kg from the previous season; 
• Catch 11,500 tonnes, down 2,000 tonnes from the previous season; 
• Fuel prices, $1/litre ex-tax, up 22 cents/litre from the previous season; 
• Bait costs, up 5 per cent from the previous season; 
• Interest rates, up 1 percentage point from the previous season; and 








In economic terms, it would appear that the Western Rock Lobster Fishery is facing 
challenging times as a result of the ongoing and intensifying cost-price squeeze, 
consistent with other primary commodity markets.  This is likely to have a 
considerable long-term impact on the profitability of the fishery, unless industry can 
continuously improve its efficiency or value of its product.  Failure to do so is likely 
to not only harm profit margins but also the capital value of pot entitlements. 
 
The main cost drivers show little sign of easing over the short- or longer term and the 
outlook for rock lobster prices is not optimistic. Even if it is assumed that prices will 
rise to $23/kg in the 2005-06, the season is likely to have lower profits than in the last 
few seasons.  Neither does it appear that the industry can rely on its good fortune in 
the late 90s and early 2000s, when the Australian dollar moved in a favourable 
direction for exporters. 
 
The industry is also facing challenges with its labour arrangements. The historical 
method of sharing revenue with fishers is placing fishing labour in an increasingly 
unattractive position while mining and tourism flourish in the key fishing areas, 
thereby drawing down the labour pool for the rock lobster industry. 
 
If industry wishes to maintain or improve its current rate of return, it needs to find a 
management system that allows it to restructure input costs.  Similarly, it needs to 
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A description on the main management rules (Table A) and assumptions (Table B) used in the economic modelling. 
 
Table A. 
A description of the management arrangements used to model the management options that were assessed and compared in the review of the 
Western Rock Lobster Fishery (from Appendix 11 in A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the West Coast Rock Lobster 
Fishery.  Economic Research Associates report prepared for the Department of Fisheries on behalf of Rock Lobster Industry Advisory 
Committee. December 2005.) 
 
Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery 
Management controls Current ITE  Modified ITE  ITQ – effort 
controlled 
ITQ  
1. Spatial – boundaries Cape Leeuwin to NW Cape 
Four Fishing Zones (A, B, C) 
and Big Bank1. 
 
No Change 
Three Zones60 (A, B & C)  
No Change 
Three Zones² (A, B & C) 
No Change 
Three Zones² (A, B & C) 
2. Temporal – opening and 
closing times 
Seasonal Controls: 
15 November-30June (Zones 
B & C) 
15 March-30 June (Zone A) 
Zone A authorisations are 
entitled to fish in Zone B up 
until 14 March. 
Big Bank¹ 10 Feb-last day of 
Extended Season 
15 November -31 August 
(Zones B & C) 
15 March-31August (Zone A) 
Zone A authorisations are 
entitled to fish in Zone B up 
until 14 March. 
No Big Bank. 
Extended Season 
15 November-31 August 
(Zones B & C) 
15 March-31August (Zone A) 
Zone A authorisations are 
entitled to fish in Zone B up 
until 14 March. 
No Big Bank. 
Extended Season 
15 November-31 August 
(Zones B & C) 
15 Mar-31Aug (Zone A) 
Zone A authorisations are 
entitled to fish in Zone B 
up until 14 March. 
No Big Bank. 
                                                 
1 Big Bank is incorporated into Zone B for modelling purposes, as it is a minor subset of Zone B. In the Department’s judgment, this is not likely to impact materially on the 
outputs from the modelling. Under the existing management rules, Big Bank operates in the following way: A Zone fishers can fish in Zone B up until 14 March, when they 
must go to the Abrolhos Islands.  A and B Zone fishers who nominate to fish the Big Bank from 10 February must remain in Big Bank until midday on the last day of 
February of the season.  Big Bank then becomes part of the B Zone fishery and any Zone A or B fisher can go there or leave it as they please. 
2 Big Bank is incorporated into Zone B. 
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Alternative Management Options for the Western Rock Lobster Fishery 






3. Access Transferable zone specific 
WRL Managed Fishery 
Licence (MFL) attached to a 
Fishing Boat Licence (FBL). 




Right of renewal. 
 
Minimum Unit Entitlement 




More than one WRL MFL can 
be attached to an FBL3 but 
only one MFL entitlement can 




Minimum Unit Entitlement 




More than one WRL MFL can 
be attached to an FBL3 but 
only one MFL entitlement can 




Minimum catch quota 
entitlement equivalent to a 45-




More than one WRL 
MFL can be attached to 
an FBL3 but only one 
MFL entitlement can be 




Minimum catch quota 
entitlement equivalent to 










Individually transferable Unit 




Individual maximum Gear 










Replaced by catch quota/pot 
for season, but maximum 











No maximum pot usage. 
Fishers can use as many 
pots as they like. 
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Pot size and volume restricted 
and escape gaps remain the 
same. 
 
Pot setting and retrievals 





With a maximum number of 
pot/fishing day entitlements in 
each zone endorsed on the 
MFL i.e. Zones B & C-185 
pot/ fishing days;  Zone A-90 
pot/fishing days. 
 
No allowance for ‘dud’ days. 
 
Two-day and more pulls are 
to be treated as one-day pulls. 
 
No carry forward of 
pot/fishing day credits, i.e. an 
individual fisher’s maximum 
pot numbers deemed to be 



























50 per cent increase in pot 
























Pot design freedom up to 
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Minimum size limits. 
77mm carapace (15 Nov-31 
Jan). 
 
76 mm carapace (1Feb-30 
Jun). 
 
Maximum size limits for 
female. 
115 mm carapace south of 30° 
South. 
 
105 mm carapace north of 30°  
South. 
 






























































Not Applicable. Not Applicable. Annual Total Allowable 
Commercial Catch (TACC), 




in-year-out’ TACC for each 
Zone, i.e. Zone A-1,600 
Annual Total Allowable 
Commercial Catch 





for each Zone, i.e. Zone 
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tonnes, Zone B-3,600 tonnes, 
Zone C-4,800 tonnes  
 
Note: Zone C may need to be 
kicked-in at a lower figure if 
the introduction of annual 
catch quotas coincided with 






2.A conservatively set variable 
annual TACC based on 
predicted (puerulus) 
sustainable catch levels for 
each of Zones A, B and C.   
 
 
Zone A authorisation will 
have a catch quota in Zone B 
that can be fished until 15 
A-1,600 tonnes, Zone B-
3,600 tonnes, Zone C-
4,800 tonnes  
 
Note: Zone C may need 
to be kicked-in at a lower 
figure if the introduction 
of annual catch quotas 
coincided with predicted 




2.A conservatively set 
variable annual TACC 
based on predicted 
(puerulus) sustainable 
catch levels for each of 
Zones A, B and C. 
 
Zone A authorisations 
will have a catch quota in 
Zone B that can be fished 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 Zone A quota to be calculated using their share/proportion of the catch (based on the number of pots held on the MFL) taken in Zone B during the period 15 November to 
14 March.  The proportion of catch thus calculated to be used for all future quota calculations.  
5 Zone A quota to be calculated using their share/proportion of the catch (based on the number of pots held on the MFL) taken in Zone B during the period 15 November to 
14 March.  The proportion of catch thus calculated to be used for all future quota calculations. Zone A fishers are to be able to take their quota of catch in Zone B at any time 
of the season. 
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Annual Catch quotas (kg) by 
zone endorsed on individual  
MFLs. 
in Zone B at any time of 
the season.5  
 
Individual Transferable 
catch Quotas (ITQ)(kgs) 
by zone endorsed on 
individual MFLs. 
7. Satellite Vessel Monitoring 
System (VMS) 
VMS assumed to be 
operational6




Individual transferable pot 
entitlements are not 
transferable between Zones B 
& C but are transferable 
within these two zones. 
 
Individual pot entitlements are 
transferable between Zones A 
& B.  Current policy requires 
that there must be a 100 per 
 
Individual residual pot/fishing 
day entitlements would not be 
transferable between zones 
but transferable within zones 
between fishers during the 
season, but within a maximum 
gear usage constraint. 
 
 
Individual residual catch 
quota/pot would not be 
transferable between zones but 




Individual catch quota to 
be fully transferable 
within zones and within 
seasons. 
                                                 
6 No decision has been made to introduce VMS under the current management regime but for the purposes of this evaluation it has been assumed that VMS is operational. 
62 Unrestricted transferability of pot entitlements between Zones A & B was reviewed by Department of Fisheries and RLIAC during the course of this evaluation because of 
concerns about the transfer of effort between Zone A and B going beyond historic levels.  The policy adopted is to only allow transfers of pots from A Zone to B Zone and 
vice versa if there is an equal transfer in the other direction. 
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Management controls Current ITE  Modified ITE  ITQ – effort 
controlled 
ITQ  






9. Cost Recovery 
 
Department of Fisheries cost 
of management, research, 
compliance and enforcement 
recovered in accordance with 












10. Processing  -Licensed processing 
establishments 
-Licensing of lobster 
processing for Australian 
domestic market is not 
restricted 
- Licensing of lobster 
processing for export is 








No restrictions on export 








No restrictions on export 








No restrictions on export 
processing licence 
                                                 
63 Continuation of this restriction on competition is conditional on satisfying the NCP ‘public interest’ test.  There is currently an initiative to remove the restriction on the 
number of WRL export processing licences. 
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Management controls Current ITE  Modified ITE  ITQ – effort 
controlled 
ITQ  





Key Differences in the Features of the Alternative Management Options Modelled (from Table 3.2 in A Bio-Economic Evaluation of Management Options for the West Coast 
Rock Lobster Fishery.  Economic Research Associates report prepared for the Department of Fisheries on behalf of Rock Lobster Industry Advisory Committee. December 
2005.) 
 
Input Controlled Regimes Quotas with Pots Controlled Quota Controlled 

























Zones Scenario Code           1 1c 2 3a 3b 3c 3d 4a 4b 4c 4d




$  - 
 




















Extra Costs ¹ $  - $5,000 $7,200 $7,200 $7,200       $7,200 $7,200 $2,200 $2,200 $2,200 $2,200


























































Rush to Fish Yes Yes Yes No No No No No No No No 
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Effort Creep 1 per 
cent 




































































1 per cent 
 




















































Whites Quota No No No No Yes  Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Zone 
A Reds Quota No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Whites Quota No No No No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes  
Zone B Reds Quota No No No No No No No No No No No 
Whites Quota No No No No No No No No No No No Zone 
C Reds Quota No No No No No No No No No No No 
Notes: ¹ Extended season increases firm cost by $7,200; ITQ’s reduces firm cost by $5,000; and pot reduction increases firm cost by $5,000. 
            ² Variable TACC= (50 per cent of ‘predicted’ current year catch for Scenario 1+ 50 per cent of the 10-year average catch for Scenario 1) 






Quota and Pot Transfers Under an Effort Controlled ITQ 
System 
If it were decided to move to ITQs with controls on effort (pot numbers), a clear set of 
business rules for quota/pot transfers would be developed with stakeholders.  
Transfers of quota and pots (buying, selling, leasing) could initially be done prior to 
the season but, as the system evolved, transfers within season could also be 
considered.  However, there are some complex issues that would have to be carefully 
thought through before any system was implemented.  The most important would be 
to decide in what way quota and pot usage should be linked, as one of the implicit 
aims of this system is to maintain control on the level of fishing effort (at least 
initially).  Some examples of how quota transfers could work under this system are 
provided below. 
No quota transfers within season 
As already mentioned, not allowing quota transfers during season would be a simple 
and perhaps first step in implementing an ITQ system with controls on pot numbers.  
However, industry would be likely to find such a system restrictive and there would 
be fishers with individual circumstances that arose during the season (e.g. health, 
accident, death, family, hardship, etc) who would need to be considered. 
Transferring quota within season – Example 1 
This example does not allow a fisher to use any more pots than he has at the start of 
the season.  If a fisher wanted extra quota he could purchase it or lease it during the 
season and he would use the number of pots on his licence at the start of the season to 
catch it.  For example if a fisher had 110 pots and he had 6,000 kg of quota left at the 
end of March and he purchased or leased an additional 4,000 kg, he would only be 
able to use his 110 pots to catch the 10,000kg by the end of the season. 
Transferring quota within season – Example 2 
In this example, a fisher would be able to use additional pots if he purchased or leased 
additional quota.  This is a flexible system from the point of view of transferring 
quota, but it would be a very complex system to administer.  It would be necessary to 
evolve the system to this degree of flexibility over a period of time (several years). 
Quota transfers 
• If a fisher had an initial ITQ for the season of 129.6 kg per unit and he had 110 
units, his total ITQ for the season would be 14,256 kg.  If he was allowed to 
use all his units to fish, he could have 110 pots in the water. 
• If he had already caught 8,256 kg (say by the end of March) and he wanted to 
transfer some of his quota and he didn’t want to continue fishing, he could 
transfer his 110 pots with 6,000 kg of quota attached (14,256kg – 8,256kg = 
6,000kg) to another fisher, or if he just wanted to fish less, he could transfer 
55 pots with 3,000 kg of quota, leaving 55 pots and 3,000 kg of quota for 
himself to fish. 
• If he decided he wanted to have additional quota, then using the same example 
above, if he had 6,000kg of quota left and he purchased 40 pots with 2,000 kg 
of quota attached from another fisher, then his quota for the remainder of the 





In the example above in which a fisher has purchased an additional 40 pots with 
2,000kg of quota to add to the remainder of his quota (110 pots with 6,000 kg of 
quota), he would have to fish his quota in the following way: 
• he would use 150 pots to catch 4,000 kg of quota; 
• and then he would have to revert to using 110 pots to catch his remaining 
4,000 kg. 
A sophisticated real time register would be needed to keep track of transfers and the 
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